272 



AK.MY. 



I !in regular tuc.ics iu'rodiiced. reqiuvd a more 

 U;oroii'ii training' ; the individual \v;is lost more and 

 more in tin' mass, and .standing armies were at length 

 cuhlishcd, inn! rose continually in rstinialion. Much 

 MM done to improve the new system by Henry IV. 

 of France, as well as liy the republic of the Nether- 

 lands, in tlirir .struggle for liberty ugainst Spain. 

 The nuiulKT of troops- organi/cd in tl,i> way still re- 

 mained, however, very small, compared with the 

 others. Henry l\'., prince Maurice of Nassau, niid 

 All \..nder, duke of I'anna, did much tor the im- 

 provement of tactics, and of the art of besieging, 

 which made on at progress in tlie war aho\c-men- 

 tioned, and contributed, in no small decree, lo ad- 

 vance the rlmracter of armies. Still more important, 

 in ilie.>e respects, was the thirty years' war in Ger- 

 many. Armies, as yet, consisted, for the most part, 

 of soldiers raised by the general, to serve only during 

 a particular war, e. g. Wallensicin's troops; but the 

 time of service having much increased, particularly 

 in the wars of Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden, the 

 character of armies and tactics was much elevated. 

 This Ling established smaller divisions, introduced 

 lighter weapons, and made many improvements in 

 the artillery, by which quicker and more complicated 

 movements became practicable. Repeated victories 

 proved the advantages of the new system, which even 

 tt'allenstein acknowledged. Soon after, under Louis 

 XIV., the whole system of war received another form 

 by means of the minister of war le Tellier. and his 

 son and successor Louvois, the art of tactics being 

 particularly improved by Turenne and other contem- 

 porary great generals. Standing armies attained an 

 extent hitherto unexampled. Instead of the 14,000 

 men maintained by Henry IV., Louis XIV., idler 

 the peace of Nimeguen, had on foot an army of 

 140,000 men. France had set the example, and 

 all the other powers of Europe followed, with tin- 

 exception of England and Holland, which, for 

 a long time, opposed a similar augmentation, re- 

 garding standing armies as dangerous to freedom. 

 These great masses must necessarily have exert- 

 ed an important influence upon the art of war. 

 This art was practised upon a continually increasing' 

 scale. France was, at the same time, endeavouring, 

 in every way, to secure her boundaries by the erec- 

 tion of new fortifications, and her military engineers 

 were particularly eminent. In the beginning of the 

 18th century, a new and important epoch commenced 

 in the military system. Not only did Russia, in the 

 time of Peter the Great, maintain a large standing 

 army, well disciplined in the European manner, 

 which afterwards, under the empress Anna, in its 

 internal regulation, also, was made to resemble the 

 armies of the other European states ; but Prussia, 

 too, came forward, under Frederic William I., as a 

 respectable military power, and supported an army 

 far exceeding a proper proportion to her population ; 

 hence she was induced to set the example of foreign 

 levies, in which originated the inconvenience, that, 

 in the hour of danger, a large part of the army could 

 not be depended on, and, moreover, it was difficult to 

 maintain discipline over this same portion, consisting 

 of the refuse of foreign nations. The native soldiers, 

 too, were corrupted by the contact, and it was found 

 necessary to reduce the army to a machine, in order 

 to make such materials serviceable. This idea was 

 put in execution by Frederic II. The system of 

 standing troops was carried to an extent such as it 

 had never reached, and Prussian tactics became a 

 pattern for all the other states of Europe. The sys- 

 U-in, however, had fatal imperfections, which would 

 necessarily produce very injurious consequences. 

 The great number of foreign vagabonds enlisted, led 

 \o tiie introduction of a degrading discipline, which 



made the condition of the soldier?, completely misera- 

 ble. Kvery prospect of advancement and all ambi- 

 tion were destroyed by the exclusive promotion of 

 1 1 Ilice rs taken from the ranks of the nobility ; und 

 even their promotion was determined by length of 

 service (a natural consequence of the long peace, 

 which had existed since the seven years' war). This 

 system seemed, indeid, to i.a\e been carried to its 

 height, when the French revolution broke out with a 

 violence which shook Europe lo its foundation. 

 Standing armies had now become bodies imvin little 

 connexion with the nations by which they were 

 maintained. They only were armed ; the nation had 

 become altogether defenceless. \\ hen the army was 

 beaten, the nation was subdued. At the same time, 

 the armies had been so much increased beyond all 

 proportion to the wealth of the states, that they must 

 necessarily remain, in a great measure, useless. They 

 had become mere machines, without any moral in 

 centive. What was the necessary consequence, 

 when, as then happened in France, a people excited 

 to fury commenced a struggle with these antiquati d 

 and rusty engines? A new mode of carryin on 

 war, produced by ti:c pressure of circumsUinc.es, and 

 by the rapid, bold, and energetic efforts of young 

 military geniuses, overturned multitudes of common 

 forms, and carried victory in its train, until the op- 

 posing powers had learned to make it their model, 

 and thereby restored the equilibrium. When the 

 French ruler ultimately began to use his army more 

 and more as a machine for the promotion of his am- 

 bitious designs, then the other European powers. 

 taught by experience, railed the nations themselves 

 to arms, in behalf of freedom ; and it was demon- 

 strated anew, that no excellence of discipline, no 

 mechanical perfection of an army, can enable it to 

 withstand, for any length of time, moral energy and 

 excitement, though connected witl; far inferior disci- 

 pline The armies on the continent of Europe are 

 raised, at present, from among the citizens, who arc 

 bound to serve for some time, and are then assigned 

 to the class reserved for any sudden emergency. The 

 time of service is various ; in France, tor instance, 

 six years; in Prussia, three, that is, in time of peace. 

 In Britain and North America, no citizen is obliged 

 to serve in the standing army, but only in the militia, 

 which is destined merely for the defence of the coun- 

 try. (See Militia and Soldier.) The organisation of 

 armies is nearly alike throughout the continent of 

 Europe ; and France, Prussia, Austria, and Russia 

 have paid much attention to the perfection of all 

 classes of troops. The military schools of these 

 countries, for the officers of different rank, as well as 

 for the various kinds of troops, particularly those of 

 France and Pnissia, are excellent. Among the 

 Prussian troops, learning is so universally cultivated, 

 that the army is considered as a great institution for 

 the diffusion of knowledge, because every Prussian 

 serves three years w : thout being able to send a sub- 

 stitute, and in each regiment schools for the privates 

 are kept. In respect to these military schools, as 

 well as to internal organization, the armies of the 

 European continent very much surpass the IJritish, 

 in which the practice of selling commissions, the ex- 

 pense of the half-pay system, the non-promotion oi 

 privates, the still continued use of tents, the degrad- 

 ing flogging, &c., remind one of a continental army 

 such as ft was fifty years ago. In the army of the 

 United States, commissions are not sold, and the half- 

 pay system has not been adopted. Napoleon in- 

 creased the size of armies to a degree before unex- 

 ampled. They are distinguished, according to the 

 purposes for which they are destined, by the names 

 of blockading armies, armies ff obtervation, of reserve t 

 &c. 



