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NATURAL LAW. 



the affirmative ; for by entering into society, men 

 necessarily engage to be governed by the will of the 

 majority, since unanimity in all matters of civil polity 

 is impracticable. The will of the majority or the 

 will of the minority must govern. If the latter, by a 

 veto, can stop all measures, the majority are govern- 

 ed by them. All reasoning and all principle, there- 

 fore, unavoidably lead to the result, that the will of 

 the majority must be deemed the will of the whole 

 for all practical purposes ; and as the interests of 

 the whole society require this, it is binding on every 

 part of it. 



3. The origin of property. One of the great 

 objects of political society is the protection of pro- 

 perty ; and many learned discussions have taken 

 place as to the origin and nature of property. Some 

 things are of common and universal use by all man- 

 kind, and to such use all mankind have an equal 

 right. Such, generally speaking, are (as we have 

 seen) air, water, and light. Other things belong, 

 exclusively, to one or more persons, and no others 

 have a right to intermeddle with, possess, or enjoy 

 them. Such an exclusive right in things is called 

 property. How did such a right originate ? It is 

 plain, that, in a mere state of nature, no man could 

 insist, that he possessed any such exclusive right to 

 things in general ; for, if one possessed it, all would 

 equally possess it, which would be the same as to 

 affirm its non-existence. The earth, and its various 

 fruits, herbage, and trees; the various inferior animals, 

 such as birds, fishes, and beasts, either for food, or 

 covering, or pleasure, or labour, seem alike to belong 

 to all mankind, and are for the use of all. To a 

 limited extent, possession and use of a thing must, 

 indeed, confer a temporary or permanent ownership. 

 If, for instance, a man stands or lies on a particular 

 spot of ground, during the time of such occupation, 

 he must have the exclusive right of occupation, for it 

 is indispensable for his immediate use, and no other 

 person can show a better right to it. So if he gathers 

 fruit, for the purpose of eating it, no other person can 

 have a better right to eat it than himself; and he 

 must, therefore, have an exclusive right, because it 

 is necessary to the use. But if he does not hold the 

 fruit to eat it at present, but lays it aside for future 

 consumption, his right to the exclusive use of it is 

 not so clear ; it is somewhat more remote ; it does 

 not turn upon immediate possession, and immediate 

 use. It may be said, that he has, by his labour, 

 gathered it, and therefore he has a superior title to 

 it. But, though his labour is his own, it does not 

 follow, that, because he bestows it upon another 

 thing, he thereby acquires any exclusive ownership in 

 that thing. It may be extremely inconvenient, and, 

 perhaps, even injurious to the common claims of 

 others, that he should so bestow his labour upon it. 

 They are not, therefore, bound to respect any claim 

 founded upon such labour. Some persons found the 

 right of property upon a presumed or tacit consent 

 of all mankind, which is a mere theory, and wholly un- 

 supported by any universal facts. Others found it upon 

 mere occupancy; but that, at most, gives only a 

 present and temporary right, during such occupancy. 

 Others, again, found it upon the very equality of all 

 mankind, and contend that, as God has given all 

 things for the use and necessities of all, each may 

 appropriate to himself whatever is proper to satisfy 

 those necessities. But, even here, he must leave 

 sufficient to satisfy the necessities of others ; and they 

 may take, of the stores so appropriated, enough to sup- 

 ply their own necessities. The truth, however, seems 

 to be, that, in a State of nature, each man actually ap- 

 propriates to himself whatever he desires, and can 

 get ; and he then holds it by the title of the strongest ; 

 and no other person respects his title any longer than 



it can be so maintained, though no one can show a 

 better title to it. As soon as families are formed, the 

 necessity of providing for their own mutual comforts 

 and wants, gradually leads them to hoard up and 

 appropriate food, and other things for future use. 

 The convenience, and, sometimes, the necessity of an 

 interchange of commodities with other families, of 

 which each has a superfluity, leads to an increased 

 accumulation. Possession and power are the guar- 

 dians of these gathered stores; and a sense of conve- 

 nience and mutual interest induces every family to 

 regard with respect the commodities in possession of 

 the other. Thus the first rudiments of exclusive 

 property begin in the fact of actual possession and 

 power, and the title gains strength and permanence 

 from a sense of the beneficial results to the in- 

 terests of all the neighbourhood, and, ultimately, to 

 the whole society, with which each family and tribe 

 are connected. The advantages of the admission of 

 such an exclusive right are soon felt by all reflecting 

 minds, and gradually prepare the way for a more 

 solemn recognition of it. It is perceived, that its 

 tendency is to increase the products of the earth, by 

 creating inducements to plant, when the planter is 

 secured in his exclusive right to the harvest. It also 

 improves the comforts and conveniences of life, and 

 introduces a fit distribution of labour ; and it cuts off 

 a great source of perpetual contest and warfare among 

 those, who would, otherwise, be struggling for the 

 common prize. In the ordinary course of things, 

 movables, such as fruits, and flocks, and herds, and 

 fishes, first become property. Land rarely becomes 

 permanent property until a much later period in the 

 history of nations. 



4. But, whatever may be the origin of the right to 

 property, it is very certain, that, as it is now recognis- 

 ed and enforced, it is a creature of civil government. 

 Whatever right a man may have to property, it. does 

 not follow, that he has a right to transfer that right to 

 another, or to transmit it, at his decease, to his chil- 

 dren or heirs. The nature and extent of his owner- 

 ship ; the modes in which he may dispose of it ; the 

 course of descent, and distribution of it upon his 

 death ; and the remedies for the redress of any viola- 

 tion of it, are, in a great measure, if not altogether, 

 the result of the positive institutions of society. Ac- 

 cordingly, we find that, in different nations, all these 

 subjects are regulated in very different manners. 

 In some nations, all the children inherit the property, 

 upon the death of the ancestor; in others, the eldest 

 son only. In some, there is power to dispose of the 

 whole, or of a part only, by will and testament ; in 

 others, this power has been denied. In some, the 

 duration of the right of property is perpetual ; in 

 others, it is limited. In some, it may be alienated at 

 all times, and in perpetuity ; in others, the power of 

 alienation is restrained. In some, long possession 

 confers title , in others, it confers none. Above all, 

 the capacity to dispose of property is variously re- 

 gulated by civil institutions. 1 1 is obvious, that idiots, 

 and madmen, and infants, ought not to be allowed to 

 dispose of property, since they have no rational dis- 

 cretion. But at what period of life shall a man be 

 deemed to possess such discretion ? At ten, or 

 twenty, or thirty years of age ? Shall it equally 

 apply, at all times, to both sexes, under all changes 

 of condition? In all nations, some peculiar regula- 

 tions have been adopted to settle these questions, 

 which, by the law of nature, it would not be easy to 

 settle by any uniform and fixed rule. The power of 

 disposing of property is sometimes allowed at eigh- 

 teen, sometimes at twenty-one, sometimes at twenty- 

 five, and sometimes at thirty years of age. It is 

 sometimes permitted to married women, but it is 

 more commonly denied to them. Who can say, 



