JURY JUS. 



239 



charged, they find their verdict according to the 

 proofs, ami the court inflict only the moderated pun- 

 ishment. And any other course would be flagrant 

 injustice. But a jury cannot, upon a trial for one 

 offi-nce, find a man guilty of another offence, not of 

 the nature of the one charged ; for instance, upon a 

 charge of murder, they cannot find him guilty of 

 forgery; but if he is charged with stealing two 

 watches, they may find him guilty of stealing only 

 one. 12. It is also objected, that juries often favour 

 criminals. But this is not generally true, except to 

 the extent that the law favours them. There may be 

 ca^cs of a popular cast, or of an odious nature, where 

 juries have occasionally shown improper biases for 

 the accused; but this objection applies to all tri- 

 bunals, ami is founded on numan infirmity generally. 

 Juries do not, even in cases of this sort, often depart 

 from their duty; and the exceptions are so few, that 

 they are seldom felt or urged in free governments. 

 13. But an objection the most pressed by those who 

 are not practically acquainted with the trial by jury, 

 is, that unanimity is required in pronouncing a ver- 

 dict of acquittal or condemnation. It is true, that no 

 verdict can be received in England which has not the 

 assent of all the twelve jurors; and there are no 

 means of compelling an assent ; and yet, practically 

 speaking, few cases of disagreement occur, except 

 where there is a solid foundation for real doubts and 

 difficulties. Unanimity is more common than, at 

 first view, might be suspected. In the first place, 

 the jury reason with each other upon all doubtful 

 points, and if they at first differ, the differences are 

 often removed by further discussion. Pride of opinion 

 is not enlisted on either side, and sometimes each 

 recedes from the first limits of his own opinion. In 

 the next place, the differences of opinion are more 

 often upon inferences and conclusions from known 

 facts than upon the fhcts themselves ; and more often 

 upon doubts as to the proper application of the law 

 to those facts ; and still more often upon mere colla- 

 teral questions, where there is no common standard of 

 measure, as in assessing damages. In criminal cases, 

 fewer difficulties ordinarily arise than in civil cases, 

 because doubts weigh favourably for the accused, 

 and often produce an acquittal. But, after all, there 

 is not probably one in twenty cases, tried by a jury, 

 in which there is a final disagreement; and it is by 

 no means sure, that a decision could be had more just 

 or fair by requiring a majority, or any other number, 

 than by requiring unanimity. The jurors might then 

 be equally divided, or the struggles of the minority 

 to prevent a verdict might be equally violent. Most 

 trials give rise to differences on several points ; and, 

 in such cases, the unanimity of a majority, in a general 

 verdict, must be produced in the same manner as 

 unanimity in the whole jury. But the best answer to 

 the objection is , that experience is in favour of requiring 

 unanimity of the whole jury. No practical evil has, 

 as yet, been felt from the rule. And it is no small 

 recommendation of it, that it gives a satisfaction and 

 confidence to the public mind, in England and Ame- 

 rica, that the decision of a mere majority could scarcely 

 ever give. If unanimity is less easily obtained in 

 France, that proves nothing as to the value of the 

 principle elsewhere. The failure may be from the 

 novelty of the trial in France, or from the habits and 

 character of the people, oc from the imperfect com- 

 prehension of the duties of the judges and the jury. 



Most of the remarks above made refer especially 

 to juries of trial in criminal cases ; but they are, in 

 a great degree, applicable to civil cases also. It 

 remains only to add, that the other preliminary guards, 

 interposed by the common law in criminal cases, are 

 of inestimable value to every citizen. He cannot be 

 accused, nor be brought to trial, unless upon an 



indictment found by a grand jury. He is thus saved 

 from prosecutions founded in malice, hatred, political 

 opposition, personal feeling, and popular prejudice. 

 The government cannot touch him ; the people can- 

 not make him the victim of their jealousy or suspi- 

 cion. A grand jury of incorruptible and impartial 

 men, who are his equals, must first accuse him, upon 

 the hearing of legal proofs and sworn witnesses, before 

 he can be called to answer for any offence. Twelve 

 men, good and true, (probi et legates homines), must 

 concur in the indictment ; and twelve more must 

 concur upon his trial, in asserting his guilt, before he 

 can be punished. When his guilt is ascertained, the 

 punishment rests, not in the discretion of the king, 

 or of the government, or any mere executive officer; 

 it is to be declared by the judges, before whom lie 

 has been tried, or in the same court, according to 

 Jaws previously passed, and regulating the nature 

 and extent of the punishment. It is not too much, 

 then, to affirm that the trial by jury is justly the 

 boast of England and America; and we may hope that, 

 by the goodness of Providence, it may be perpetual. 



JURY-MAST; a temporary or occasional mast 

 erected in a ship in the place of one that has been 

 carried away by tempest, battle, &c. Jury-masts are 

 sometimes erected in a new ship, to navigate her 

 down a river, or to a neighbouring port, where her 

 proper masts are prepared for her. 



JUS (Latin) signifies 1. that which is right or con- 

 formable to law ; also the obligation which the law 

 imposes ; 2. a body of laws, decrees, and usages ; 3. 

 a man's privileges, singly or collectively; 4. the place 

 where justice is administered ; 5. the power which 

 originates from the law. Hence the word is of very 

 frequent use in law. 



Jus divimtm is that which is ordered by a revela- 

 tion, in contradistinction to that which is ordered by 

 reason ; but as the rig At must be one and the same, 

 it is evident that the distinction exists only in the 

 form, and not in the essence, because that which is 

 ordered by our reason is to be referred to God, as its 

 origin, equally with that which is decreed by revela- 

 tion. A law may have both a human and a divine 

 origin; for instance, " Thou shalt not kill." This 

 rule may be adopted because it is ordered in the 

 decalogue, or because it is the dictate of reason, 

 and is established by most nations, unacquainted with 

 the decalogue. The division, however, is rather 

 antiquated, and the philosophical la wyer will refer all 

 law to a common origin. See Thomasius, DeJure Div. 



Jus Italicum signified the lowest degree of privi- 

 leges enjoyed by cities under the Romans. 



Jus Latii, or jus Latinum, denoted the privileges 

 granted by the Romans to the inhabitants of Latium, 

 according to the various significations of the word. 

 (See Latium.) It held a rank between the jus Itali- 

 cum and tile, jus Romamtm. | 



Jus Quiritium (civitas optima lege, optima jure) ; 

 the fullest enjoyment of Roman citizenship, the pri- 

 vilege and obligations of Roman freeborn citizens, 

 including in the flourishing times of the common- 

 wealth, 1. public privileges libertas (security of 

 personal liberty, militia (participation in the service 

 of the legions, census (registration on the list of 

 property: see Census), jus tribus (the incorporation 

 in a tribe), jus suffragiorum (the jus Quiritium in a 

 narrower sense, the right of suffrage), jus honor -urn 

 (participation in public honours), jus sacrornm 

 (participation in religious celebrations, sacra publica 

 and privata) 2. private privileges jusgcntititatiset 

 agnationis (the privilege o! family and clan ; e. g. 

 successio and tittela agnatoruni, jits legitimi dmninii 

 (the privilege of lawful property), jus connubiorum 

 (privilege of lawful marriage), jus patrium (unlimited 

 power over the persons and property of real or 



