BONAPARTE. 



the enemy on their way to Paris. The senate, too, 

 formerly so submissive, rose against the emperor, and 

 the insecurity of absolute power was strikingly de- 

 monstrated. Mannont, at last, abandoned his master. 



April 11, 1814, Napoleon signed the act of abdica- 

 tion, and the treaty, which ! u him tin- Mand of Elba, 

 v.iili smerei^n power, the title of emperor, and an 

 income of 2,000,000 francs. He abdicated with the 

 words, " The allied powers having proclaimed that 

 the emperor Napoleon is the only obstacle to the re- 

 establishment of peace in Kurope,the emperor Napo- 

 leon, faithful to his principles, declares tliat he re- 

 nounces, for himself and his heirs, the thrones of 

 France and Italy, because there is no personal sacri- 

 tirc. even thai of his life, which he is not ready to 

 make, for the welfare of France, and for the peace 

 of the world." 



At this point we may consider the history of the 

 empire as, in the main, closed, and pause for a mo- 

 mem. The time has not yet arrived when Napoleon 

 can be coolly estimated. It must be left to future 

 generations to consider calmly his whole career, un- 

 disturbed by personal or party feeling, and unembar- 

 rassed by the multitude of details which now prevent 

 I he true bearing of his measures from being seen. 

 The opinions now entertained respecting him may be 

 classed, we think, under the following heads: 1. 

 That he was a usurper. This charge is preferred by 

 two very different parties ; a. by the adherents of 

 legitimacy, who think his noblest course would have 

 been to play the part of general Monk. b. The 

 charge of usurpation is also made by some republi- 

 cans. We have already observed that, up to the 

 time when Napoleon took the reins of government, 

 no republic can be said to have existed in France. 

 We need then only ask, whether the tendency of 

 France was towards a republic, and whether Napo- 

 leon ought to have lent his power to establish it, 

 pro v idea he could have seen the possibility of its 

 permanence. The forms of governments, important 

 as they are, are but secondary compared to the 

 primary elements of national character and political 

 condition, and are always dependent on the latter. 

 The preservation of the new politico-social relations 

 was first to be attended to. If a republic was 

 incompatible with justice, safety of person and pro- 

 perty, internal peace, or national independence, 

 the former ought to have given way to the lat- 

 ter. We believe there are few people of judg- 

 ment, who, at present, maintain that, at that pe- 

 riod, a republic would have comported with the in- 

 ternal and external relations of France. As there 

 must be a difference in the habitations of men, ac- 

 cording to the materials which they possess for their 

 construction, so governments must differ with the 

 character and condition of the governed. Republics 

 cannot exist without republicanism, and republican- 

 ism cannot be created by the forms of a constitution, 

 but springs, in a great measure, from the nature of 

 men's relations in ordinary life. Those forms of so- 

 cial connexion which are favourable to this spirit, it 

 is, of course, the duty of every lover of liberty to 

 promote. 2. There are some who admire Napoleon, 

 and acknowledge that he did much good to France, 

 but maintain that his own genius and success led him 

 astray ; that by degrees he deviated from the princi- 

 ple which had elevated him, and afforded the only 

 firm basis of his power ; and that he gradually gave 

 way to principles which must ruin him ; that, more- 

 over, he laid the foundations of numerous institutions 

 which, if they had been developed, would have 

 brought in again many of those evils which the 

 revolution had just removed ; and that he omitted 

 to lay the foundation of those institutions which, if 

 developed, would have produced that wide-spread 



political and social activity, on which true liberty can 

 alone rest ; but, on the contrary, deprived the nation 

 of free action, and organized the whole body politic 

 less in a civil than in a military manner; and that 

 ambition, so natural to noble and elevated souls, 

 overpowered him. 3. Lastly, there are those who 

 insist upon Napoleon's having sincerely wished for 

 peace ; tliat he had no desire for renewing war after 

 the peace of Luneville and of Amiens, but that he 

 was forced to war by the unrelenting attacks of the 

 aristocracy of Europe, supported by the money of 

 Britain, which was itself ruled by its own aristo- 

 cracy, who expected that Napoleon would exhaust 

 France, and exasperate Europe, by continual conflicts. 

 As his repeated offers of peace were spurned, he was 

 unable, they say, to establish in France institutions in 

 accordance with free principles, which he sincerely 

 wished to establish, and which he must have been 

 desirous of establishing from his love of posthumous 

 fame, and from his knowledge of the character of his 

 age, in which authority could no longer be maintained 

 merely by brute force, but required the support of 

 public opinion. They sum up the whole history of the 

 empire in these few words : " Napoleon was forced to 

 war by the British, and to the dictatorship by the 

 war." Napoleon used, not unfrequently, to say to his 

 confidants, " If a general peace is ever concluded, 

 then only shall I be able to show myself such as I 

 am, and become the moderator of Europe. France is 

 enabled, by her high civilization, and the absence of 

 aristocracy, to moderate the extreme demands of the 

 two principles which divide the world, by placing 

 herself between them, thus preventing a general 

 conflagration, of which none of us could reasonably 

 expect to see the end, or guess the issue : for that, I 

 want ten years' peace, and the British oligarchy 

 will not allow it." We quote his brother Joseph, as 

 one to whom he disclosed himself in this way re- 

 peatedly. The latest events are melancholy com- 

 mentaries in favour of Napoleon, whether we do or 

 do not approve entirely of his course, considering 

 what the internal state of France, as well as what the 

 condition of Europe, required. 



We return to our biographical sketch. On the 

 island of Elba, Napoleon occupied himself with 

 literature, and the construction of public works ; and 

 whilst he was observing the discord of the European 

 powers at the congress of Vienna, and the blind folly 

 manifested by the Bourbons in France, the court 

 papers of Paris represented him as mad ! We are 

 unable to state what caused him to return from Elba 

 precisely at the time when he did. He embarked, 

 February 26, 1815, with 900 men, and landed, 

 March 1, at Cannes, not far from Frejus, where he 

 had landed sixteen years before, on his return from 

 Egypt ; and his march to Paris at this time might 

 well be compared to his former journey. On the 

 voyage, he had written a proclamation, which set 

 forth the reasons of his return, and of which he caused 

 many copies to be made. Without encountering any 

 royal troops, he advanced rapidly. March 7th, he 

 first met a body of royal troops, commanded by Labe- 

 doyere, who could not prevent them from joining 

 Napoleon's guards. The same evening, the gates of 

 Grenoble were opened to him. Lyons was entered 

 on the evening of the 10th. On the 13th, marshal 

 Ney went over to him ; and March 20th he reached 

 Paris, which Louis XVIII. had left in haste, an 

 event which plainly showed, that the great majority 

 of the French were against the Bourbons, and se- 

 veral distinguished persons, who had been always 

 unwilling to rally round Napoleon, now joined him, 

 either considering his return indispensable, or at least 

 the return of the Bourbons as the greatest evil which 

 could befall France. The royalists How became 



