77t> 



QUATRE-BRAS. 



where tlie road from Nivelles to Namur crosses, in 

 a south-easterly direction, that to Brussels), Ge- 

 nappes and Waterloo. On this road, marshal Ney 

 was ordered to advance with the first and second 

 divisions, and the cavalry belonging to them (42,000 

 strong), to Quatre-Bras, to drive every thing before 

 him, and to prevent, at any sacrifice, the approach 

 and junction of Wellington, who was expected to 

 advance from Brussels. Ney, therefore, com- 

 manded the left wing of the French army, and 

 formed the wedge which Napoleon proposed to 

 force between the British and Prussian armies, 

 while he threw himself upon Blucher. Ney's charge 

 seems to have been a difficult one: it appears from 

 the complaints and the justifications of his conduct, 

 thai, the emperor, by a certain indistinctness in his 

 orders, placed him in the disagreeable situation of 

 being obliged to act according to circumstances. 

 Ney executed his orders literally ; that is, he ad- 

 vanced, on the 15th of June, as far as Frasnes, his 

 outposts being beyond that place, in the direction 

 of Quatre-Bras, where they encountered an ad- 

 vanced post of the prince of Orange's corps, which 

 prince Bernard of Weimar had thrown forward 

 from Quatre-Bras. This post was maintained; 

 and night coming on prevented any examination 

 of what was passing behind it. During the whole 

 day, Ney had heard a warm cannonade in his rear 

 (caused by the action between Vandamme, Grouchy 

 and the first Prussian corps near Fleurus), which 

 forbade him to calculate on a very rapid advance 

 of the French. This circumstance induced him to 

 act with caution: he remained at Frasnes. It 

 cannot be doubted that the brave resistance of the 

 first Prussian corps, which Vandamme and Grouchy 

 were not able to drive back quickly enough, was 

 unexpected by Napoleon. He had probably ex- 

 pected to penetrate beyond Fleurus, on the 15th, 

 with his main body. On the night of the 15th, the 

 British forces, sensible of Napoleon's object, ad- 

 vanced on the road from Brussels towards Quatre- 

 Bras, in order, if possible, to support the Prussians; 

 and Blucher got his first, second, and third divisions 

 in position to the north of Fleurus, having the 

 British on his right, and expecting his fourth 

 division, under Bulow, from Liege. His position 

 was on a chain of heights imperfectly covered by 

 the Ligny, a small stream, and dependent upon 

 the possession of the villages St Amand, Ligny, 

 Tongrines, and Sombref in front: in the rear it 

 was intersected by the road from Quatre-Bras to 

 Namur. Napoleon, having examined his disposition 

 on the morning of the 1 6th, and it being necessary 

 to rest his troops, ordered an attack in the after- 

 noon. Ney again received orders to press forward 

 on Quatre-Bras, to drive out the English before they 

 could be concentrated, and to make a diversion 

 in the Prussian rear, leaving his first corps under 

 general Erlon, 20,000 strong (nearly half of his 

 whole force), as a reserve at Frasnes, which might 

 support him or Napoleon, as necessity should re- 

 quire. Some French writers have accused Ney of 

 dilatoriness, while others have defended him from 

 this charge. (See Gourgaud's Campaign of 1815, 

 with the counter statements of Gamot and Mar- 

 chand.) It is certain that he did not fully develope 

 his forces before four o'clock in the afternoon, when 

 he made his attack on Quatre-Bras, after the prince 

 of Orange, with the Netherlandish troops, the duke 

 of Brunswick, with his corps, and the Hanoverian 

 and British divisions, under Alien and Picton, had 

 already arrived and taken position. Although the 

 junction between Blucher and Wellington was not 

 accomplished on that day, yet Ney's attack was 

 repulsed, notwithstanding his superiority, in the 



beginning of the action, in cavalry and artillery, of 

 which his opponents were almost completely desti- 

 tute, and in spite of the uncommon valour displayed 

 by his troops. Wellington, on the Nivelles road, 

 with his right wing resting on Quatre-Bras, and 

 the wood defended by the duke of Saxe-Weimar, 

 and his left on the village of Piermont, held Ney in 

 check so successfully, that, in the evening, new 

 British reinforcements continuing to arrive, the 

 former was forced to send for his reserve at 

 Frasnes, and, finally, to make a retrograde move- 

 ment, and leave the field to the British. The loss 

 on both sides was nearly equal, amounting to about 

 10,000 men, among whom was the duke of Bruns- 

 wick. Napoleon began his attack on the Prussians 

 at three o'clock in the afternoon, in two columns. 

 The third French division, under Vandamme, ad- 

 vanced against the Prussian right wing at St 

 Amand ; the fourth, under Gerard, pressed for- 

 ward towards Ligny ; Grouchy, with the cavalry, 

 occupied the attention of the Prussian left wing, 

 under Thielemann, near Sombref. Vandainme's 

 attack was, at first, not without effect, but, towards 

 five o'clock, was repelled so effectually that Napo- 

 leon desisted, and, as Ney's diversion in the Prus- 

 sian rear was not effected, directed his attention 

 upon Ligny. The Prussians had, from the begin- 

 ning, considered the possession of this village as of 

 the greatest importance. Here the battle raged 

 with the greatest fury, and the ground was covered 

 with the dead and wounded. Gerard had sacrificed 

 nearly his whole division for the possession of one 

 half of the village, separated by the rivulet of the 

 same name from the other half. He was unable to 

 penetrate farther ; nor could the Prussians, on the 

 other hand, dislodge him by the most vigorous 

 attacks. If the fourth division, under Bulow, had 

 arrived at this moment, it would have decided the 

 fate of the day; but a variety of obstacles retarded 

 it. The evident relaxation in Napoleon's attack on 

 the right wing gave the Prussians an opportunity 

 of obtaining an apparent advantage in that quarter. 

 All the disposable reserves were directed towards 

 that point, when Napoleon unexpectedly threw 

 himself upon Ligny. He now accomplished his 

 purpose by means of his guards, who passed the 

 Ligny on the right and left of the village, and 

 threatened to cut off the exhausted Prussians, which 

 would have been the more easily effected, as all 

 the reserves and artillery had been withdrawn. 

 Blucher attempted in vain to repel the French 

 cuirassiers, with about 1000 light cavalry. He was 

 in such danger, on this occasion, that he was only 

 saved by the darkness, almost by a miracle. (See 

 Blucher.) Nothing remained but to abandon 

 Ligny, and retire with his first and second 

 divisions, in large bodies, upon Wavne, whither, 

 towards midnight, the third division, which had 

 been less actively engaged during the day, fol- 

 lowed. Napoleon overrated the loss of the Prus- 

 sians, and allowed them to retire unmolested, pro- 

 bably because his troops were too much fatigued, 

 and required rest to be in a state to be led against 

 Wellington. Grouchy, Vandamme, and generals 

 Excelmans and Pajol, received orders, on the 17th, 

 to follow the Prussians, with 35,000 men ; but they 

 had lost sight of them in the beginning of the pur- 

 suit a circumstance which, with Grouchy's affair 

 at Wavre, had a great influence upon the events ac 

 Waterloo. In the battle of Ligny, the Prussians 

 were superior in number. They lost about 20,000 

 men and fifteen cannons, partly in consequence of 

 their confined position. Napoleon had brought 

 only about 60 ,000 men into battle, his sixth division 

 not having reached Fleurus till dark ; and the first 



