562 



PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. 



discarded, and the American soldiers, who from 

 the first were exasperated by every form of Malay 

 treachery and a total disregard of the rules of civ- 

 ilized warfare and of the restraints of honor as 

 understood by themselves, had now no means of 

 recognizing the foes who were the heroes of the na- 

 tive communities, and often the most forward in 

 their offers of loyalty and services. This made the 

 Americans more relentless and increased their con- 

 tempt for the Filipino character, which in turn 

 made the Filipinos more bitter in their hatred for 

 the Americans, whom they despised for the drunk- 

 enness and debauchery in which some indulged, 

 and more ardent and united in their alleged strug- 

 gle for national liberty. The army of Trias in the 



of schools, their open activity was commend- 

 able. At the same time they were exacting 

 contributions and supplies and recruiting men 

 for the Philippine forces and sending all pos- 

 sible military information to the Filipino lead- 

 ers. Wherever in any part of the islands a 

 group of insurgents was active all contiguous 

 towns contributed to its support, and without 

 their aid it could not subsist. The towns, there- 

 fore, although in American occupation and 

 having a municipal organization established and 

 controlled by the American military commanders, 

 were the bases for all military activities of the in- 

 surgents, not only furnishing supplies for the fly- 

 ing columns of guerrillas, but affording secure 



BAMBOO RAFTS, BROUGHT TO MANILA ON THE BINONI 



south was still intact, and was only broken up 

 by the campaign of Gen. Bates, in which Gen. 

 Schwan's column got in the rear of the rebels 

 and shut them off when Gen. Wheaton advanced 

 in January, 1900. The policy of the United States 

 Government, which was loyally carried out by the 

 commanders in the Philippines, forbade a resort 

 to the retaliatory measures usually adopted to 

 check the treacherous conduct of an irregular foe. 

 Punishment was not visited on the villages and 

 towns, in which it was attempted to institute 

 municipal government under American auspices. 

 While the guerrilla warfare was at its height most 

 of the towns throughout the archipelago, under 

 the advice and control of the military authorities, 

 organized municipal governments, for which kind 

 of local administration the people evinced such 

 intelligent capacity as to encourage the expecta- 

 tion of rapid progress in the art of self-govern- 

 ment when the larger political administrations 

 could be organized. The presidcntcs and other 

 town officials installed by the military authorities 

 after the people had signified their choice readily 

 subscribed to the obligation of exclusive fidelity 

 to the sovereign power of the United States, and 

 outwardly they complied with all due forms of 

 decorum and loyalty. They acted openly in be- 

 half of the Americans, yet secretly they aided the 

 insurgents. They even appeared zealous for the 

 success of the institutions introduced by the 

 Americans. In all matters touching the peace of 

 the town, the regulation of markets, the building 

 of roads, streets, and bridges, and the institution 



places of refuge. This was true of all parts of 

 the archipelago excepting the part of Mindanao 

 occupied by Moros and the Jolo group. The 

 Moros were in no way subject to Tagalog influ- 

 ence, and while hostility to Americans ran high 

 in Luzon and the other islands they appeared to 

 be satisfied with American control and anxious 

 to maintain existing conditions. The succes- of 

 the guerrilla system depended upon unity of 

 action among the native population. How such 

 unity was brought about, the American ottiivr- 

 could not understand. How the officials installed 

 by the Americans and other Filipinos who pro- 

 fessed with apparent sincerity to believe Ameri- 

 can sovereignty to be beneficial and necessary 

 were influenced to aid the insurgents, was inex- 

 plicable. Intimidation accounted for the -iinn 

 .tion to some extent, and captured correspondence 

 revealed the efforts of the insurgent leaders to ii - 

 timidate and control the people. Fear. lx>\ve\< -. 

 could not be the only motive, and (Jen. Mar.V 

 thur thought it more probable that the adhe-i\e 

 principle came from ethnological homogeneity, 

 which induces men to respond for a time In tie 

 appeals of consanguineous leadership even when 

 such action is opposed to their own inteie-1 ami 

 convictions of expediency. He tried to ascertain 

 by inquiries among the various social d 

 what were the definite aspirations of the in-u 

 gents. The leaders themselves seemed to have m> 

 expectation of founding a stable independert 

 Philippine republic except with the support of t 

 military and naval power of the I'liited Stall- 





