TRANSVAAL. 



077 



4 they captured at Reddersburg an entire detach- 

 ment, consisting of 107 mounted men and 424 in- 

 fantry, of whom 10 were killed and 3U wounded. 

 These successes led hundreds who had surrendered 

 to the British and returned to their farms to rejoin 

 the active Boer forces. Gen. de Wet joined hands 

 with Olivier's commando from Ladybrand at 

 Wepener, and closely besieged the British force 

 that was posted on the Basutoland frontier to keep 

 the Kaffirs loyal. Here, as at Mafeking, the 

 British had natives fighting with them. When 

 relief from Bloemfontein approached the Boers 

 withdrew. A large part of the British army was 

 needed tft garrison Bloemfontein on account of the 

 known hostility of the Dutch citizens, who kept 

 the Boer generals informed of all movements of 

 the British and who had many weapons concealed. 

 Lord Roberts deported the citizens whom he sus- 

 pected. The blunders at Koornspruit and Redders- 

 burg were humiliating to the British. The pri- 

 mary blunder of leaving detachments at Thaba 

 Ncliu and Wepener unconnected with the base 

 raised a question as to the competency of the 

 British commanders, and the retirement of two 

 divisions under Gen. Colvile's command, the in- 

 fantry division, and Gen. French's cavalry, leaving 

 the whole southern country open to the com- 

 mandos of De Wet and Olivier, seemed to have 

 turned the tide of Avar once more in favor of the 

 Boers. The inability of British generals to cope 

 with the Boer militia attracted the attention of 

 the military men of all countries, and the publica- 

 tion of some dispatches in which the English com- 

 manders commented sarcastically on the careless 

 manner in which their subordinates led their men 

 into Boer traps brought on a discussion as to the 

 advisability of reforming the whole military sys- 

 tem of Great Britain, even to the extent of intro- 

 ducing compulsory service. The Boer military sys- 

 tem was a national one in which every burgher was 

 versed, in which the tactics were familiar to all, 

 and the plan of every action was communicated 

 to all the soldiers who took part. Every Boer was 

 not only a fair marksman, but possessed a good 

 eye for country and cover, and was able to judge 

 whether a hili or a fold in the ground was de- 

 fensible and offered facilities for attack or retreat. 

 The art of digging trenches and erecting scJtan~cs, 

 or breastworks of stone, and of putting them in 

 the position where they were effectually concealed 

 from any advancing force, was a natural faculty 

 of the burghers developed in their incessant war- 

 fare with the natives and their previous conflicts 

 with the British. The mobility of their army, in 

 which every man was mounted, not only enabled 

 them to strike hard blows where they were not 

 expected, but was of greater use in defense, per- 

 mitting them to mass their whole strength at the 

 points attacked, denuding every other point of 

 their line, which they did with seeming reckless- 

 icss. They could thus hold a line of fortifications 



rith a tenth of the force that a European gen- 

 eral would consider necessary, and impressed the 

 English with the belief that they we~e ten times 

 as strong as they actually were. The individual 

 initiative allowed to every burgher and the knowl- 



Ige that every burgher possessed of what was 

 ?oing on contrasted with the British method of 



ancealing all intended movements not only from 

 the men, but from the officers except the few who 

 had to do with directing operations. As far as 



assible, the plan of an intended battle was com- 

 municated to the whole Boer army beforehand ; 

 and, knowing the general plan, every man had a 

 clear idea of the right thing to do in the emer- 

 gencies that arise in the separate parts of a battle- 



leld. The Boers had no admiration for courageous 



daring unless strategic necessity called for a sacri- 

 fice of life. Piet Cronje's wonderful rear-guard 

 light and the tenacity with which his men held 

 out in their holes in the river bank to enable the 

 main force to escape won the highc-t pmi-e.s, but 

 whenever an exposed position was incautiously 

 occupied, no matter how valiantly it was defended, 

 as Mandslaagte was by the Johannesburg com- 

 mando, the Boer generals had no praise tor the 

 bravery of their men, only blame for their rash- 

 ness. In holding on to a position as long as j. 

 ble, and then retiring to one in the rear .and de- 

 fending that to the last, no troops ever displayed 

 greater courage. They had not the courage, how- 

 ever, to take risks in following up an advantage, 

 and had a chronic fear of being surrounded, as it 

 wa$ the plan of Lord Roberts w r ith his superior 

 forces invariably to surround them. The costliness 

 of the frontal attacks of Lord Methuen on Magers- 

 fontein and of Sir Redvers Buller on the Tugela 

 defenses determined him to avoid such tactics in 

 the future, but Lord Kitchener, in attacking Gen. 

 Cronje's retreating force at Drieputs on Feb. 10, 

 departed from the rule, and suffered heavy loss 

 in consequence. The Boer generals had no Euro- 

 pean advisers except for the handling of artillery, 

 and the Boers themselves displayed resourcefulness 

 in turning all sorts of guns to a useful purpose, 

 whether they were field guns, naval guns, or guns 

 of position. There were about 1,000 trained gun- 

 ners under Col. Trichardt. The Boers had lost 

 only 4 men killed and 25 wounded of their artil- 

 lery force during the entire previous course of the 

 war, and of their material only 1 Krupp quick- 

 firing gun, 2 Nordenfelts, and 1 Maxim-Nor- 

 denfelt, while 2 howitzers were rendered use- 

 less. They took from the British 4 mountain guns 

 at Nicholson's Nek, 10 15-pounders at Colenso, and 

 5 15-pounders and 2 Maxims at Koornspruit, other- 

 wise known as Sannaspost, and all these they 

 employed against their former owners. The Boers 

 had ordered 20 batteries of Creusot guns, but could 

 not get them delivered. The foreign volunteers 

 fighting for the Boers, exclusive of the Uitlanders 

 of the Rand, were 120 Russian scouts, 100 Amer- 

 ican scouts under Capt. Hassell, 150 Germans, 100 

 Irish, 100 Italians, 200 French, and 200 Dutch. 

 The Uitlanders fighting on the Boer side numbered 

 over 5,000, consisting of 300 in the Irish brigade, 

 similar Dutch, French, Italian, and Scandinavian 

 brigades, and about 500 Irish and Irish- American-*, 

 a larger number of Dutch and of Germans, and 

 smaller numbers of the other nationalities, includ- 

 ing a few English, scattered among the Transvaal 

 and Free State commandos. The total strength 

 of the Boer forces in the field, including Boers, 

 Afrikanders from the Cape and Natal, Uitlanders, 

 and foreigners, hardly ever exceeded 35,000 at one 

 time. After the death of Gen. Piet Joubert, who 

 latterly was not able to direct active operations 

 in the field, Lord Methuen, whose diminished di- 

 vision occupied Kimberley while Lord Roberts was 

 driving the Boer army back upon Bloemfontein, 

 sent out an expedition for the relief of MafekiiiL r . 

 where a British force under Col. Baden-Powell had 

 been closely besieged for many months. Col. Keke- 

 wich, the "late commandant at Kimberley, con- 

 ducted a second expedition through Griqualand, 

 but in every case when the British were not pres- 

 ent in force the inhabitants rose in arms. The 

 march through a desert country, with enemies in 

 both front and rear, could not be made from the 

 south. Col. Plumer, who attempted to break the 

 siege from the other direction, had an insufficient 

 force, but was able to create a diversion by threat- 

 ening Zeerust. Gen. Villebois-Mareuil, a French 

 officer whose services were of great value to the 



