564 



PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. 



insurgent leaders, and presidentes of the villages 

 had frequently to be deposed. The insurgents 

 were strong enough to harass the garrisons daily. 

 The generals led strong expeditions through the 

 country, established posts, and the more the sol- 

 diers came into contact with the people and were 

 able to protect the pacificos, the less formidable 

 became the resistance. In the early spring cam- 

 paigns were conducted under Gen. Hughes in 

 Panay and under Gen. Bates and Gen. Kobbe in 

 southeastern Luzon, attended by many sharp 

 battles. Gradually, as the army occupied the 

 islands and spread out into small garrisons, the 

 number engaged descended the scale from brigades 

 to regiments, to battalions, to companies, to 

 squads, and while the number of actions increased, 

 the number of casualties diminished. Thus in Feb- 

 ruary. 1899. the first month of the rebellion, there 

 were (54 engagements, in which 66 officers and men 

 were killed and 360 wounded; in the second 

 month 80 were killed and 563 wounded in 61 

 actions; and in June, when operations grew slack 

 on account of the weather, 32 were killed and 135 

 wounded in 32 actions. In December, 1899, there 

 were 75 actions, in which 19 were killed and 81 

 wounded : in January, 1900, when, besides desul- 

 lory actions in the north, a regular campaign 

 was proceeding in the southern provinces of 

 Luzon, in 114 actions 41 Americans were killed 

 and 131 wounded; in February, 30 were killed 

 and 70 wounded in 104 actions; in March, 21 

 were killed and 62 wounded in 103 actions; in 

 April, 38 were killed and 67 wounded in 121 

 actions; in May, 28 were killed and 66 wounded 

 in 108 actions; in June, 25 were killed and 56 

 wounded in 131 actions. The conflict at this 

 point had descended to bushwhacking and brig- 

 andage. The distribution of troops in 300 posts 

 dispelled hostility and improved the temper of the 

 people, who had been originally aroused by absurd 

 falsehoods of the leaders, such as the statement 

 that the United States Government meant to 

 place them on reservations, where they would die 

 out like the American redmen. Insurgents who 

 did not surrender after defeat divided into small 

 guerrilla bands or became ladrones. The mass 

 of the people longed for peace and were willing to 

 accept the government of the United States. 

 Nearly all the prominent generals and politicians 

 of the insurrection were either captured in these 

 months or voluntarily surrendered and took the 

 oath of allegiance to the United States. The pol- 

 icy of leniency and the promise of amnesty in- 

 duced them to surrender. The small bodies of in- 

 surgents remaining under arms fled to mountain 

 fastnesses, whence they issued for night attacks, 

 usually harmless, or to ambush small American 

 detachments, or to collect contributions or recruit 

 among the people, whom they terrorized by cut- 

 ting out tongues, cutting off limbs, or burying 

 alive, and by their murders and robberies. They 

 made themselves detestable, and still they main- 

 tained a surveillance over the people, even in gar- 

 risoned towns, and whoever gave .information to 

 the Americans usually risked his life. 



In June the Filipino leaders plotted an uprising 

 against the authorities in Manila, a general massa- 

 cre of Americans and of the natives serving or 

 friendly to the Government, and the soi/ure of 

 arms and ammunition to re-equip the insurgent 

 forces. Inhuman conduct marked the guerrilla 

 campaign from the beginning on the part of the 

 insurgents. When one of their camps was at- 

 tacked in January they tried to strike terror into 

 the breasts of the Americans by leading out 5 

 prisoners and shooting them. Their military 

 power, even as a guerrilla force, was broken before 



the rainy season began. Yet their reign of terror 

 continued, and the acts of vengeance anil rapine 

 that they committed on the amigos, the friends 

 of the Americans, necessitated constant vigilance 

 and activity on the part of the troops. 



On June 21, 1900, by direction of the President, 

 a proclamation was issued by Gen. MacArthur 

 granting amnesty to all insurgents who made sub- 

 mission. Many of the leaders took advantage of 

 it, and large numbers of insurgents delivered up 

 their arms. 



Aguinaldo and the other leaders who still held 

 out were watching the trend of public opinion in 

 the United States. When they found that the 

 leaders of one of the great political parties seemed 

 ready to commit the fate of the Philippine Islands 

 into their care, and that whereas befoiv only ;i 

 group of independent politicians and publicists in 

 the United States befriended them, they had a 

 prospect of making terms with the United States 

 Government to suit themselves if the presidential 

 election should be won by that party, they were 

 spurred to a supreme effort. When the issue was 

 once raised in American politics fresh disturbances 

 broke out, not in Luzon alone, but in Leyte, Panay. 

 Samar, Cebu, and other islands where the Tagalogs 

 had introduced their doctrines and authority in 

 the early days of the rebellion. In central and 

 northern Luzon, which American troops had first 

 occupied in force, the natives had learned to trust 

 Americans and to desire a settled state of affairs 

 under their government. They could not be stirred 

 up anew to any extent. Some of the principal 

 members of Aguinaldo's former government, such 

 as Buencamino, the Secretary of State in the 

 Malolos administration, Mabini. and Paterno, and 

 some of his best generals were now co-operating 

 heartily with the Americans, and telling the na- 

 tives to submit. Of the generals, Pio del Pilar, 

 Macabulos, Catalino, Garcia, and others had sur- 

 rendered or been captured. It was in southern 

 Luzon and the Visayas that the hostilities broke 

 out anew. The departure of two regiments for 

 China, and the prospective return to America of 

 the volunteers forming half the army of occupa- 

 tion in a few months, encouraged the insurgent 

 leaders in the belief that they could by holding out 

 have matters go in any way they would. The 

 inclination of the people not actively engaged in 

 the rebellion to embrace the American cause \vas 

 checked by the revival of terrorism. The presi- 

 dentes and municipal councilors appointed in 

 towns where local self-government was being in- 

 troduced under American auspices were in sum 

 instances murdered even in central Luzon. The 

 army of 65,000 men could not guard against such 

 reprisals. The men formerly identified with the 

 Philippine Republic and prominent Filipinos wha 

 preceded them in the expression of American sym- 

 pathies were no longer safe in Manila. Many if 

 them went away to Hong-Kong. The high prii'-i - 

 of food 40 to 75 cents a pound in gold for mea 1 ;, 

 and rice double the normal price had much to 

 do with the discontent. In Spanish times llu> Gov- 

 ernment came into competition with the vendeis 

 when meat sold for more than 10 cents a pound. 

 All northern Lu/.on. except in Xucva Keija and 

 Bui u can, was practically free from insurgents in 

 August, and the people were planting and asking 

 for municipal government. In southern Lu/on in- 

 surrectionary bands were dodging from one moun- 

 tain refuge to another, as also in Samar. Leyte. MI d 

 parts of Panay; but in Negros, Cebu, Romblol, 

 Masbate. Sibuyan, Tablas. Hohol, and other Vi- 

 sayan islands there was little disturbance. In 

 Mindanao ladrones made the country dangerous 

 near the old Tagalog penal settlement of Cagay. n 



