THE RELIGION OF NATURE 



markablc habits of the ants ; but to ascribe these 

 to forethought and reasoning power is mischiev- 

 ous, as representing insects on the human plane, 

 to which, for want of knowledge, they have no 

 chance to rise. 



I have now shown, by instancing the behavior 

 of the Sensitive Plant, that living things do not 

 necessarily " feel " when their actions suggest 

 that they do. Next I instanced the sea-anemone, 

 which, although it is an animal, merely closes up 

 when touched, like the Sensitive Plant, while it 

 catches its food like the Sundew plant, stings like 

 the Nettle plant, and, when divided in half, be- 

 comes two separate individuals, as do many plants 

 in like case. The consequent presumption is that 

 it has no more conscious " feeling " than a plant. 



I then took the argument higher up the scale 

 of animal life, and showed, by describing the be- 

 havior of a female solitary wasp, that actions of 

 insects which appear to us to be dictated by the 

 same sort of maternal affection as a woman feels, 

 must be performed by mere instinctive habit only, 

 because the creature cares nothing at all about 

 her child, if you take it out of the nursery and 

 leave it in its mother's way. 



I have also shown that it is a mistake to give 

 insects credit for forethought and reasoning 

 powers merely because such " clever " insects as 



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