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LAW, LEGISLATION, CODES. 



natural and fair interpretation of them. In short, 

 the spirit, and the mtson are derived principally 

 from examining the whole text, and not a single 

 passage ; from a close survey of all the other means 

 of interpretation, and not from mere private reason- 

 ing as to what a wise or beneficent legislature might 

 or might not intend. Cases, indeed, may readily be 

 put, which are so extreme, that it would be difficult 

 to believe that any rational legislature could intend 

 what their words are capable of including. But 

 these cases furnish little ground for practical rea- 

 soning, and are exactly ot that class, where, from 

 the "generality of the words, they are capable of 

 contraction or extension, according to the real ob- 

 jects of the legislature. These objects once ascer- 

 tained, the difficulty vanishes. This natural, and 

 sometimes necessary limitation upon the use of words 

 in a law, we often call construing them by their 

 equity. In reality, nothing more is meant, than that 

 they are construed in their mildest, and not in their 

 harshest sense, it being open to adopt either. 9. For 

 the same purpose, in the common law, regard is 

 often had to antecedent and subsequent statutes 

 upon the same subject; for being in pari mate- 

 ria, it is natural to suppose, that the legislature 

 had them all in their view in the last enactment, 

 and that the sense which best harmonizes with the 

 whole, is the true sense. 10. For the like reason 

 words and phrases in a statute, the meaning of which 

 has been ascertained (especially in a statute on the 

 same subject), are, when used in a subsequent statute, 

 presumed to be used in the same sense, unless some- 

 thing occurs in it to repel the presumption. 11. As 

 a corollary from the two last rules, it is a maxim of 

 the common law, that all the statutes upon the same 

 subject, or having the same object, are to be construed 

 together as one statute ; and then every part is to be 

 taken into consideration. 12. Another rule is, to 

 construe a statute as a whole, so as, if possible, or as 

 nearly as possible, to give effect, and reasonable 

 effect, to every clause, sentence, provision, and even 

 word. Nothing is to be rejected, as void, superfluous, 

 or insignificant, if a proper place and use can be 

 assigned to it. 13. If a reservation in a statute be 

 utterly repugnant to the purview of it, the reservation 

 is to be rejected ; if the preamble and the enacting 

 clauses are different, the latter are to be followed. 

 But the reservation may qualify the purview, if con- 

 sistent with it, and the preamble control the general- 

 ity of expression of the enacting clauses, if it gives 

 a complete and satisfactory exposition of the apparent 

 legislative intention. 14. The common law is also 

 regarded, as it stood antecedently to the statute, not 

 only to explain terms, but to point out the nature of 

 the mischief, and the nature of the remedy, and thus 

 to furnish a guide to assist in the interpretation. In 

 all cases of a doubtful nature, the common law will 

 prevail, and the statute not be construed to repeal it. 

 15. Hence, where a remedy is given by statute for a 

 particular case, it is not construed to extend so as to 

 alter the common law in other cases. 16. Remedial 

 statutes are construed liberally; that is, the words are 

 construed in their largest sense, so far as the context 

 permits, and the mischief to be provided against 

 justifies. By remedial statutes, we understand those 

 whose object is to redress grievances, and injuries to 

 persons, or personal rights and property, in civil cases. 

 Thus, statutes made to suppress frauds, to prevent 

 nuisances, to secure the enjoyment of private rights, 

 are deemed remedial. 17. So statutes are to be con- 

 strued liberally which concern the public good ; such 

 as statutes for the advancement of learning, for the 

 maintenance of religion, for the support of the poor, 

 for the institution of charities. 18. The general rule 

 is, that the sovereign or government is not included 



within the purview of the general words of a statute, 

 unless named. Thus, a statute respecting all persons 

 generally, is understood not to include the king. He 

 must be specially named. But, nevertheless, in 

 statutes made for the public good, which are con- 

 strued liberally, the king, although not named, is 

 often included by implication. 19. On the Other 

 hand, penal statutes, and statutes for the punishment 

 of crimes, are always construed strictly. The words 

 are construed most favourably for the citizens and 

 subjects. If they admit of two senses, each of which 

 may well satisfy the intention of the legislature, that 

 construction is always adopted which is most lenient. 

 No case is ever punishable, which is not completely 

 within the words of the statute, whatever may be its 

 enormity. No language is ever strained to impute 

 guilt. If the words are doubtful, that is a defence to 

 the accused ; and he is entitled, in such a case, to 

 the most narrow exposition of the terms. This rule 

 pervades the whole criminal jurisprudence of the 

 common law, and is never departed from under any 

 circumstances. It is the great leading principle of 

 that jurisprudence, that men are not to be entangled 

 in the guilt of crimes upon ambiguous expressions. 

 But it is not to be understood, that the statute is to 

 be construed so as to evade its fair operation. It is 

 to have a reasonable exposition, according to its 

 terms ; and, though penal, it is not to be. deemed 

 odious. 20. Private statutes, also, generally receive 

 a strict construction ; for they are passed at the sug- 

 gestion of the party interested, and are supposed to 

 use his language. 21. Statutes conferring a new 

 jurisdiction, and, especially, a summary jurisdiction 

 contrary to the general course of the common law, 

 are construed strictly. They are deemed to be in 

 derogation of the common rights and liberties of the 

 people under the common law, and are on that ac- 

 count jealously expounded. There are many other 

 rules, of a more special character, for the construc- 

 tion of statutes, which the extreme solicitude of the 

 common law to introduce certainty, and to limit the 

 discretion of judges, has incorporated into maxims. 

 But they are too numerous to be dwelt upon in this 

 place. They all, however, point to one great object 

 certainty and uniformity of interpretation ; and no 

 court would now be bold enough, or rash enough, to 

 gainsay or discredit them. On the contrary, it is the 

 pride of our judicial tribunals constantly to resort 10 

 them for the purpose of regulating the necessary 

 exercise of discretion in construing new enactments. 

 The legislative power of a government is generally 

 co-extensive with its sovereignty ; and therefore em- 

 braces every thing which respects the concerns of 

 the society. But it is in fact employed, if not uni- 

 versally, at least generally, in mere acts of amend 

 ment and supplement to the existing laws and 

 institutions. Its office is ordinarily not so much to 

 create systems of laws, as to supply defects, and cure 

 mischiefs in the systems already existing. The ques- 

 tion is often discussed in our day, how far it is prac- 

 ticable to give a complete system of positive law, or 

 a complete code of direct legislation. And, if prac- 

 ticable, the farther question arises, how far it is 

 desirable, or founded in sound policy. These ques- 

 tions have been the subject of ardent controversy 

 among the civilians and jurists of the continent of 

 Europe, living under the civil law ; and, as may well 

 be supposed, different sides have been taken by men 

 of distinguished ability and learning ; and the con- 

 troversy is, and probably for a long period will be, 

 pursued with great animation and powers of reason- 

 ing. In the countries governed by the common law, 

 and especially in England and America, the same 

 questions have been matter of wide discussion among 

 the legal profession, as well as among statesmen, and 



