AUSTRALASIA. 



61 



both houses by popular suffrage. In colonies where 

 female suffrage has been adopted women will be 

 entitled to vote for the federal as well as for the 

 colonial legislators. In the State Council each 

 colony will have the same number of representa- 

 tives, whatever its population, while in the lower 

 house representation will be in proportion to popu- 

 lation. Equal representation in the Senate was the 

 condition on which the smaller colonies insisted 

 before they would consent to enter into the federa- 

 tion. In return the larger colonies demanded that 

 the upper house should have no power to amend 

 money bills. As a compromise it was finally 

 agreed that the Senate may suggest amendments to 

 financial measures. The State Council, moreover, 

 retains the power of veto. Another safeguard for 

 the rights of the smaller states is that all powers 

 that are not explicitly vested in the commonwealth 

 shall be retained by the individual states, reversing 

 the Canadian system of federation, which leaves to 

 the Dominion all authority not definitely reserved 

 to the individual colonies. One of the main diffi- 

 culties encountered in the Federal Convention was 

 to provide for the possibility of a deadlock caused 

 by disagreement between the two houses of the 

 Federal Legislature, a constitutional problem that 

 has blocked the wheels of legislation and given rise 

 to unpleasant conflicts in some of the colonies of 

 Australia. After a long debate and a revision of 

 the first conclusion it was in the end decided that 

 in the event of a deadlock, after the lower house 

 has passed a measure twice over the Senate's veto, 

 both houses shall be dissolved simultaneously; in 

 case the newly elected houses disagree they shall 

 meet together in a joint session and vote on the bill 

 in question, which shall be carried or rejected by a 

 three-fifths majority of both houses voting to- 

 gether. The problem of federal finance was left 

 for its final adjustment to be solved in the light of 

 experience. It was generally agreed that the cus- 

 toms and excise revenue of the colonies was to be 

 surrendered for the purposes of federal expenditure, 

 and that the surplus remaining after all federal 

 requirements were satisfied should be returned to 

 the several colonies. The proportion in which 

 eachshould share in this surplus presented prac- 

 tical difficulties. A motion to restrict federal ex- 

 penditure to one fourth of the revenue collected 

 was carried, but afterward was rescinded. To re- 

 distribute the surplus in proportion to population 

 would be advantageous to Tasmania, and would 

 disturb but little the finances of Victoria and 

 South Australia, but would be most unjust to 

 Western Australia, which raises by indirect taxation 

 more than three times as much revenue per capita 

 MS the other colonies. Equal tariff rates would 

 place an undue share of the burden on New South 

 Wales. The question of determining what is the 

 fair share to be paid by each colony and what the 

 actual contribution obtained from it by the tariff 

 involved the whole subject of the financial relations 

 of the several colonies. It was referred to a special 

 committee on finance, and the recommendations of 

 the committee were, with slight modifications, incor- 

 porated in the bill. They are to the effect that a 

 uniform tariff shall be established for the federated 

 colonies within two years, and that within the 

 limits of this tariff trade shall be absolutely free. 

 A system of careful and detailed bookkeeping and 

 statistics shall be maintained for five years, by 

 means of which it is hoped that the just contribu- 

 tion of each of the colonies to the general trade and 

 its just share in the general expenditure of the 

 commonwealth will be ascertained, and the Federal 

 Parliament will then be able to decide on the pro- 

 portion of the surplus of the customs revenue that 

 each state is entitled to receive. Many other points 



were discussed, but the prevailing idea was that it 

 would be unwise to load down the measure with 

 specific legislation. The commonwealth bill dealt 

 rather with constitutional principles and essential 

 questions, and contained compromises and conces- 

 sions in which the representatives of the small 

 colonies and those of the large, the exponents of 

 protection, and the free traders found it hard to 

 acquiesce. There was a general understanding that 

 in case of the commonwealth bill becoming law an 

 arrangement would be made for the admission of 

 Queensland to the federation. The parliamentary 

 representatives of the central division of Queens- 

 land petitioned the Federal Convention to admit 

 central and northern Queensland as separate states, 

 irrespective of southern Queensland. It was not 

 necessary to initiate the scheme that all the colonies 

 should unite to form the federation. The enabling 

 bill enacted by the British Parliament provided 

 that three or more of the colonies might unite in a 

 federation, which the other colonies might join 

 from time to time as their interests should dictate 

 and their people decide. The enabling bill left the 

 final decision to the electors of the several colonies, 

 and prescribed that in each colony a substantial 

 minimum vote should be required so as to preclude 

 the possibility of a misinterpretation of the popular 

 desire or the possibility of a change except by a 

 deliberate resolution of the people. This minimum 

 was fixed in some of the colonies at so high a figure 

 that the advocates of federation anticipated great 

 difficulty in obtaining the prescribed majority. 

 Thus, in Victoria a minimum vote of 50,000 was 

 required among 252,000 qualified electors ; in New 

 South Wales, with a total of 293,000, the minimum 

 was increased from 50,000 to 80,000 votes. 



The question of referring legislation on old-age 

 pensions to the Federal Parliament was at once de- 

 cided in the negative by the convention. A spirited 

 controversy between the representatives of South 

 Australia and New South Wales grew out of the 

 proposition to leave to the Federal Parliament the 

 exclusive control of intercolonial rivers. The South 

 Australian delegates, having special regard to the 

 tributaries of the river Murray, contended that the 

 navigation of the lower reaches of a river ought not 

 to be impeded by the withdrawal of the upper 

 waters for irrigation purposes. The Government of 

 New South Wales conceded to the commonwealth 

 the control of the navigation of the Murray, but 

 claimed the free use of the water of the tributaries 

 for irrigation purposes, having sold lands with the 

 understanding that the water should be available to 

 settlers. The rivers were regarded as the most 

 valuable part of the colony, without the use of 

 which for irrigation a large portion of the surf are 

 must remain a sheep run instead of being perma- 

 nently settled. It was resolved that if Great Britain 

 contributed a third of the cost of .the projected 

 Pacific cable, and Canada a third, then New South 

 Wales, Victoria, Queensland, and Tasmania should 

 find the remaining third. The convention gave the 

 interests of navigation precedence over irrigation. 

 It was decided against the protest of Queensland 

 and Western Australia to give the federation exclu- 

 sive power to legislate concerning aliens, the re- 

 striction of immigration to remain a question for 

 the individual states until federal legislation shall 

 have been enacted on the subject. It was resolved 

 to pass an act similar to the law of Natal restricting 

 the immigration of colored races. A clause was 

 adopted declaring that the commonwealth shall not 

 prohibit any religion nor impose any religous test 

 for office. The federation, by a clause which was 

 first made mandatory, then merely permissive, can 

 assume and consolidate the debts of all the colonies. 

 The convention could not see a way, in view of the 



