CHINA. 



127 



of infringing the rights and privileges guaranteed 

 by existing treaties between China and foreign 

 countries, and that both Port Arthur and Talien- 

 wan would be opened to foreign commerce. Lord 

 Salisbury on March 22 expressed grave objections 

 to the lease of Port Arthur, describing it as useless 

 for commercial purposes, its whole importance be- 

 ing derived from its military strength and strategic 

 position, the occupation of which would be con- 

 sidered in the East as a standing menace to Pekin 

 and a commencement of the partition of China. 

 On March 24 M. de Staal explained to Mr. Balfour 

 that Talienwan was the outlet to Russian commerce, 

 but that it must be protected ; therefore Port 

 Arthur, which entirely dominated it, could not be 

 left in the hands of another power. When Sir 

 Nicholas O'Conor suggested that an understanding 

 with England would secure the safety of the Rus- 

 sian fleet at Talienwan without Port Arthur, Count 

 Muravieff complained that England alone of all the 

 powers stood in the way of Russia and resented in 

 any degree her proposed action. Why should not 

 Russia, when every other great maritime power 

 possessed a naval station in the China seas, have a 

 safe harbor for her fleet that would not be at the 

 mercy of the elements at Vladivostok or dependent 

 upon the good will of the Japanese. On March 28 

 Mr. Balfour in a long dispatch embodied the 

 British views on the Russian concessions, which 

 were that a railroad under Russian management 

 annecting ports on the Pacific with the Russian 

 :>mmercial and military system would revolution- 

 the political and economic state of Manchuria, 

 it would not be regarded with dissatisfaction so 

 ang as the natural flow of trade was not obstructed 

 jr diverted by fiscal or administrative regulations ; 

 mt the occupation of Port Arthur, however, a 

 ival base of great natural and artificial strength, 

 lominating the Gulf of Pechili and menacing 

 ^ekin, was likely to have political consequences of 

 reat international importance, and that it was un- 

 jrtunate that it had been thought necessary by a 

 Rat military power which is conterminous for 4,000 

 riles with the land frontier of China, and never 

 iely therefore to be without a due share of influ- 

 ice on the councils of that country, to obtain in 

 idition control of a port which, if the rest of the 

 rulf of Pechili remained in hands as helpless as 

 lose of the sovereign power, commanded the mari- 

 time approaches to its capital. The British Gov- 

 ernment, its proposal to abstain from occupying a 

 aort in the Gulf of Pechili so long as other powers 

 lid the same having been rejected, retained entire 

 liberty of action to take what steps it thought best 

 protect its interests and diminish the evil con- 

 ^uenoes that it anticipated. Abandoning the 

 licy of the open door to which it was committed, 

 the preponderant interest and priority of claim in 

 China asserted by Mr. Curzon, the principle just 

 leclared by the House of Commons that it is of 

 dtal importance for British commerce and influ- 

 ence that the independence of Chinese territory 

 shall be maintained, the British Government ended 

 by claiming as its share the port of Wei-Hai-Wei. 



The arrangement for the lease of Port Arthur 

 and Talienwan, with the right to connect them with 

 Petuna, on the Trans-Manchurian Railroad, by way 

 of Mukden, was signed on March 27. Great 

 Britain made a great naval demonstration in the 

 Gulf of Pechili, which did not deter the Tsung-li- 

 Yamen from acceding to the Russian demands. 

 The imperial ratification had previously been given, 

 and the Russians immediately took possession of 

 Port Arthur. The Emperor received the Russian 

 charge d'affaires, who as a novel mark of distinc- 

 tion was allowed to ascend the throne, and in his 

 speech in answer to the Czar's message he spoke of 



a treaty of alliance, lately concluded, that strength- 

 ened the cordial friendship existing since two cen- 

 turies between the two states. The Russo-Chinese 

 agreement, which was signed by M. Pavloff and by 

 Li-Hung-Chang and Chang-Yin-IIuan, provides 

 that Port Arthur and a part of Talienwan shall be 

 reserved as naval ports for the sole use of Russian 

 and Chinese men-of-war. It left the delimitation 

 and the railroad route to be settled with the Chinese 

 envoy in St. Petersburg, Hsu-Ching-Cheng, who 

 was Chinese director of the Eastern China or 

 Trans-Manchurian Railroad. North of the least-d 

 territory a neutral zone was to be measured off, 

 within which China should exercise jurisdiction, 

 but not quarter troops without the consent of 

 Russia. Within the Russian jurisdiction the Chi- 

 nese inhabitants had the option of remaining, and 

 any Chinese charged with a criminal offense must 

 be handed over to the nearest Chinese official. The 

 term of the lease was originally intended to be 

 ninety-nine years, but was altered to conform to 

 the German precedent. In the Russian lease it is 

 provided that it may be extended further by com- 

 mon accord. The Russians reserved to themselves 

 the right of collecting the customs duties at Talien- 

 wan, agreeing as a temporary arrangement to pay 

 all moneys collected in excess of the cost of collec- 

 tion over to the Chinese Government, so that the 

 imperial customs revenue shall not suffer loss when 

 Talienwan supplants Niuchwang as the chief port 

 of Manchuria. 



On April 1 Count Muravieff, in answer to a re- 

 quest that his assurances should be recapitulated in 

 writing, explained that the ideas confidentially ex- 

 pressed previous to the conclusion of the arrange- 

 ments with China were not assurances.. Now that 

 concrete assurances could be given, he affirmed that 

 Russia intended to maintain the rights of sov- 

 ereignty of China and to respect existing treaties. 

 The substitution of the usufruct of Russia for the 

 possession of China had not impaired the interests 

 of the other powers ; on the contrary, by agreement 

 with China, Talienwan would be made a treaty 

 port. As regards all other points, the status quo 

 would be scrupulously maintained, and Port Arthur 

 would be open to English ships on the same con- 

 ditions as it has always been, but Russia would not 

 abuse the lease by transforming a closed and prin- 

 cipally military port into a commercial port like 

 any other. In April the leased territory at Talien- 

 wan was extended so as to include Kinchau Bay. 

 Fortifications were added speedily to the works at 

 Port Arthur, the strong forts built by German 

 engineers. At Talienwan, the southern part of the 

 port was laid out as a military harbor and closed 

 to merchant vessels. The area taken under Russian 

 administration embraces 800 square miles, including 

 Kinchau and all the harbors between Port Arthur 

 and Talienwan. The effective occupation of the 

 leased territory was begun on March 28 by R ear- 

 Admiral Dubasoff. The Russian garrison at the 

 end of June was 5,000, and before the close of 1898 

 it was arranged to bring it up to 20,000 men, in 

 addition to the 50,000 picked soldiers who will act 

 as guards for the protection of the railroads. Japan 

 was reconciled to the Russian occupation of Leao- 

 tong when the Russian financial advisers and 

 military instructors were withdrawn from Koiva. 

 where a political agitation against the Russians 

 had hindered their work and the Korean Govern- 

 ment had said that it could do without foreign 

 assistance. The Russian Government gave warn- 

 ing that if the Koreans could not maintain order 

 and preserve their independence it would take 

 measures for the protection of the interests and 

 rights of Russia. Subsequently Russia and Japan 

 entered into an engagement to join in preventing 



