SCEPTICISM SCHAFFIIAUSEN. 



115 



philosophers, called sceptics, were also called Pyr- 

 rhonists, from Pyrrho of Elis ; also Aporetici, i. e 

 doubters; Ephectici, that is, abstaining (from judg- 

 ing). Pyrrho (born 384 A. D.) was a man wli 

 aim, according to Diogenes Laertius, was upright- 

 ness of life, unconcerned about philosophical specu- 

 lation, which, as then pursued, was not favourable 

 to integrity. He wrote nothing himself; but some 

 information respecting him is contained in the ex- 

 tant fragments of the writings of Timon of Phlius 

 in Achaia. He is represented as truly virtuous, 

 hostile to all pride of opinion, and not esteeming 

 mankind very highly. In fact, his scepticism was 

 essentially different from that of a later period. 



Ten topics of argument were used in the school 

 of the sceptics, with this reservation, that nothing 

 could be positively asserted concerning either the 

 number or force of the arguments which may be 

 urged in favour of uncertainty. 1. That on account of 

 the variety which takes place in the organization of 

 different animal bodies, it is probable that the same 

 external objects present different images to different 

 animals, and man can have no reason for asserting 

 that his perceptions are more conformable to the 

 real nature of tilings than those of inferior animals. 



2. That even among men, there is a great diversity 

 both of mind and body, which necessarily occasions 

 a great variety of opinions: every man judging ac- 

 cording to his particular apprehension, whilst no 

 one is able to determine the real nature of things. 



3. That the different senses give different reports 

 of the same thing ; whence bodies may have differ- 

 ent properties from those which the senses lead us 

 to suppose. 4. That the same thing appears differ- 

 ently, according to the different dispositions or cir- 

 cumstances of the person who perceives it ; whence 

 it is impossible for any one man to pronounce that 

 his judgment concerning any object is agreeable to 

 nature. 5. That things assume a different aspect, 

 according to their distance, position, or place ; and 

 no reason can be assigned why one of these aspects 

 should agree with the real object, rather than the 

 rest. 6. That no object offers itself to the senses, 

 which is not so connected and mixed with others, 

 that it cannot be distinctly separated and examined. 

 7. That objects of sense appear exceedingly differ- 

 ent, when viewed in a compound and in a decom- 

 posed state ; and it is impossible to say, which ap- 

 pearance most truly expresses their real nature. 8. 

 That every object being always viewed in its relation 

 to others, it is impossible to determine what it is sim- 

 ply in its own nature. 9. That our judgment is lia- 

 ble to uncertainty, from the circumstance of fre- 

 quent or rare occurrence; that which happens every 

 day appearing to us in a very different light from 

 that in which the same thing would appear if it were 

 new. 10. That mankind are continually led into 

 different conceptions concerning the same thing 

 through the influence of custom, law, fabulous tales 

 and established opinions. On all these accounts, 

 every human judgment is liable to uncertainty; 

 and we can only say, concerning any thing, that it 

 seems to be, not that it is what it seems. 



Besides these topics, the later sceptics made use 

 of some others. They maintained that every pro- 

 position requires some prior proposition to support 

 it in infinitum, or supposes some axiom which cannot 

 be proved, and is therefore taken for granted with- 

 out demonstration, that is, may be denied ; that, in 

 argument, the point assumed, and that which is to 

 be proved, may often be alternately used in each 

 other's place, both being equally uncertain: and, 



lastly, that nothing can be understood by itself, as 

 appears from the endless disputes of philosophers 

 concerning the nature of things ; nor by means of 

 something else, whilst itself remains unknown. An 

 avoidance of all settled opinion on subjects o 

 knowledge (i-^), and a consequent tranquillity 

 (araaa^icc) amid all the changes of life, were the be- 

 ginning and end of this system. 



Sextus Empiricus, towards the end of the second 

 cer.tury, carried out the system of scepticism with 

 rare erudition and acuteness, and separated the rea- 

 soning of the sceptics from the negative dogmatism 

 of the later academy (see Plato} ; and to him we 

 are indebted for our knowledge of scientific scep- 

 ticism in its maturity. Of modern sceptics, we 

 may mention Francis Sanchez (born 1562, at Bra- 

 cara, in Portugal, died 1632) ; Francis de la Mothe 

 le Vayer (born 1586, died 1672; Sorbiere and 

 Foucher were his disciples ; he declared his belief 

 in revealed knowledge) ; Peter Daniel Huet (born 

 1630, died 1721); Jos. Glanvill (died 1680) ; and 

 Peter Bayle (born 1647), a man of great acuteness, 

 and the celebrated Hume (born 1711). (See Hume.) 

 A limited scepticism was recently taught by G. E. 

 Schulze, of which the chief maxim is, that the ori- 

 gin of our knowledge is inexplicable. See History 

 and Spirit of Scepticism, &c., by Staudlin (Leipsic, 

 1794 95, 2 vols.). It is highly necessary to dis- 

 tinguish between that puerile doubting which dis- 

 qualifies for forming a decided opinion in individual 

 cases, and that scepticism which, in science, is op- 

 posed to dogmatism, and is indispensable to keep 

 the mind within due bounds in its eternal striving 

 for a solution of the great riddle of existence, and for 

 a correct understanding of intellect, reality, and the 

 power which pervades and upholds all existence. 



SCEPTRE (from sceptrum, ffx^vT^nv,}, originally 

 a staff, the emblem of sovereign power. Some say 

 that it was only a lance, without the metal point, 

 to indicate the continuance of supreme power in 

 time of peace ; but in some cases it may have ori- 

 ginated from the simple staff with many tribes the 

 emblem of old age and wisdom. The baton, the 

 short sceptre, has always remained a sign of dis- 

 tinction ; as in the case of the marshals. In the 

 Greek assemblies, a person who wished to speak 

 received a sceptre from the herald; and the judges 

 also bore it while in the exercise of their authority. 

 Kings swore by the sceptre. By degrees it became 

 the emblem of power alone. Through the Unman 

 emperors it passed to the Western monarchs. The 

 sceptre and ball now form the two most important 

 emblems of royal and imperial power. 



SCHAFFHAUSEN ; one of the smallest of the 

 twenty-two cantons of Switzerland, in the northern 

 part of which it lies, on the right bank of the Rhine, 

 nearly surrounded by Baden, and separated by the 

 Rhine from the cantons of Zurich and Thurgau, on 

 the south. Its superficial extent is 115 square 

 miles ; population, 28,050, in seven towns and 

 ihirty five villages, all reformed (Calvinists), except 

 210 Catholics. (See Switzerland.} The capital 

 of the same name, on the right bank of the Rhine, 

 las a population of 7000 souls. Lon. 8 37' E. ; 

 at. 47 43' N. It has a castle, a college (collegium 

 kumanitatis), with nine professors, a gymnasium, a 

 own library, theological library, town hall, &c., 

 ind manufactures of cotton, silk and leather. It is 

 situated about a league above the celebrated catar- 

 act of the Rhine, of which the descent is seventy or 

 eighty feet. (See Rhine and Cataract.} The si- 

 tuation of the town gives it a considerable transit 

 U 2 



