38 



CAPITAL CAPITAL PUNISHMENT. 



thing having been collected in the capitals, and the 

 provinces having Ivcn almost stripped of picture-, 

 libraries, \c. In many countries, this fault is ac- 

 knowledged, and a return to a more equitable systei a 

 is perceptible. The great increase of wealth and 

 consequence, which the capitals of large empires in 

 Europe liave acquired in modern times, by the intro- 

 duction of the bureau system (q. v.), which has 

 brought together, in one place, the different depart- 

 ments of administration, lias had much intliience on 

 military operations, having made the capture of the 

 capital now far more important than formerly. In 

 the United States, the word capital is not used offi- 

 cially, but, instead of it, the plirase seat of govern- 

 ment, which is, in most cases, not the largest place 

 of the state. It is not here the place to discuss, 

 whether it would be more beneficial to the whole 

 country if the seat of the general government were 

 in one of the largest cities of the United States. As 

 it is now, to use the words of a traveller, " Wash- 

 iiigton must by no means be considered as the capital 

 of i lie nation, but only as the capital of governmental 

 business. It is a camp of business." 



CAPITAL, in architecture. See Architecture. 



CAPITAL OFFENCE. See Crime. 



CAPITAL PUNISHMENT. The questions most 

 commonly discussed by philosophers and jurists un- 

 der this head are, 1. as to the right of governments 

 to inflict the punishment of death ; 2. as to the ex- 

 pediency of such punishment ; 3. as to the crimes to 

 which, if any, it may be most properly confined and li- 

 mited ; 4. as to the manner in which it should be inflict- 

 ed. A few words will be said on each of these points. 



1. As to the right of inflicting the punishment of 

 death. This has been doubted by some distinguished 

 persons ; and the doubt is often the accompaniment 

 of a highly cultivated mind, inclined to the indul- 

 gence of a romantic sensibility, and believing in hu- 

 man perfectibility. The right of society to punish 

 offences against its safety and good order will scarcely 

 be doubted by any considerate person. In a state of 

 nature, individuals have a right to guard themselves 

 from injury, and to repel all aggressions by a force 

 or precaution adequate to the object. This results 

 from the right of self-preservation. If a person at- 

 tempts to take away my life, I have, doubtless, a 

 right to protect myself against the attempt by all 

 reasonable means. If I cannot secure myself but by 

 taking the life of the assailant, I have a right to take 

 it. It would othenvise follow, that I must submit 

 to a wrong, and lose my life, rather than preserve it 

 by the means adequate to maintain it. It cannot, 

 then, be denied that, in a state of nature, men may 

 repel force by force, and may even justly take away 

 life, if necessary to preserve their own. When men 

 enter society, the right to protect themselves from 

 injury and to redress wrongs is transferred, generally, 

 from the individuals to the community. We say that 

 it is generally so, because it must be obvious that, in 

 many cases, the natural right of self-defence must 

 remain. If a robber attacks one on the highway, 

 or attempts to murder him, it is clear that he has a 

 right to repel the assault, and to take the life of the 

 assailant, if necessary for his safety ; since society, in 

 such a case, could not afford him any adequate and 

 prompt redress. The necessity of instant relief, and 

 of instant application of force, justifies the act, and 

 is recognized in all civilized communities. When 

 the right of society is once admitted to punish for 

 offences, it seems difficult to assign any limits to the 

 exercise of that right, short of what the exigencies 

 of society require. If a state have a right to protect 

 itself and its citizens in the enjoyment of its privileges 

 and its peace, it must have a right to apply means 

 adequate to this object. The object of human punish 



ments is, or may be threefold ; first, to reform the 

 olleiiilt-r; secondly, to deter others from offending : 

 and, lastly, to secure the safety of the community, 

 by depriving the offender of the power of doing mis- 

 chief. The first consideration rarely enters into hu- 

 man legislation, because of the inadequacy of our 

 means to produce great moral results by the infliction 

 of punislunent. The two latter considerations enter 

 largely into the theory and practice of legislation. 

 Who is to be the judge, in such cases, what is the. 

 adequate punishment for any offence ? Certainly, 

 punishments ought not to be inflicted, which ;ire 

 utterly disproportionate to the offence, and beyond 

 the exigencies of society. No government 1ms \\ 

 right to punish cruelly and wantonly, and from mere 

 revenge; but, still the discretion must be vested 

 somewhere, to say what sliall be the degree of pun- 

 ishment to be assigned to a particular offence, 'i I ml. 

 discretion must be, from its nature, justly a part of 

 the legislative power, and to be exercised according 

 to the actual state of society. It may, nay, it must. 

 be differently exercised in different ages, and in dif- 

 ferent countries ; for the same punislunent which, in 

 one age or country, may be sufficient to suppress an 

 offence, or render it comparatively liarmless, may, in 

 another age or country, wholly fail of the effect. If 

 mild punishments rail of effect, more severe must be 

 resorted to, if the offence be of a nature which affects 

 society in its vital principles, or safety, or interests. 

 The very frequency of a crime must often furnish a 

 very strong ground for severe punislunent, not only 

 as it furnishes proof that the present punishment is 

 insufficient to deter men from committing it, but from 

 the increased necessity of protecting society against 

 dangerous crimes. But it is often said, that life is 

 the gift of God, and therefore it cannot justly be 

 taken away, either by the party himself, or another. 

 If he cannot take it away, he cannot confer that power 

 on others. But the fallacy of this argument is obvi- 

 ous. Life is no more the gift of God than other per- 

 sonal endowments or rights. A man has, by the gift of 

 God, a right to personal liberty and locomotion, as 

 well as to life ; to eat and drink and breathe at large, 

 as well as to exist ; yet no one doubts that, by way 

 of punishment, he may be confined in a solitary cell ; 

 that he may be perpetually imprisoned or deprived o^ 

 free air, or compelled to live on bread and vater. In 

 short, no one doubts that he may be restrained in the 

 exercise of any privileges or natural rights short of 

 taking his life. Yet the reasoning, if worth any 

 thing, extends to all these cases in an equal degree. 

 If, by his crimes, a man may justly forfeit his person- 

 al rights, why not his life ? But we have seen that 

 it is hot true, even in a state of nature, that a man's 

 life may not be taken away by another, if the neces- 

 sity of the case requires it. Why, then, may not so- 

 ciety do the same, if its own safety requires it ? Is 

 the safety of one person more important than the safe- 

 ty of the whole community ? Then, again, as to a 

 man's inability to confer on others a right which he 

 does not himself possess. Suppose it is so ; the con- 

 sequence which is deduced from this does not, in fact, 

 arise. Blackstone, indeed, in his Commentaries (4 

 Comment. 8), seems to deduce the right of society to 

 punish capital offences, in certain cases (that is, in 

 cases of mala prohibita, and not mala in se), from the 

 consent of the offenders. The marquis Beccaria, on 

 the other hand, denies that any such consent can con- 

 fer the right, and therefore objects to its existence. 

 But the notion of consent is;- in nearly all cases, a 

 mere theory, having no foundation in fact. .If a fo- 

 reigner comes into a country, and commits a crime 

 at nis first entrance, it is a very forced construction 

 to say that he consents to be bound by its laws. If 

 a pirate commits piracy, it is almost absurd to say 



