530 



PHILOSOPHY, MENTAL. 



phenomena are revealed in thought, which cannot he 

 resolved into any modification of sense ; that intelli- 

 gence supposes principles, which, as the conditions 

 of its activity, cannot be the result of its operations ; 

 and that the mind contains notions, which, as primi- 

 tive, necessary and universal, are not to be explained 

 as generalizations from the contingent and particular, 

 about which alone our external experience is con- 

 versant. His enumeration of the faculties of the 

 mind, which he does not, however, give as complete, 

 comprises perception, memory, conception, abstrac- 

 tion, judgment, reason, taste, moral perception, con- 

 sciousness. The representation of consciousness as a 

 special faculty, when, in reality, it is the generic 

 condition of all mental activity, was a pregnant error 

 in Keid's philosophy ; while his doctrine of the im- 

 mediate or intuitive knowledge of mind and matter, 

 which involved the overthrow of the ideal system, 

 and the scepticism (or rather nihilism) deduced from 

 it, was an important step in the progress of philoso- 

 phy. Stewart, with some deviations, followed in the 

 tri'k of his master; but Brown, while he adopted 

 many of the principles of Reid, departed, in many 

 points of fundamental importance, from his philoso- 

 phy. He assumes the existence of primary intuitions 

 of direct belief, which are not only necessary to rea- 

 soning, but to thought itself: all our conceptions im- 

 ply the idea of form, which is -derived from relation 

 in space (co-existence), and of power, which is deriv- 

 ed from relation in time (successive existence) ; cause 

 is only the invariable antecedent, effect the invariable 

 consequent, power the invariable antecedence, in any 

 sequence of phenomena. All feelings and thoughts 

 ;ire the mind itself existing in certain states ; con- 

 sciousness is not a distinct faculty, but a general 

 term for all the states of the mind. Mental (person- 

 al) identity is an intuitive law of thought, it being 

 impossible to conceive of successive states but as mo- 

 difications of the permanent being the I. The differ- 

 ent states are divided by Brown into the external 

 states (sensations), produced by the presence of ex- 

 ternal objects, and the internal slates, arising in con- 

 sequence of preceding affections of the mind itself. 

 The latter class is divided into intellectual states and 

 emotions, which are all referrible to one generic sus- 

 ceptibility suggestion (association of ideas). The 

 laws of suggestion are resemblance, contrast, and 

 nearness in time or place, which are all reducible to 

 proximity. That capacity of suggestion which revives 

 conceptions, Brown terms simple suggestion, and 

 that which gives rise to feelings of relation, relative 

 suggestion. To the former are reducible those mental 

 states commonly called the faculties of conception, 

 memory, imagination, and habit ; to the latter, those 

 of judgment, reasoning, and abstraction. But 

 Brown's philosophy involves many radical inconsist- 

 encies, and would hardly deserve to be mentioned in 

 so general a sketch, were it not remarkable as an 

 open revolt against the Scotch system, at the moment 

 the latter seemed to be developed with new power, 

 and to acquire new authority on the European con- 

 tinent ; and for the temporary popularity it possessed 

 in Great Britain, and particularly in this country. 

 While France and Germany have in recent times im- 

 bibed a new spirit of metaphysical inquiry, the sci- 

 ence of mind has been entirely neglected in Great 

 Britain, and all interest in psychological researches 

 seems to be extinct in that country. 



German Philosophy. To the remark already 

 made, of the impracticability of giving a satisfactory 

 view of German philosophy within the limits to which 

 we are confined, we must add, that if any science 

 requires to be studied in a spirit of candour, and 

 with a sincere desire to understand its real merits 

 f and what science can be properly studied without 



such a spirit ?), it is intellectual philosophy, partic- 

 ularly German philosophy. Nothing is easier (han 

 to take a phrase or a passage relating to subjects 

 beyond the reach of the senses (whether of a philo- 

 sophical, religious, or poetical character), and turn it 

 into ridicule. We would also remark, that, since 

 German philosophy lias of late years diverged with 

 unprecedented rapidity in all directions, and sys- 

 tem after system has been raised and overthrown, it 

 has been often asked, What has been gained by it ? 

 Have the philosophers settled any of the mysteries 

 which have always perplexed the mind of man; or 

 have they acquired any clearer and deeper know- 

 ledge respecting the most important interests of 

 human society, government, law, and the civil ties 

 in general, on which they write so much ? We 

 answer, that the Germans have acquired, by their 

 philosophy, a spirit of scientific liberty, unknown in 

 other nations. Every nation and age has its task 

 and condition. As yet it has not been the lot of 

 Germany to enjoy the blessings of civil freedom, and 

 the manly spirit which it generates ; but the spirit 

 which pervades the best German works on religion, 

 on literature, on natural philosophy, may well chal- 

 lenge comparison. The spirit of system and inde- 

 pendent thought, which German philosophy has 

 infused into German literature, sometimes leads, 

 indeed, to prolixity of exposition, and sometimes to 

 extravagance of speculation ; but these are small 

 disadvantages compared with the benefit which it 

 has conferred ; and the whole tone of the literature 

 proves, what we have had occasion to remark more 

 than once already, that civil liberty alone is wanting 

 to hold the Germans up to the world as a noble and 

 manly nation. While we dwell on the good conse- 

 quences which German philosophy has had on the 

 spirit of inquiry, we are far from pretending that it 

 has been productive of unmixed good, or that every 

 system of German philosophy which has acquired 

 distinction in its time, dserves its reputation. How 

 often has a figurative expression been taken for a 

 profound truth^ and served as the basis of arguments 

 and systems, which sink into nothing before a criti- 

 cal investigation, and to which nothing but tl:; im- 

 agination of Germans could have given a short-lived 

 existence ! This unsoundness, which is found in 

 many German systems, is owing, in a great degree, 

 to the predominance of the speculative over the 

 active life in that country. Free institutions would 

 soon enable them to shake off the dreaminess of the 

 closet, by rousing them to vigorous action on prac- 

 tical subjects. The ill repute in which German 

 philosophy long stood with foreigners, is owing, 

 partly, to the reckless independence with which 

 most of the German philosophers have created and 

 shaped their language according to their systems, 

 so as to render its study particularly difficult for 

 strangers ; partly to the premature and partial 

 applications which inferior talents have made ot 

 those systems to other branches of literature, and 

 which have mostly been known sooner than the 

 original system ; partly to real extravagances ; but 

 greatly, also, to the difficulty of justly estimating so 

 large and so new a department of literature. A 

 German philosophy, properly so called, could not 

 appear until German prose had received a certain 

 degree of cultivation. As long as the German phi- 

 losophers wrote chiefly in Latin, they confined them- 

 selves principally to the defence of the predominating 

 philosophy of the time e. g. the scholastic philoso- 

 phy or else attacked it (after the fifteenth century), 

 but without establishing new systems. The proper 

 German philosophy is distinguished by an incessant 

 striving for a systematic character, and the deduction 

 of scientific conclusions from the simplest and mosl 



