CHINA. 



103 



charged on the double quick through a rain of 

 bullets, not once faltering in spite of prodigious 

 losses. Before they reached the trenches the Chi- 

 nese fled. The main trenches, partly enfiladed by 

 the British artillery, were evacuated when the 

 whole line advanced, the Chinese artillery having 

 already retired and the infantry only waiting to 

 empty their magazine guns at long range. They 

 evacuated the left bank also without coming into 

 action with the Russians and French, and deserted 

 the town of Peitang. The Russians and French 

 precipitated their withdrawal by sending a col- 

 umn beyond Peitang, threatening the line of re- 

 treat. The impetuous assault on the first line of 

 trenches cost the Japanese 300 men, but it had 

 the effect of demoralizing the Chinese, who be- 

 lieved after that that with repeating rifles behind 

 the best intrenchments they could not stop a rapid 

 infantry charge. From that time they would not 

 await a Japanese attack on their trenches. Before 

 other troops they stood their ground better. 

 'They retreated from Peitang to the much stronger 

 position that they had prepared at Yangtun. It 

 was the suggestion of Gen. Yamaguchi that the 

 .allies should follow up their initial victory by con- 

 tinuing to pound the Chinese until they became 

 ompletely demoralized. Accordingly, the allies 

 advanced on Y'angtun the next day. There the 

 Boxers and imperial troops were found in greater 

 force and in a more extended position. The Amer- 

 icans and British began the fight with artillery 

 preparation, and when the Chinese right retired 

 the infantry advanced in the center. The Indian 

 troops began to waver as the shell and small-arms 

 fire from the railroad embankment became hot, 

 but the Fourteenth Americans, under Col. Dag- 

 gett, dashed onward with a yell and carried the 

 embankment, where for a time they suffered from 

 the fire of the English artillery in the rear as much 

 .as from that of the Chinese intrenchments ahead. 

 The casualties of the Fourteenth were 10 men 

 killed and 55 wounded, 10 of them by British 

 shells. Gen. Chaffee with the rest of the Amer- 

 icans cleared the villages on the right, coming 

 under a severe cross fire at one point, and the 

 Russians advanced cautiously through the already 

 deserted villages on the left, and after a stubborn 

 fight made themselves masters of the bridges and 

 railroad station, losing 118 men. The Chinese 

 had several lines of excellent intrenchments, but 

 most of them were undefended. The Japanese, 

 who were in the rear, brought up their batteries 

 in time to join the Americans in shelling the re- 

 treating columns. The fighting lasted six hours, 

 in the midst of tall corn that shut off the view in 

 front, and in an atmosphere so stifling that, while 

 the casualties of the Americans were 74, more 

 than 1,000 men dropped from exhaustion. Of the 

 British, 45 fell in the battle. The Chinese, 

 screened by the broom corn and evading a close 

 fight, got away with slight losses. 



The Chinese had been so well beaten at Tientsin, 

 and chased away so easily from Peitang and 

 Yangtun, that the generals formed a new estimate 

 of their strength, supposed to have been 45,000, 

 and of their power of resistance. At a council 

 of war the Japanese generals proposed not to 

 wait for 7,000 additional British troops that were 

 expected, besides American re-enforcements, nor 

 for their own complement of supplies and trans- 

 port, but to push on with the whole force, instead 

 of leaving one of their two brigades at Yangtun 

 to guard communications, although they had pro- 

 visions for less than five days and train for only 

 a single brigade. By chasing the Chinese without 

 .giving them a chance to recover breath or courage 

 they counted on rolling them up to the gates of 



Pekin without another battle. The other generals 

 concurred. On Aug. 8 the Japanese set out before 

 daylight, the other troops some hours later, and 

 the next two days it was the same. Ik-fore they 

 had marched an hour they came up with th<- ' 

 nese, and they harried their rear for the rest of 

 the day. Fresh troops went forward each morning 

 to form the advance guard of the day. Although 

 the Americans had thrown away their blankets, 

 ponchos, and other incumbrances, and the British 

 had pack trains, none of the other troops could 

 keep up with the Japanese, whose burden in light 

 marching order was still the heaviest. They 

 reached Hosiwu on Aug. 9, just in time to prevent 

 the Chinese, who were working on a huge trench, 

 from flooding the fields and roads and putting an 

 end to boat transportation on the river above. 

 The long marches in the hot sun were trying to 

 all nationalities, but most so to the Americans, 

 who were debilitated by their campaign in the 

 Philippines, and least so to the Japanese, who 

 rested in the middle of the day. 



At Hosiwu the Chinese left behind a powder 

 magazine. They made no determined stand in the 

 fortified towns of Matou and Changkia wan, though 

 their losses in the latter place were 500 men, most 

 of them killed while trying to get away. At 

 Huohsien they intended to give battle, having col- 

 lected their Manchu troops, but these also were 

 demoralized by the defeats they had suffered and 

 took flight when the Japanese and European 

 troops appeared. 



Before Tungchau, on Aug. 11, the vanguard 

 came in contact with some of Tung-Fuhsiang's 

 troops, and preparations were made to assault the 

 town in the morning, but in the night the Chinese 

 evacuated it and fell back on Pekin. The total 

 number of the allied forces between Taku and 

 Pekin was at this time 39,000 men, with 120 guns, 

 the Japanese and Russians making three fourths 

 of the total. The troops mobilized by the powers 

 would double this strength in a month's time. 

 The generals no longer hoped to enter Pekin with- 

 out a stiff battle. However, they were determined 

 to make the assault with the forces they had at 

 the front, knowing not only the preparations the 

 Chinese had made for defense, but the extremity 

 to which the legationists were reduced. 



The commanding officers held a council of war 

 at Tungchau on Aug. 12, and agreed upon a plan 

 providing for a reconnoissance in force on four 

 roads leading to Pekin on the following day. Each 

 force was to go into camp 7 miles from Tungchau 

 and 5 miles from Pekin and establish contact with 

 the other forces, and on Aug. 14, when all the 

 forces had been concentrated on the line of these 

 camps, to make reconnoissances around the city, 

 perhaps encircling the walls, as it was expected 

 that there would be a hard battle to force an en- 

 trance. The general attack was planned to begin 

 at daybreak on Aug. 15, and to be directed against 

 the gates of the east wall. The camps were estab- 

 lished at the places designated. The Russians 

 pushed their reconnoissance in force up to the 

 wall of the city, and, encountering no opposi- 

 tion, Major-Gen. Vasselievski decided to force the 

 Tungpien gate that night. The cannonade that 

 the Chinese in the city had begun upon tlu> lega- 

 tions determined him to act quickly and impelled 

 the other generals to push their forces forward. 

 He succeeded in blowing in the gate, which was 

 feebly defended, and when he entered with his 

 small force he concluded that the way was free 

 to the Tartar city and the legations, and there- 

 fore advanced in column. The Chinese were wait- 

 ing on the wall near the gate, and as soon as the 

 Russians emerged into the street they opened a 





