CONGRESS. (PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE.) 



147 



time a ruinous conflict had for seven years wasted 

 tlie neighboring island. During all those years an 

 utter disregard of the laws of civilized warfare and 

 of the just demands of humanity, which called 

 forth expressions of condemnation from the nations 

 of Christendom, continued unabated. Desolation 

 and ruin pervaded that productive region, enor- 

 mously affecting the commerce of all commercial 

 nations, but that of the United States more than 

 any other by reason of proximity and larger trade 

 and intercourse. At that juncture Gen. Grant ut- 

 tered these words, which now, as then, sum up the 

 elements of the problem : 



" A recognition of the independence of Cuba 

 being, in my opinion, impracticable and indefensi- 

 ble, the question which next presents itself is that 

 of the recognition of belligerent rights in the parties 

 to the contest. In a former message to Congress I 

 had occasion to consider this question, and reached 

 the conclusion that the conflict in Cuba, dreadful 

 and devastating as were its incidents, did not rise 

 to the fearful dignity of war. ... It is possible 

 that the acts of foreign powers, and even acts of 

 Spain herself, of this very nature, might be pointed 

 to in defense of such recognition. But now, as in 

 its past history, the United States should carefully 

 avoid the false lights which might lead it into the 

 ma/es of doubtful law and of questionable pro- 

 priety, and adhere rigidly and sternly to the rule, 

 which has been its guide, of doing only that which 

 is right and honest and of good report. The ques- 

 tion of according or of withholding rights of bel- 

 ligerency must be judged, in every case, in view of 

 the particular attending facts. Unless justified by 

 necessity, it is always, and justly, regarded as an 

 unfriendly act and a gratuitous demonstration of 

 moral support to the rebellion. It is necessary, and 

 it is required, when the interests and rights of an- 

 other government or of its people are so far affected 

 by a pending civil conflict as to require a definition 

 of its relations thereto. But this conflict must be 

 one which will be recognized in the sense of inter- 

 national law as war. 



" Belligerence, too, is a fact. The mere existence 

 if contending armed bodies, and their occasional 

 conflicts, do not constitute war in the sense referred 

 to. Applying to the existing condition of affairs in 

 Cuba the tests recognized by publicists and writers 

 on international law, and which have been observed 

 by nations of dignity, honesty, and power, when free 

 from sensitive or selfish and unworthy motives, I 

 fail to find in the insurrection the existence of 

 such a substantial political organization, real, pal- 

 pablc, and manifest to the world, having the forms 

 and capable of the ordinary functions of govern- 

 ment toward its own people and to other States, 

 with courts for the administration of justice, with 



local habitation, possessing such organization of 

 'orce, such material, such occupation of territory as 

 o take the contest out of the category of a mere 



bellions insurrection, or occasional skirmishes, 

 and place it on the terrible footing of war, to which 

 a recognition of belligerency would aim to ele- 

 vate it. 



" The contest, moreover, is solely on land ; the 

 insurrection has not possessed itself of a single sea- 

 port whence it may send forth its flag, nor has it 

 any means of communication with foreign powers 

 except through the military lines of its adversaries, 

 apprehension of any of those sudden and diffi- 

 cult complications which a war upon the ocean is 

 iipt to precipitate upon the vessels, both commer- 

 cial and national, and upon the consular officers of 

 Dther powers, calls for the definition of their rela- 

 tions to the parties to the contest. Considered as 



question of expediency, I regard the accordance 

 >f belligerent rights still to be as unwise and pre- 



mature as I regard it to be at present indefensible 

 as a measure of right. 



"Such recognition entails upon the country ac- 

 cording the rights which flow from it difficult and 

 complicated duties, and requires the exaction from 

 the contending parties of the strict observance of 

 their rights and obligations. It confers the right of 

 search upon the high seas by vessels of both parties; 

 it would subject the carrying of arms and muni- 

 tions of war, which now may be transported freely 

 and without interruption in vessels of the United 

 States, to detention and possible seizure ; it would 

 give rise to countless vexatious questions, would 

 release the parent Government from responsibility 

 for acts done by the insurgents, and would invot 

 Spain with the right to exercise the supervision, 

 recognized by our treaty of 1795, over our com- 

 merce on the high seas, a very large part of which, 

 in its traffic between the Atlantic and the Gulf 

 States and between all of them and the States on 

 the Pacific, passes through the waters which wash 

 the shores of Cuba. The exercise of this supervision 

 could scarce fail to lead, if not to abuses, certainly 

 to collision perilous to the peaceful relations of the 

 two States. There can be little doubt as to what 

 result such supervision would before long draw 

 this nation. It would be unworthy of the United 

 States to inaugurate the possibilities of such result 

 by measures of questionable right or expediency or 

 by any indirection." 



Turning to the practical aspects of a recognition 

 of belligerency and reviewing its inconveniences 

 and positive dangers, still further pertinent con- 

 siderations appear. In the code of nations there 

 is no such thing as a naked recognition of belliger- 

 ency unaccompanied by the assumption of interna- 

 tional neutrality. Such recognition without more 

 will not confer upon either party to a domestic- 

 con flict a status not theretofore actually possessed or 

 affect the relation of either party to other states. 

 The act of recognition usually takes the form of a 

 solemn proclamation of neutrality which recites 

 the de facto condition of belligerency as its motive. 

 It announces a domestic law of neutrality in the 

 declaring state. It assumes the international obli- 

 gations of a neutral in the presence of a public 

 state of war. It warns all citizens and others with- 

 in the jurisdiction of the proclaimant that they 

 violate those rigorous obligations at their own peril 

 and can not expect to be shielded from the conse- 

 quences. The right of visit and search on the seas 

 and seizures of vessels and cargoes and contraband 

 of war and good prize under admiralty law must 

 under international law be admitted as a legitimate 

 consequence of a proclamation of belligerency. 

 While according the equal belligerent rights de- 

 fined by public law to each party in our ports, dis- 

 favors would be imposed on both which, while 

 nominally equal, would weigh heavily in behalf of 

 Spain herself. Possessing a navy and controlling 

 the ports of Cuba, her maritime rights could be 

 asserted not only for the military investment of the 

 island, but up to the margin of our own territorial 

 waters, and a condition of things would exist for 

 which the Cubans within their own domain could 

 not hope to create a parallel; while its creation 

 through aid or sympathy from within our domain 

 would be even more impossible than now, with the 

 additional obligations of international neutrality 

 we would perforce assume. 



The enforcement of this enlarged and onerous 

 code of neutrality would only be influential within 

 our own jurisdiction by land and sea, and applica- 

 ble by our own instrumentalities. It could impart 

 to the United States no jurisdiction between Spain 

 and the insurgents. It would give the United 

 States no right of intervention to enforce the con- 



