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PHILOSOPHY, MENTAL. 



Aristotle developed the system. The former was 

 distinguished for the warmth and vividness of his 

 conceptions ; the latter aimed at cool and patient 

 reflection on the nature of tilings. By the side of 

 the academic and peripatetic schools, c. the Stoic 

 school, founded by Zeno, and, d. the Epicurean 

 placed themselves in opposition. All these systems 

 were attacked by the sceptic school, founded by 

 Pyrrho. (See Scepticism.) The other Socratic 

 schools e. the Cyrenaic, Megarean, Cynian, Elian 

 and Eretrian followed the practical direction of 

 their master with more or less deviation and peculi- 

 arity. " We see here," says Schulze, speaking of 

 this period, " the philosophic spirit, undertaking, 

 with manly circumspection, the solution of philoso- 

 phical problems and the philosophical investigation 

 of all subjects important for mankind." For this 

 reason the inquiries of this period into the grounds 

 of human knowledge, are of so great importance, 

 hi the third division, the philosophic spirit appears, 

 like an enfeebled old man, striving only to unite the 

 conflicting parties (with the Eclectics, q. v.), or, in 

 order to escape from scepticism, flying to mysticism 

 (with the Alexandrians, q. v'., and New Platonists, 

 q. v., whose founder was Ammonius Saccas, 193 B. 

 C.). The Romans propagated and fostered only the 

 philosophy which they had received. (For more in- 

 formation respecting this period, see Greek Litera- 

 ture, and the articles on the different philosophers 

 and sects.) 2. The history of the philosophy of the 

 middle ages, from 800 to 1500, A. D., or of the 

 scholastics shows the struggle of reason for philoso- 

 phical knowledge, under the influence of a principle 

 elevated above it, and given by the Christian reve- 

 lation, or acting in the service of the church. (See 

 Scholastic Philosophy.) The Arabians, the flourish- 

 ing period of whose literature falls in the middle 

 ages, only cultivated the Greek philosophy and some 

 detached religious philosophemes. 3. The third 

 period, which begins with the fifteenth century, is 

 characterized, says Tenneman, by a freer, more in- 

 dependent spirit of inquiry, penetrating deeper and 

 deeper into ultimate causes, and striving for a syste- 

 matic union of knowledge. First, the scholastic 

 philosophy was attacked by those who called to 

 mind the ancient Greek philosophy in its original 

 purity. After this struggle, new views were pre- 

 ented. Some built upon experience, as Bacon and 

 Locke. Opposed to them, Descartes, with whom 

 some begin modern philosophy, strove to establish it 

 upon its own ground, by dialectic reasoning ; passing 

 over from doubt to dogmatism, and taking the con- 

 sciousness of thought and existence (cogito, ergo sum) 

 as the foundation of his philosophy, whence modern 

 philosophy first received its direction towards ideal- 

 ism. Spinoza and Leibnitz pursued the trodden path 

 of reflection ; the latter in the way of idealism, the 

 former in that of realism. 



We intend now to give a brief sketch of the philo- 

 sophy of Britain, Germany, and France. The cele- 

 brity of the German philosophy would seem to entitle 

 it to an extended notice. But to give a satisfactory 

 account of it would far exceed the limits of this 

 work. The very explanation of the terminology of 

 the German philosophers, which would be necessary 

 to qualify an English reader to understand their 

 systems, would occupy much more space than we 

 can give to the whole of this article, so that we can 

 barely touch upon some of the most prominent points 

 of the subject. 



British Philosophy. Modern philosophy in Bri- 

 tain must be dated from Bacon. In his Novum 

 Organum (1620), he takes a path directly opposite 

 to that universally followed in his time, and, instead 

 of appealing by dialectics to the notions of the un- 



derstanding, he attempts to restore knowledge by 

 the aid of observation, through induction, lie w&s 

 not the founder of a sect ; he did not deliver opinions ; 

 he taught modes of philosophizing ; he did not at- 

 tempt to discover new principles, but to render ob- 

 servation and experience the predominant character 

 of philosophy. His services consist in his dethroning 

 scholastic philosophy, directing the attention to na- 

 ture and observation, and rejecting final causes from 

 physical inquiries ; yet he made some detached 

 psychological remarks of great value. Bacon is the 

 father of experimental or empirical philosophy. 

 Hobbes, the friend of Bacon, a bold and profound 

 thinker, was the founder of modern sensualism. 

 Philosophy, according to him, is such a knowledge 

 of effects or appearances as we acquire by true rea- 

 soning from the knowledge we have of their causes 

 or generation, or such causes and generations as 

 may be, from knowing first their effects. The object 

 of philosophy is any body of which we can conceive 

 any generation, or which is susceptible of composi- 

 tion or decomposition. It is therefore either natural 

 or civil. All knowledge is derived from the sense 

 by motion ; thoughts are representations of the 

 qualities of bodies without us ; the cause Of sense is 

 the pressure of the external object on the organ of 

 sense ; what we call sensible qualities are nothing 

 but motion, and can produce nothing but motion in 

 us ; imagination is nothing but decaying sense, and 

 understanding is imagination raised by words or 

 other voluntary signs. Besides sense and thought, 

 and train of thoughts, the mind has no other motion. 

 Whatever we imagine is finite ; therefore there is no 

 idea of any thing infinite. Reasoning is nothing but 

 reckoning, that is, adding or subtracting. The pas- 

 sions are internal voluntary motions ; when appetites 

 and aversions, hopes and fears, arise alternately 

 about the same thing, the whole sum of these motions 

 is deliberation, and the last appetite or aversion in 

 deliberation, is will, not the faculty, but the act of 

 willing. (See Hobbes's Human Nature, 1650, and 

 Leviathan, 1651.) From these principles Hobbes 

 having concluded that right and wrong were unreal, 

 because they are not perceived by the senses, Cud- 

 worth (Intellectual System of the Universe, 1678) 

 endeavours to refute the doctrines of the sensual 

 theory. He maintains that there are many objects 

 of the mind which are not derived from the sense, 

 and could be formed only by a faculty superior to 

 sense ; these are not fantastical (conceivable by the 

 imagination) , but only noematical. Cudworth was, 

 in most points, a follower of Plato ; his plastic nature, 

 a vital and spiritual but unintelligent and necessary 

 agent, created by the Deity for the execution of his 

 purposes, is Plato's soul of the world ; and he main- 

 tains the Platonic doctrine of innate ideas. Locke 

 introduced into the study of the human mind the 

 method of investigation, which had been pointed out 

 by Bacon, and gave the first example of nn ample 

 enumeration of facts, collected and arranged for the 

 purpose of legitimate generalization. Without 

 meddling with physiological hypotheses or transcen- 

 dental metaphysics, he seeks, " in a plain, historical 

 method, to give an account of the ways in which the 

 understanding attains the notions it has. for which," 

 says he, "I shall appeal to every one's own experi- 

 ence and observation." This cautious empiricism 

 has been little observed by those who have called 

 themselves his disciples in Britain and France, and 

 who, neglecting his method, have seized upon some 

 unguarded expressions to build up systems of idealism 

 (Berkeley), scepticism (Hume), or sensualism and 

 materialism (the French philosophers and the Hart- 

 leian school). The true spirit of the Lockian philo- 

 sophy was first revived in the Scotch school (Reid 



