278 



FRANCE. (BEFORE THE REVOLUTION.) 



until the revolution of 1830; for it was not the 

 power and consolidation of the crown, but the re- 

 establishment of the same aristocratic privileges, 

 which had precipitated France into such a state of 

 confusion and suffering in 1789, that agitated her 

 until the final expulsion of the Bourbons. The 

 third estate, as it existed before the revolution of 

 1 789, comprised the most different classes of citizens, 

 from the poorest peasants and the humblest artisans, 

 to the wealthiest merchants and the most distin- 

 guished scholars. To this class also belonged, as 

 tar as their social connexions were concerned, the 

 new noblesse, who had acquired titles from the pos- 

 session of office, but were despised by the old nobility 

 as upstarts and intruders. This circumstance was a 

 double source of complaint to the nation. The 

 whole weight of the taxes fell upon the lower classes 

 with such an inconceivable severity, increased by the 

 insolence, and frequently by the cruelty of the lords 

 of the soil and their officers, by the abuses of a 

 corrupt and arbitrary administration of justice, and, 

 on the part of the government, by a system of taxa- 

 tion equally corrupt, arbitrary, and preposterous, 

 that general impoverishment and suffering were the 

 necessary consequences; thence came the bitter- 

 ness and fury, with which the peasants in many 

 places, and the lower class in the cities, fell upon 

 their nobles and those in power, when the signal of 

 opposition was raised. In the second place, the 

 higher class of the third estate were, in point of in- 

 formation and wealth, superior to a great part of the 

 old nobility ; and yet the latter endeavoured to 

 maintain an aristocracy, the basis of which had long 

 since been lost. Talents and riches always demand 

 the highest stations in society, and where they are 

 denied them a change will follow, unless the system 

 is supported by mere force. Necker was considered 

 the only man who could save the state, at the time 

 that the administration of the finances was conferred 

 upon him ; yet the title of minister, and a seat and 

 voice in the privy council, which were indispensable 

 for his station, were long denied him, because he 

 was not of noble descent. Government knew the 

 causes of the evil only in part ; the court was in- 

 fected with all the prejudices of the aristocracy, and 

 the power of the king was not sufficiently great, 

 even when right measures were adopted, to carry 

 them into effect, in opposition to the court nobility 

 and the aristocratic parliaments. 



Constitution of the State. Just before the revolu- 

 tion, whole volumes were written on the question 

 whether France had a constitution, or whether the 

 power of the sovereign was absolute. One of the 

 most important works on this subject, Maximes du 

 Droit public Francais, Brussels, 1775, 2 vols. 4to, 

 by Aubry, Mey, and Maultrot, is in reality only a 

 learned argument against the absolute power of the 

 king, and in favour of the right of parliament to refuse 

 registering the decrees of the king until they had sa- 

 tisfied themselves of their legality, or, at least, the 

 right to make remonstrances against them before 

 their publication. The authors prove this from the 

 Bible, the fathers of the church, and the most ap- 

 proved theologians of modern times, and, what is of 

 more consequence, from the practice of the govern- 

 ment. Madame dc Stael devoted to this question a 

 whole chapter of her Considerations on the French 

 Revolution ; and while the ministers, such as Ca- 

 lonne, denied any constitutional limitations of the 

 regal power, the privileged classes, with the parlia- 

 ments, were- the more zealous in maintaining their 

 existence. Monthion, chancellor of the count 

 d'Artois, refuted Calonne's assertions as late as 1796, 

 in a work published in London Rapport d Sa Maj. 

 Louis XVIII. But at the same time that it is not 



to be denied, that the constitution of France, in the 

 earliest times, was based on those free principles 

 which were common to all the German tribes; that 

 at a later period the feudal system contained some 

 faint traces of them ; and that the states-general, 

 even in the reign of Henry IV., had, at least, an 

 undisputed right of granting taxes ; yet, on the other 

 hand, it is certain, that the constitutional institu- 

 tions of France did not form an organized whole, liut 

 only disconnected and jarring fragments, the relics 

 of different ages, destitute of all practical force. All 

 the limitations of absolute power which existed (in 

 theory rather than in fact) in the French constitution 

 of that period, were wanting in the first requisites of 

 justice and stability ; they were not intended to pro- 

 mote the general welfare, but were merely in favour 

 of certain classes, who formed a very small portion 

 of the whole nation ; hence the importance, which 

 had been sometimes ascribed to them, was entirely 

 imaginary. They were besides wanting in every 

 thing which could give them a beneficial influence. 

 They impeded the operations of government, without 

 restraining its abuses. On the contrary, by throw- 

 ing obstacles in the way of the regular action of the 

 administration, they often rendered the irregu- 

 lar exercise of power necessary. All branches 

 of government, the executive, legislative, and judi- 

 cial, were so confusedly entangled, that neither could 

 acquire its free action ; and yet there were so many 

 insulated points, that all unity of government was 

 destroyed, and the exertions of the best intentioned 

 ministers were rendered ineffectual. 



A. In the constitution of the estates, the provin- 

 cial states, which existed in some of the provinces, 

 must be distinguished from the states- general of the 

 realm. The former originated in the times when 

 the great feudal princes in France were almost as 

 independent as the princes of the German empire ; 

 and they were preserved in Artois, Burgundy, Beam, 

 Brittany, and Languedoc, when those fiefs were 

 united to the crown. They were composed of the 

 clergy, nobility, and cities ; but they had no power, 

 except to distribute the taxes in the province, and 

 to determine how they should be raised. This gave 

 rise to different systems of taxation in different pro- 

 vinces, which not only increased tlie expenses of the 

 administration, but were also attended with many 

 other disadvantages. This diversity in the, financial 

 administration of the provinces was the chief cause 

 that the ruinous internal customs (traitcs) , and the 

 threefold division of France by douanes (into 1. the 

 provinces des cinq grosses fermes ; 2. reputees etran- 

 geres ; and 3. traitees comme eirangcres), were main- 

 tained, notwithstanding all tiie exertions of Colbert 

 and his successors. Of the gabelle (salt tax) we shall 

 have occasion to speak hereafter. The other pro- 

 vinces also had estates in the earlier times, but they 

 soon fell into disuse. Their abolition is perhaps 

 chiefly owing to the appointment by Charles V. (in 

 1373) of two deputies of the states in each episcopal 

 see, to distribute the taxes, and to settle all disputes 

 relating to them. This arrangement was gradually 

 changed ; the deputies (elus) were erected into 

 boards of taxation, which were established in each 

 bailiwic ; and that part of France, which had pro- 

 vincial estates, was divided into 181 elections. But 

 on the establishment of these boards, the right of 

 election was taken from the estates, and the mem- 

 bers of the elections, from whose decisions an appeal 

 lay to the cours des aides (higher boards of taxation), 

 were appointed by the king. In all other matters, 

 the provincial administration was conducted wholly 

 by the royal intendants. Their powers were finally 

 settled by Richelieu, in 1637. France was divided 

 into thirty-two generalites, at the head of each of 



