114 



CHINA. 



counsels would prevail. The situation in southern 

 and central China, where a strong and growing 

 revolutionary party aimed to upset the dynasty, 

 seemed to the Russian chancellor to be more crit- 

 ical. The Japanese Government also was anxious 

 not to complicate a position of affairs already 

 serious. A cautious course was desired, too, by the 

 United States. Germany, whose action had done 

 most to rouse the national excitement, and Great 

 Britain, which had followed the German initiative 

 in the partition of China as a check to the spread 

 of Russian influence, were least disposed to take 

 account of the patriotic excitement they had done 

 most to provoke, and took the lead in menacing 

 the Chinese Government. No government, however 

 suspicious of the motives of others, desired to pre- 

 cipitate an international crisis. None was pre- 

 pared for isolated action, and a previous agreement 

 among all the powers was understood to be the 

 condition of any important step to be taken. 

 Japan was received into this concert more thor- 

 oughly and cordially than before, and for military 

 action was the most important member, because 

 Japan alone had troops sufficient and ready to 

 accomplish any operations in China that might be- 

 come necessary. Russia made the first offer to lend 

 troops for the suppression of the Boxers when the 

 Chinese Government represented that the rebellion 

 was too serious to be easily quelled with. its own 

 forces. This offer was followed by a similar one 

 from Japan. Both were taken into consideration 

 and courteously declined. 



The admirals on June 5 decided in conference 

 to assume, with the object of protecting the lives 

 and property of their nationals, an attitude of 

 armed defense, their military movements to be di- 

 rected not against the Chinese Government, with 

 which their countries were at peace, but against 

 the insurgents seeking its overthrow. Should the 

 rebels prove stronger than the Government, aid 

 would be lent to the Government to quell them; 

 but if the Chinese Government did not attack the 

 rebels, then the allied powers would proceed to 

 attack them. Each commander was to comply 

 with the wishes or obtain the concurrence of his 

 minister unless communication with Pekin should 

 be severed. Should a situation arise affecting the 

 interests of all the foreign powers in common, they 

 agreed then to act in concert, seeking instructions 

 from home if there were time to do so ; but in case 

 the emergency were too pressing, they would deter- 

 mine their course after consultation together. At 

 a later meeting they agreed to land men at, once 

 on the motion of the American admiral. Mean- 

 while Admiral Seymour had sent re-enforcements 

 at the request of the British minister, and his 

 course was followed by other admirals until rail- 

 road communication was interrupted. Thereafter 

 followed the march of an allied force under Ad- 

 miral Seymour toward Pekin. The governments 

 of the powers having naval forces in the Peiho 

 America, Austria-Hungary, England, France, Ger- 

 many, Italy, Japan, and Russia gave full discre- 

 tion to their admirals to act in consultation with 

 the other senior naval officers as the emergency 

 seemed to demand. The French admiral suggested 

 giving command of the detachments that were sent 

 up to Tientsin to Col. Wogsu-k, a Russian officer of 

 experience. The German admiral held it better 

 that each detachment should act independently in 

 concert with its consul until an emergency should 

 arise making it necessary to unite them under a 

 single command. The British admiral saw no ne- 

 cessity of choosing a commanding officer before a 

 column started for Pekin. When the relief column 

 did start the command was given to him as senior 

 officer. 



When all communications with Pekin were cut 

 off and Admiral Seymour's relieving force was 

 stopped, troops were dispatched to Taku from the 

 nearest foreign garrisons German troops from 

 Kiaochau, British from Hong-Kong, Russians from 

 Port Arthur, and Japanese troops. On June 14 

 a Russian force of 1,700 men left Tientsin to join 

 Admiral Seymour, but only succeeded in rescuing 

 his exhausted and decimated expedition. A Rus- 

 sian contingent of 6,000 soldiers was ordered to 

 Taku to be at the disposal of the Russian minister. 

 After the capture of the Taku forts the British 

 Government arranged for the dispatch of 10,000 

 Indian troops under command of Sir A. Gaselee. 

 A third brigade, intended for the protection of 

 Shanghai and the British interests in the Yangtse 

 valley, was mobilized while the allies were march- 

 ing to Pekin. France arranged to bring the 

 strength of its contingent up to 15,000 men. 



The Government of Great Britain sounded the 

 Japanese Government on June 25 with reference 

 to the immediate dispatch of 25,000 or 30,000 

 Japanese troops for the restoration of order in 

 Tientsin and Pekin, and inquired of the Russian 

 and German governments especially if they ob- 

 jected. Japan expressed a willingness to under- 

 take the task on receiving assurances that it 

 would not lead to complications with other powers. 

 The Russian Government, \vhile not disposed to 

 give a mandate, did not wish to hinder Japan's 

 freedom of action. The German Government 

 would not assent to Japanese intervention unless 

 convinced that the interests of third powers were 

 left untouched. The Japanese Government ordered 

 the mobilization of 22,000 men, and urged the 

 advisability of an exchange of views as to joint 

 measures, considering the troubles in the north of 

 China so grave that an expedition of 70,000 men 

 would be required, which it was not prepared to 

 furnish without being indemnified for outlay of 

 money as well as protected from complications by 

 previous agreement among the powers. The Brit- 

 ish Government offered to guarantee the expense 

 of an immediate expedition for the rescue of the 

 legations, any ulterior operations to be left to 

 future consideration. 



Soon after the bombardment of the legations 

 began detailed accounts were circulated from 

 Shanghai that the ministers and other foreigners 

 in Pekin were massacred. A report of that nature 

 was received later at St. Petersburg from Man- 

 churia. It was reported also that the Emperor and 

 the Empress Dowager had been poisoned. After 

 June 11 there was no telegraphic communication 

 with Pekin, but a message from Sir Robert Hart 

 came through by courier, declaring the situation 

 desperate on June 25. The Chinese ministers in 

 Europe and the United States and the viceroys in 

 the south denied the stories that the ministers in 

 Pekin were dead, though they admitted later that 

 they had no authentic information. 



Secretary Hay defined the attitude of the United 

 States in a circular dispatch of July 3. Adhering 

 to the policy initiated by the United States in 1S">7 

 of peace with the Chinese nation, the furtherance 

 of commerce, and the protection of its citizens by 

 all means guaranteed by extra-territorial treaty 

 rights or by the law of nations, the United Stale- 

 Government proposed to hold responsible the au- 

 thors of any wrong done to Americans, and viewed 

 the condition in Pekin as one of virtual anarchy, 

 whereby power and responsibility were devolved 

 upon the local and provincial authorities, who. 

 so long as they were not in collusion with the 

 rebellion and used their power to protect foreign 

 life and property, would be regarded as represent- 

 ing the Chinese people, with whom the United 



