

CONGRESS. (CUBA.) 



157 



Recognition of the insurgents as belligerents; rec- 

 ognition of the independence of Cuba ; neutral in- 

 tervention to end the war by imposing a rational 

 compromise between the contestants, and interven- 

 tion in favor of one or the other party. I speak not 

 of forcible annexation, for that can not be thought 

 of. That, by our code of morality, would be crimi- 

 nal aggression." 



Thereupon I reviewed these alternatives, in the 

 light of President Grant's measured words, uttered 

 in 1875, when after seven years of sanguinary, de- 

 structive, and cruel hostilities in Cuba he reached 

 the conclusion that the recognition of the independ- 

 ence of Cuba was impracticable and indefensible ; 

 and that the recognition of belligerence was not 

 warranted by the facts according to the tests of 

 public law. I commented especially upon the lat- 

 ter aspect of the question, pointing out the incon- 

 veniences and positive dangers of a recognition of 

 belligerence which, while adding to the already 

 onerous burdens of neutrality within our own juris- 

 diction, could not in any way extend our influence 

 or effective offices in the territory of hostilities. 



Nothing has since occurred to change my view in 

 this regard ; and I recognize as fully now as then 

 that the issuance of a proclamation of neutrality, 

 by which process the so-called recognition of bellig- 

 erents is published, could, of itself and unattended 

 by other action, accomplish nothing toward the one 

 end for which we labor the instant pacification of 

 Cuba and the cessation of the misery that afflicts 

 the island. 



Turning to the question of recognizing at this 

 time the independence of the present insurgent 

 government in Cuba, we find safe precedents in our 

 history from an early day. They are well summed 

 up in President Jackson's message to Congress, Dec. 

 21, 1836, on the subject of the recognition of the 

 independence of Texas. He said : 



"In all the contests that have arisen out of the 

 revolutions of France, out of the disputes relating 

 to the Crowns of Portugal and Spain, out of the 

 separation of the American possessions of both from 

 the European governments, and out of the numer- 

 ous and constantly occurring struggles for domin- 

 ion in Spanish America, so wisely consistent with 

 our just principles has been the action of our Gov- 

 ernment that we have, under the most critical cir- 

 cumstances, avoided all censure, and encountered 

 no other evil than that produced by a transient es- 

 trangement of good will in those against whom we 

 have been by force of evidence compelled to de- 

 cide. 



' It has thus made known to the world that the 

 uniform policy and practice of the United States is 

 to avoid all interference in disputes which merely 

 relate to the internal government of other nations, 

 and eventually to recognize the authority of the 

 prevailing party without reference to our particu- 

 lar interests and views or to the merits of the origi- 

 nal controversy. 



"... But on this, as on every other trying oc- 

 casion, safety is to be found in a rigid adherence to 

 principle. 



" In the contest between Spain and the revolted 

 colonies we stood aloof, and waited not only until the 

 ability of the new states to protect themselves was 

 fully established, but until the danger of their be- 

 ing again subjugated had entirely passed away. 

 Then, and not until then, were they recognized. 



" Such was our course in regard to Mexico her- 

 self. ... It is true that with regard to Texas the 

 civil authority of Mexico has been expelled, its in- 

 vading army defeated, the chief of the republic 

 himself captured, and all present power to control 

 the newly organized government of Texas annihi- 

 lated within its confines; but, on the other hand, 



there is, in appearance at least, an immense dis- 

 parity of physical force on the side of Texas. The 

 Mexican republic, under another executive, is 

 rallying its forces under a new leader and mena- 

 cing a fresh invasion to recover its lost dominion. 



" Upon the issue of this threatened invasion the 

 independence of Texas may be considered as sus- 

 pended; and were there nothing peculiar in the 

 relative situation of the United States and Texas, 

 our acknowledgment of its independence at such a 

 crisis could scarcely be regarded as consistent with 

 that prudent reserve with which we have hitherto 

 held ourselves bound to treat all similar questions." 



Thereupon Andrew Jackson proceeded to con- 

 sider the risk that there might be imputed to the 

 United States motives of selfish interest in view of 

 the former claim on our part to the Territory of 

 Texas, and of the avowed purpose of the Texans in 

 seeking recognition of independence as an incident 

 to the incorporation of. Texas in the Union, con- 

 cluding thus : 



" Prudence, therefore, seems to dictate that we 

 should still stand aloof and maintain our present 

 attitude, if not until Mexico itself or one of the 

 great foreign powers shall recognize the independ- 

 ence of the new government, at least until the 

 lapse of time or the course of events have proved 

 beyond cavil or dispute the ability of the people of 

 that country to maintain their separate sovereignty 

 and to uphold the government constituted by them. 

 Neither of the contending parties can justly com- 

 plain of this course. By pursuing it we are but 

 carrying out the long-established policy of our Gov- 

 ernment, a policy which has secured to us respect 

 and influence abroad and inspired confidence at 

 home." 



These are the words of the resolute and patriotic 

 Jackson. They are evidence that the United States, 

 in addition to the test imposed by public law as the 

 condition of the recognition of independence by a 

 neutral state (to wit, that the revolted state shall 

 " constitute in fact a body politic, having a govern- 

 ment in substance as well as in name, possessed of 

 the elements of stability," and forming de facto, 

 " if left to itself, a state among the nations, reason- 

 ably capable of discharging the duties of a state "), 

 has imposed for its own governance in dealing with 

 cases like these the further condition that recogni- 

 tion of independent statehood is not due to a re- 

 volted dependency until the danger of its being 

 again subjugated by the parent state has entirely 

 passed away. 



This extreme test was, in fact, applied in the case 

 of Texas. The Congress to whom President Jack- 

 son referred the question as one " probably leading 

 to war," and therefore a proper subject for " a pre- 

 vious understanding with that body by whom war 

 can alone be declared and by whom all the provisions 

 for sustaining its perils must be furnished," left the 

 matter of the recognition of Texas to the discretion 

 of the Executive, providing merely for the sending 

 of a diplomatic agent when the President should be 

 satisfied that the republic of Texas had become "an 

 independent state." It was so recognized by Presi- 

 dent Van Buren, who commissioned a charge 

 d'affaires March 7, 1837, after Mexico had aban- 

 doned an attempt to reconquer the Texan territory, 

 and when there was at the time no bona fide contest 

 going on between the insurgent province and its 

 former sovereign. 



I said in my message of December last, " It is to 

 be seriously considered whether the Cuban insur- 

 rection possesses beyond dispute the attributes of 

 statehood which alone can demand the recognition 

 of belligerency in its favor." The same require- 

 ment must certainly be no less seriously considered 

 when the graver issue of recognizing independence 



