PHILOSOPHY, MENTAL. 



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comprehensive principles. It must be considered to 

 begin with Leibnitz towards the end of the seven- 

 teenth century. Leibnitz endeavoured to deduce 

 philosophical truth from necessary and innate ideas 

 of reason, by the way of mathematical demonstration. 

 This system he opposed to the sensualism of Locke. 

 His doctrine of innate ideas, of the monads, of the 

 pre-established harmony of the universe, his theodicea, 

 furnished subjects of thought to the most thinking 

 men of his time. His followers, in particular Wolf 

 and Baumgarten, extended his system, about the 

 time of Frederic the Great ; and, by their endeavours 

 to reduce philosophy to one principle, and by the 

 precise formulas in which they carried on their de- 

 monstrations, the formal side of philosophical science 

 gained very much. The fault of this system was, 

 that it sought truth merely by the way of definitions 

 and demonstrations, as in mathematics. Wolf's 

 disciples carried this system almost to absurdity. 

 Lambert, Ploucquet, Reimarus, and others, his follow- 

 ers, cultivated logic with great success. This school 

 was followed by a period of eclectic philosophy, in 

 which, however, the scepticism of Hume, the ex- 

 amination of the understanding by Locke, the 

 psychological investigations of Feder, Garve, Men- 

 delssohn, the works of Plainer and Abbt, together 

 with the revived interest for art and criticism, and 

 not less the sentimentality which reigned in poetry 

 as well as in religion, excited and directed the at- 

 tention of the whole thinking world to the nature of 

 their own souls, and prepared the way for the system 

 of Immanuel Kant. (q. v.) With him begins the sec- 

 ond period of German philosophy. He showed that, 

 instead of inquiring what the world was in itself, we 

 ought first to inquire how we perceive it. Thus he 

 began to examine all the means which man possesses 

 for the perception of the external world, and deter- 

 mined the laws according to which every organ 

 operates, and the sphere to which it is limited. His 

 criticism denied to reason the possibility of finding 

 and proving any truth, without the sphere of con- 

 sciousness and of physical phenomena. The theory 

 of Kant was extended by his followers in many 

 directions, yet not with the harmony and comprehen- 

 sive judiciousness with which he united and arranged 

 all the different kinds and objects of menial activity. 

 The human mind, however, was not satisfied with 

 learning only its own limits. The relation between 

 its own notions and realities, was again endeavoured 

 to be determined in different ways. Fichle rejecled 

 the idea of any such relation, by admitting the abso- 

 lute exislence only of the thinking individual, by 

 which he considered even the objects of thought to 

 be produced ; he denied the reality of an exterior 

 world. This syslem atoned for its exclusive charac- 

 ter by the high standard to which this vigorous 

 spirit raised the moral dignity of man. Between 

 him and Kant stands Fries, in his Neue Kritic der 

 Vemunft ; he likewise was distinguished for the 

 moral tendency of his philosophy. In opposition lo 

 Fichte, Schelling proceeds from the idea of ihe ob- 

 jective absolute (see Objective), and arrives at length 

 at the idea of individual existence (the I), from which 

 Fichte sels out. He begins a third period in the 

 German philosophy with his doctrine of identity, in 

 which he determines the relation between subject 

 and object. To him, mind ami nature are only 

 manifestations of the Divine principle, and the know- 

 ledge of this identity between thought and outward 

 existence resls on intellectual inluition. Oken has 

 founded a nalural philosophy on Ihis syslem. Hegel* 

 ha<< sought to establish a strict idealism, on Schelliug's 

 principles, by considering the absolute as the under- 



* He died in Berlin, in the winter of 18312. of the cholera. 



standing conceiving of itself, and makes three 

 divisions in his philosophy, logic, the philosophy of 

 nature, and Ihe philosophy of mind. Each of these 

 systems has, at different periods, found many follow- 

 ers, who, with more or less success, have laboured to 

 extend them in different directions. Krug has 

 united all the principal doctrines of Kant systemati- 

 cally in his Transcendental Syrilhetics. Bardili 

 considered all philosophy as resting on the idea of 

 the absolute, which he found in the act of thinking ; 

 he, therefore, treated logic as a source of real know- 

 ledge. Wagner and Eschenmayer endeavoured to 

 correct or lo extend the doctrine of Schelling. Jac- 

 obi's doctrine on feeling and faith is of an original 

 character. Schulze distinguished himself as an 

 opponent of Reinhcldby a limited scepticism, Plainer 

 by his aphorisms, and Herbart by his melaphysical 

 fragmenls. In considering the many changes Ger- 

 man philosophy has undergone in so short a time, 

 we shall naturally feel inclined to reproach this 

 mania for new systems ; but the truth or error of 

 any comprehensive view cannot be appreciated 

 justly, until il is developed in a consistent form, and 

 Ihe more different systems can be compared, the 

 more comprehensive arid impartial will be our know- 

 ledge. 



French Philosophy. Totally opposite to German 

 philosophy is the modern French philosophy. While 

 the former strives to explore the abysses of existence, 

 and to comprehend the mysleries of human nalure, and 

 thus often loses ilself in flights of imagination, the 

 French, of late, have understood by philosophy litlle 

 more than the critical investigation of those subjects 

 which are comprehensible at first view, and have 

 banished from philosophy all that cannot be grasped 

 by the plainest common sense ; and so far have they 

 carried this system, that at one time it proved most 

 dangerous to morality, the original principles of 

 which are by no means susceptible of such plain and 

 simple demonstralion as was required by the French 

 school ; and we have little doubt that, to this day 

 sensualism, or the French philosophy, founded on 

 Condillac's system, produces fatal effects. So much, 

 indeed, do the French and Germans differ, that what 

 the former call philosophy and metaphysics is, in fact, 

 totally different from that which the latler designate 

 by the same terms. It is also very characteristic of 

 the French people, that their modern philosophy 

 may be said to have unfolded itself in fashionable 

 sociely. Towards Ihe end of Ihe sevenleenth century, 

 a tone of light philosophy was introduced into polite 

 circles, in opposition to the affecled moralily then in 

 vogue, which, however, had some connexion with 

 the old romantic spirit. Both systems had adherenls 

 in Ihe world of fashion, under the palronage of ladies : 

 al Ihe head of one parly was the spiritual Ninon de 

 1'Enclos, wilh her philosophizing friend St Evre- 

 mond ; at the head of the other, the amiable mar- 

 chioness de Sevigne. Both the circles acquired 

 literary celebrity ; language attained the highest re- 

 finemeiil,and conversation itsgreatesl perfeclion ; but 

 the consequence was, that a conversational tone was 

 given to literalure. Descarles (q. v.), Arnauld(q. v.), 

 (to whom is ascribed the Art de Penser), Nicole, De 

 la Forge, and Ihe deep-thinking Malebranche (q. v.), 

 belong to another time. The direction which modern 

 French philosophy has taken, originated from the 

 English philosopher Locke, (q. v.) On the doc- 

 trines of Ihis acute reasoner a system of sensualism 

 was founded by Etienne Bonnot de Condillac (born 

 1715, died 1780). He taught that the basis, the 

 principle of all thai is developed in our mind, is sen- 

 sation (lafaculte de sentir). All ideas, knowledge, 

 faculties, even reflection, actions and customs, are 

 successive transformations of this principle. The 

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