UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 



and that the rate of tax was progressively in- 

 creased by the amount of each separate legacy 

 or distributive share, and not by the whole amount 

 of the personal estate of the deceased from which 

 the legacies or distributive shares were derived. 



In Plummer rs. Coler the question involved was 

 whether, under the inheritance-tax laws of a State, 

 a tax may be validly imposed on a legacy consist- 

 ing of United States bonds, issued under a statute 

 declaring them to be exempt from State taxation 

 in any form. It was held that the right to take 

 property by will or descent is derived from and 

 regulated by municipal law, and in assessing a 

 tax upon such right or privilege tne State may 

 lawfully measure or fix the amount of the tax 

 by referring to the value of the property passing; 

 and the incidental fact that such property is com- 

 posed, in whole or in part, of Federal securities, 

 does not invalidate the State tax or the law under 

 which it is imposed. 



In the cases of Murdock, executor, rs. Ward, 

 collector, and Sherman rs. the United States, it 

 was held that legacies consisting of United States 

 bonds were subject to the United States legacy tax. 



Tax on /v.'/or.s'S Packages. The cases of the 

 American Express Company vs. Michigan and 

 Crawford rs. Hubbell, treasurer of Adams Express 

 Company, involved the question whether the ship- 

 per or the carrier shall pay for the stamp which 

 the war revenue act requires on receipts of goods 

 accepted for carriage and transportation. The 

 cases arose from an effort to compel express com- 

 panies to accept packages for transportation with- 

 out requiring the shipper to provide or pay for 

 a revenue stamp in addition to the usual or ordi- 

 nary charges that existed before July 1, 1898, when 

 the act went into effect. The court held that 

 express companies are not forbidden to shift the 

 burden of the stamp tax by an increase of rates 

 which are not unreasonable. 



Chinese Certificates. In United States rs. Mrs. 

 Gue Lim the question was raised whether a wife, 

 or minor children, of Chinese merchants who are 

 already domiciled in this country may enter the 

 United States without the certificates prescribed 

 by section 6 of the act of July 5, 1884. The court 

 held that a certificate is not necessary in either 

 case. 



Removal from Office. In Keim vs. United 

 States, decided April 9, 1900, it was held that 

 the courts have no general supervising power over 

 the action of the executive departments of the 

 ( .'nvernment in discharging one of the clerks 

 therein, and that the power of removal from office 

 is incident to the power of appointment. 



War Prize Cases. The court decided several 



Prize cases, among them the following: The 

 'anama sailed from New York for Havana with 

 n general cargo on April 20, 1898, and was cap- 

 tured on the 25th while approaching Havana. 

 She was condemned in the court below, on the 

 ground that, since by the act of Congress of April 

 2fi, 1898, and by the Executive proclamation on 

 the succeeding day, it was determined that the 

 war with Spain began on April 21, including that 

 lay. all Spanish property afloat captured from 

 that time became liable to condemnation, and that 

 this vessel was not exempt under any provision 

 of the Kxecutive proclamation. The majority of 

 the Supreme Court aUirmcd the condemnation and 

 found that the Panama was not entitled to the ex- 

 emption of Article IV of the proclamation because, 

 being under a contract with the Spanish Covern- 

 ment, which nit ached her provisionally to the 

 naval reserve, she carried an armament susceptible 

 of use for hostile purposes, and was liable, upon 

 Arrival at the enemy's port of destination, to be 



appropriated for such purposes. No general rule 

 of international law exempts mail ships from cap- 

 ture as prize of war. 



The Adula, decided Feb. 26, 1900, was a British 

 steamer owned by the Atlas Steamship Company, 

 of Kingston, Jamaica, leased to a Spanish citizen 

 for carrying refugees from Guantanamo, Cuba. 

 The vessel was captured June 29, 1898, when en- 

 tering Guantanamo Bay, and was condemned as 

 a prize vessel. The court held that Admiral Samp- 

 son's blockade was effective; that the purpose of 

 the voyage was pecuniary and not charitable, and 

 that the vessel was a lawful prize. If a master 

 has actual notice of a blockade, he is not at liberty 

 even to approach the blockaded port for the pur- 

 pose of making inquiries. If a neutral vessel be 

 chartered to an enemy, she becomes to a certain 

 extent and pro hac vice an enemy's vessel, and 

 a notice to her charterer of the existence of a 

 blockade is a notice to the vessel. Justices Shiras, 

 Gray, White, and Peckham dissented. 



The Benito Estenger was decided March 5. This 

 was a Spanish vessel, but was sailing under the 

 English flag after transfer from the Spanish owner 

 to the neutral, and was captured off Cape Cruz, 

 on the south coast of Cuba. . She was condemned 

 in the court below, and that condemnation was 

 affirmed by the Supreme Court, three justices dis- 

 senting. The transfer to the neutral was found 

 to be merely colorable. The former, or rather the 

 real owner, a Cuban subject of Spain, declared 

 that he was an adherent of the insurgent cause, 

 and therefore an ally of the United States rather 

 than a loyal subject of Spain. The court applied 

 the general doctrine that in time of war citizens 

 or subjects of the belligerents are enemies to each 

 ether, without regard to individual sentiments or 

 dispositions, and that political status determines 

 the question of enemy ownership. 



The Carlos F. Roses, decided May 14, was a 

 Spanish bark, and was proceeding from Monte- 

 video to Havana, with a cargo of jerked beef and 

 garlic. She was captured in the Bahama Channel 

 by the cruiser New York, and was duly condemned 

 as enemy property. Neutral bankers claimed the 

 cargo, on the ground that they had made advances 

 upon the security of the bills of lading indorsed 

 in blank, and were wholly unindemnified except 

 through insurers, who would be subrogated to 

 their own rights. The majority of the Supreme 

 Court found that the transactions, so far as they 

 were shown, presented evidence of an enemy in- 

 terest which called upon the asserted neutral own- 

 ers to prove beyond question their right and title, 

 which they had not sufficiently done within the 

 rules established by the authorities. The court 

 aoverted to the fact that provisions, by the mod- 

 ern law of nations, may become contraband, al- 

 though belonging to a neutral, on account of the 

 particular situation of the war or on account of 

 their destination, as for military use at ports of 

 naval or military equipment. 



Deiwy's Boutiii/ Claims. Dewoy r*. the United 

 States. The original suit was brought in the Court 

 of Claims to recover bounty money earned by the 

 commanding officer of the American fleet at the 

 battle of Manila, on May 1, 1898. In fixing the 

 amount of the bounty it was necessary to determine 

 whether the Spanish vessels engaged at Manila 

 were of superior or inferior force to the American 

 fleet, and to determine, as matter of law, whether, 

 in determining the relative strength of the two 

 fleets, the land batteries and mines and torpedoes 

 of the Spanish should be taken into consideration 

 in arriving at the strength of the Spanish fleet. 

 The Court of Claims held that the land batteries 

 and mines and torpedoes should not be considered 



