NATURAL LAW. 



145 



all domestic ties between parents and children. On 

 the other hand, a very restricted allowance of divorces 

 has a natural tendency to preserve peace and concord 

 in families, by perpetuating a common interest, and 

 encouraging mutual forbearance and affection. By 

 denying, except for extraordinary reasons, the right 

 of divorce, we discourage, in a proportionate degree, 

 the desire, as well as the means of accomplishing it. 

 Christianity has confined the right of divorce to the 

 single case of adultery ; though the law of nature 

 may perhaps be thought to justify some few other 

 exceptions. 4. We next come to the duties of man 

 as a member of political society. And, here, we shall 

 briefly treat of certain rights and duties, which may 

 arise from the law of nature independent of any 

 organization into political societies, but which more 

 naturally find a place here, because they constitute 

 the principal grounds for such organization. Thus 

 the right of property, the obligation of contracts, the 

 duty of speaking the truth, the sanctity of oaths, with 

 other corresponding duties, strictly speaking, may be 

 perfect in a mere state of nature, without the recog- 

 nition of any fixed society ; for they may exist and 

 have a necessary application independent of such 

 society. But their value and importance are far 

 more felt, and far better provided for, in political 

 society, and, therefore, properly belong to the pre- 

 sent head. 



1. The origin of political society The origin of 



political society may be traced back to the primitive 

 establishment of families. From the union of a 

 number of related families grew up tribes ; and from 

 tribes gradually grew up colonies and nations. Ac- 

 cidental associations for offence or defence may, in 

 some instances, have introduced the first elements of 

 fixed society between strangers ; and a sense of 

 mutual interest and mutual dependence may have 

 rendered them permanent. Coeval with the estab- 

 lishment of civil societies was the origin of civil 

 government. Parents, from necessity as well as from 

 prudence, exercised, and were admitted rightfully to 

 exercise, immediate authority and government over 

 their children and families. The patriarch or chief 

 of a tribe, in like manner, exercised authority over 

 those, who were of his blood and lineage. And, 

 silently, the powers of rule or government were either 

 divided as convenience or accident dictated, or were 

 retained by the head, as the common bond of the 

 union of the whole. Sometimes, indeed, government 

 did or might arise from military associations for 

 plunder or protection. And in such cases the 

 strongest, the most intelligent, and the most enter- 

 prising and valiant, were the most likely, in the first 

 instance, to be intrusted with the highest powers. 

 The necessity, in all such cases, of prompt submission 

 and obedience, in order to accomplish the immediate 

 objects in view, furnished a sufficient excuse, if not 

 just reason, for intrusting the leaders with summary 

 and despotic authority. 



2. Governments, then, may be properly deemed to 

 arise from voluntary consent, or from long acquies- 

 cence and prescription, or from superior force. The 

 fundamental objects of all civil governments are, or 

 ought to be, to promote the welfare and safety of the 

 whole society. It is obvious, that no single individual 

 can protect himself to the same extent, or by the 

 same means, as an organized society or government 

 can protect him. The latter has the powers, authority, 

 union, and resources of numbers. Men enter, then, 

 into civil societies for the protection of their persons, 

 and personal rights and property. In a state of 

 nature, if either be invaded, the only redress is by 

 the application of positive force by the individual 

 who is injured. But under the establishment of civil 

 governments, the redress is taken from the individual, 



and is administered by the government itself through 

 its own functionaries, and according to its regulations, 

 and by the authority and force of numbers. The 

 entering into civil society, therefore, necessarily, or, 

 at least, naturally, induces the surrender of all those 

 private rights, which are indispensable for the good 

 order, peace, and safety of the whole society. And, 

 indeed, unless some surrender of powers and rights 

 were made, there could be no such thing as a regular 

 government, since each person would be at liberty to 

 do as he pleased, and there could be no such thing as 

 lawful authority on one side to give a rule, or, on the 

 other side, any duty of obedience. Civil government, 

 then, may be properly said to consist in the exercise 

 of such delegated powers, as are proper or necessary 

 for the safety, protection, and happiness of the whole 

 community. And civil liberty may be said to consist 

 in not being restrained by any laws, which are not 

 conducive to the public welfare. We sometimes see 

 governments existing, in which these objects are but 

 imperfectly obtained, and ask ourselves, why they 

 are not changed. There are several reasons, which 

 may help us to a just understanding of the facts, and 

 enable us satisfactorily to solve the inquiry, how it 

 should happen, that governments should fail of attain- 

 ing the very objects, on which they are founded, and 

 yet be supported by the acquiescence of the people. 

 In the first place, in every government, there are 

 many persons, who obey from mere prejudice, or the 

 habit of obedience, and from an inherent indisposition 

 to contemplate any thing otherwise than as it at 

 present exists. They do not stop to consider, whether 

 it can be made better or not. They are content, from 

 a vis inertia, to let things remain as they are. In the 

 next place, those whose obedience is governed by 

 reason, are often persuaded to obedience by the con- 

 sciousness of their own inability to procure suitable 

 changes; by the dread of civil commotions ; by doubts 

 as to the method of curing existing evils ; and by the 

 persuasion, that in many instances the form of 

 government has become so interwoven with the 

 habits and institutions of the people, that as much 

 mischief as good might be done by a change. In 

 the next place, in every government, many persons 

 have a direct and positive interest in preserving the 

 government as it is, and even in perpetuating its very 

 corruptions. They may be a favoured class, enjoy- 

 ing peculiar privileges, ranks, or patronage; they 

 may have their whole property and importance in- 

 volved in the existence of the present state of things. 

 In the next place, the actual moral and intellectual 

 power, and even physical power, of the state in its 

 present organization, may be so combined in the 

 structure of the government, that they may present 

 insuperable barriers to any change. If, for instance, 

 the whole of the privileged classes should happen to 

 be the only educated persons in the nation ; if the 

 whole priesthood should depend upon the govern- 

 ment for its influence and support, and its exclusive 

 patronage and privileges ; if the whole wealth of the 

 community should be lodged in few hands, and those 

 few should be the very heads of the government ; if 

 the military power should be so organized, that it 

 could scarcely find the means, or possess the power, 

 to act except under the existing arrangements ; in 

 any, and in all of these cases, it is easy to perceive, 

 that there would be immense difficulties in introduc- 

 ing any fundamental and salutary change. It could 

 scarcely take place but upon some general convul- 

 sion, which should break asunder all the common 

 ties of society. But it may be asked, as civil govern- 

 ment is formed by the whole people, whether it can 

 ever be justly altered, except by the will of the 

 whole. If by the will of the whole be meant the 

 will of each individual singly, it may be answered in 



