278 



ARNOLD. 



altered his manner and language. He affected to 

 have forgotten the affront of the reprimand, and 

 pretended lo feel a more lively attachment tlutn ever 

 to the cause of independence. The country through 

 which the 1 liaison flows was the principal theatre of 

 \he war. A station in this quarter would, he thought, 

 best answer his purpose. He was well acquainted 

 with the localities. He examined, with minute 

 attention, in what spot, by wliat operations, he could 

 most beneficially second the enterprises of the British, 

 ind which was the most important position to betray 

 into their hands. New York, was, at this time, in 

 the hands of the British, who had assembled there 

 the greatest part of their troops. The fortress of 

 West point, a military station of very great impor- 

 tance, is distant twenty leagues from this city. Ar- 

 nold aimed at the chief command of this post, with a 

 view of betraying it into the hands of the British, 

 with the garrisons, and the arms, and immense stores 

 which were deposited there ; for fort Clinton con- 

 tained, besides the ammunition necessary for its own 

 defence, the stock of powder of the whole army. 

 The command of the fort had been intrusted to 

 general Howe, an officer of tried courage, but of 

 limited capacity, who could be employed elsewhere 

 without inconvenience to the service. The wounds 

 of Arnold did not as yet allow him to mount on 

 horseback ; they did not disqualify him, however, for 

 conducting the defence of a citadel. He had early 

 secured the patronage of some of the leading men of 

 the state of New York, and Washington was prevailed 

 upon to consign West point to him. Being a traitor 

 to his own country, he was apprehensive lest those 

 to whom he was about to sell himself might prove 

 treacherous to him. He felt anxious to receive the 

 price of his ignominious bargain at the moment of its 

 ratification ; out he could extort nothing more than 

 a promise of 30,000 pounds sterling, and the assurance 

 that he should be maintained in the British army, in 

 the rank of brigadier-general, which he already held. 

 About a month previous (July 10, 1780), the first 

 division of the French army arrived at Newport, in 

 the state of Rhode Island. The situation of the 

 English became every day more and more critical. 

 Sir Henry Clinton had relinquished his projected 

 expedition. He urged Arnold to fulfill his engage- 

 ments, and supposed the thing easy for a general who 

 was master of the forts and the river ; but there 

 were, in fact, numerous obstacles in the way, and of 

 these the presence of the commander-in-chief was the 

 most serious. Arnold knew his vigilance and activity. 

 He insisted, therefore, with Clinton, on the necessity 

 of deliberation, adding however, that all should be in 

 readiness to improve the first favourable opportunity. 

 A young officer ot foreign extraction served in the 

 British army. He was endowed with all the qualities 

 which render a man useful to his country and dear to 

 society. This was JOHN ANDRE, adjutant general of 

 the British army. General Sir Henry Clinton had 

 taken him as his aid-de-camp, and did not disdain 

 him as a counsellor. To him Clinton committed the 

 business of negotiating with Arnold. A correspon- 

 dence ensued between Arnold and Andre, under the 

 supposititious names of Gvstavus and Anderson. 

 Mercantile relations were feigned, to disguise the 

 real object, and an American, whose dwelling stood 

 between the lines that separated the two armies, 

 served as a common messenger. At this period, the 

 rumour began to spread of a second division of the 

 French army having sailed, and that Washington 

 only awaited its arrival to begin the siege of New 

 York. The marshal de Castries, who then adminis- 

 tered the department of the marine with so much 

 reputation, had, in fact, advised the French envoy of 

 the approaching departure of a second expedition. 



Clinton caused Arnold to be told that it was time to 

 act ; that a day must 1>e fixed for the surrender of 

 the forts ; and that, if time were given to the allies 

 to effect a junction, it might no longer be in the 

 power of Arnold himself to fulfill his engagements. 

 He asked, also, plans of the forts, ami the instructions 

 necessary for the safe guidance of the British troops 

 when they were sent to take possession of West 

 point. Arnold replied to these new importunities in 

 the language concerted with Andre : " Our master 

 goes away on the 17th of tin's month. I le will be ab- 

 sent five or six days. Let us avail ourselves of this 

 interval to arrange our business. Come immediately, 

 and meet me at the lines, and we will settle definitive- 

 ly the risks and profits of the copartnership. All will 

 be ready; but this interview is indispensable, and 

 must precede the sailing of our ship." It was thus 

 that Arnold apprized Cfinton of the approaching de- 

 parture of the commander-in-chief. Washington 

 had, in fact, given a rendezvous to count de Rocham- 

 beau, generaF of the French land-forces, and to the 

 chevalier de Ternay, commander of the squadron. 

 They were to meet at Hartford, in Connecticut, to 

 confer about the operations of this and the ensuing 

 campaigns. But Arnold was not correctly advised 

 as to the period of Washington's departure, and the 

 mistake led to important consequences. He had, in 

 other letters, solicited an interview with Andre, and 

 he now exacted it as a condition indispensable for the 

 prosecution of the enterprise. Hitherto, every thing 

 had succeeded beyond his hopes. There had been 

 a total absence of those mysterious rumours, and 

 vague surmises, which accompany and seem to por- 

 tend, a great conspiracy. Never had to momentous 

 a plot been more felicitously brought so near to its 

 execution. This profound secrecy was owing to the 

 precaution of Arnold, in not having unbosomed him- 

 self to any of his own countrymen, and in admitting 

 only Andre and Robinson as correspondents. He 

 took credit for this policy, and his urgency for an in- 

 terview with Andre arose chiefly from his resolution 

 to confide to the hands of this officer alone, the maps 

 and particular information which Clinton demanded. 

 The 17th of September, the day specified for the, 

 departure of Washington, passed, and lie was still at 

 West point. Arnold advertised Clinton of the delay, 

 and explained his mistake by mentioning a circum- 

 stance which had not been before noted. The 17th 

 fell on a Sunday, a day which the Americans con- 

 secrated entirely to the duties of religion, and on 

 which most of them abstained even from journeys, 

 which, elsewhere, would be thought indispensable. 

 Clinton admitted this explanation the more readily 

 as he knew that Washington respected the scruples 

 of others, and was himself very religious. To obviate 

 untoward accidents, it was agreed that Andre should 

 leave New York only on the 19th of September, and 

 reach the American forts about the 20th. He ac- 

 cordingly embarked in the night on board the Vulture 

 sloop of war. Clinton sent with him Beverley Robin- 

 son, the colonel through whom Arnold had made his 

 first overture. He expected that the prudence ot 

 this officer would moderate the ardour of Andre. 

 Moreover, Arnold occupied Robinson's house, and the 

 private aflairs, which he, as a refugee, had to adjust 

 with congress, furnished a plausible pretence for his 

 approaching the American lines and posts. Septem- 

 ber 20, they arrived almost opposite to fort Montgom- 

 ery, situated on the same side as West point, five 

 miles lower down. They cast anchor in sight of the 

 nearest American redoubts, but beyond the reach of 

 some small cannon, the only artillery of those re- 

 doubts. The Vulture got aground at low water. 

 The movement on board, and some signals which she 

 made, alarmed the vigilance of colonel Livingston, 



