T36 



UNITED STATES OP AMERICA. 



of the United States was refuted by a description 

 of the onerous and expensive measures adopted for 

 the enforcement of the neutrality laws, amply suffi- 

 cing to cover all international obligations. While 

 regretting that the Spanish Government had not 

 accepted the offer of good offices, but had recom- 

 mended joint action of the two countries, each in 

 its domestic sphere, Gen. Woodford promised that 

 any progress toward a contented and recuperative 

 peace attained through just and humane measures 

 could not but be benevolently viewed, and that so 

 long as the event invited and justified such a course 

 the United States would persevere in the path of 

 kindly expectancy. 



Proposed Cuban Autonomy. The measure of 

 self-government proclaimed by the Spanish Crown 

 on Nov. 25, 1897. was rejected in advance by the 

 insurgents, while the Spanish Cubans who upheld 

 Weyler's policy condemned any concessions. The 

 remnant of the Autonomist party accepted it as an 

 earnest of a better constitution to be obtained in 

 the future, and applied themselves to the task of 

 putting the autonomous system in operation, and 

 the multitude of pacificos who had taken no will- 

 ing part in the hostilities on either side were in- 

 clined to accept any solution that promised to end 

 the period of havoc and suffering and restore peace 

 to tne island. The autonomy act fell far short of 

 the promises and professions of the Spanish Gov- 

 ernment. The Autonomous Legislature could en- 

 act no law without the approval of the Governor 

 General. Even the fiscal independence that was 

 promised was rendered nugatory by a clause pro- 

 viding that the Madrid Government should fix the 

 amount to be paid by the colonial treasury for the 

 maintenance of the rights of the Spanish Crown, 

 and that the Cuban Chamber could not discuss the 

 estimates for the colonial budget until this amount 

 was voted. Another clause provided for perpetual 

 preferential duties in favor of Spanish trade and 

 manufactures. 



The insurgents rejected the compromise of au- 

 tonomy from the time the project was first mooted. 

 The Minister of the Colonies repeatedly stated that 

 autonomy was not given to the rebels, but to peace- 

 ful and loyal Cubans, so that the protest of the 

 Spanish authorities that the failure of autonomy 

 was due to the encouragement given to the rebels 

 by the threatening attitude of the United States 

 toward Spain was not well founded. The opposi- 

 tion shown to reforms by the military element had 

 been a serious obstacle to peace. Conciliatory 

 measures suggested by the leaders of the Autono- 

 mist party were not tried because of the opposition 

 of the army. When it was proposed to disband 

 the local Spanish volunteer regiments and substi- 

 tute a force of Cuban militia drawn from the ranks 

 of the insurgents, the volunteers obtained a promise 

 from Gen. Blanco, which was afterward confirmed 

 by the Madrid authorities, that in no case would 

 their organization be disturbed. The proposal to 

 treat with the Government of the Republic of Cuba, 

 and endeavor to secure terms on which the rebels 

 would accept the new constitution and lay down 

 their arms, fell through because of the determined 

 resistance of high military authorities both in Spain 

 and in Cuba. 



The autonomous system was formally inaugu- 

 rated in Cuba in the" beginning of January, 18U8. 

 The Autonomous Cuban ministry was composed of 

 Jose Maria Gal vez, Antonio Galvez, Rafael Montoro, 

 Francesco Zavas, Sefior Govin, Sefior Giberga, and 

 SeHor Ambard. No sooner had it been constituted 

 than serious differences arose between the members, 

 caused by the sympathies of some toward the cause 

 of Cuban liberty and the tendency of the others 

 toward the restoration of the old colonial system. 



Ministers Giberga and Ambard were accused of 

 secretly treating with the Separatists and favoring 

 the independence of Cuba. Antonio Govin, the 

 Cuban Minister of Justice and Interior, was de- 

 nounced by the Spaniards as a traitor. There were 

 some hopeful signs in the beginning that the pro- 

 posed autonomy might result in a peaceful compro- 

 mise. Many refugees returned from the United 

 States, and some insurgents of more or less promi- 

 nence submitted to the authorities in accordance 

 with Marshal Blanco's proclamation of amnesty. 

 The first disturbing influence proceeded from the 

 Spaniards in Cuba, who in the middle of January 

 made riotous demonstrations against autonomy and 

 threatened Americans in Havana. This impelled 

 Consul-General Lee to request that an American 

 war ship be sent to protect United States citizens. 

 The Military Situation in Cuba. The proffer 

 of more satisfactory and complete autonomy would 

 not have induced the Cubans to lay down their 

 arms, even if they had faith in the permanence of 

 the Spanish concessions. The bitterness engendered 

 by Gen. Weyler's policy divided the partisans of 

 Spain from the Cuban patriots by an impassable 

 gulf, and the rebels, exhausted and suffering though 

 they were, believed that their relative position was 

 stronger than ever. Though ill clad, often starving, 

 and badly armed, they had made so stiff a roi-t- 

 ance to the largest army that Spain could muster 

 for transmarine service that the military and finan- 

 cial resources of the Spanish Government probably 

 could not outlast one more campaign. The number 

 of Spanish soldiers who had died from wounds or 

 disease from the beginning of the war, in February, 

 1895, to January, 1898. was officially stated to be 

 52,000, while 47,000 had been sent back to Spain as 

 invalids, and 42,000 were in hospital and unfit for 

 duty. This reduced the effective strength of the 

 active army to about 70,000 men, besides whom 

 there were about 16,000 irregular cavalry under 

 arms. In case of war the Spaniards could rely on 

 about 150,000 men trained in the regular army then 

 in Cuba, about 50,000 volunteers who had received 

 some military training, and an indefinite number of 

 irregular troops. The losses of the rebels from the 

 number of men killed and disabled, and from sick- 

 ness and lack of medical attendance, had been 

 equally heavy. Still, they were able to maintain 

 their position indefinitely without seeking to en- 

 gage the Spanish forces ; for, although they were 

 better provided with arms and ammunition than 

 they ever had been before, they had ceased their of- 

 fensive tactics. Food was very scarce, especially 

 in the country desolated by both armies and depopu- 

 lated by the bando of reconcentration, embracing 

 the provinces of Havana, Matanzas, Santa Clara, am 

 Pinar del Rio, but the mobile insurgent grou 

 could find everywhere enough to live upon. 

 January and February skirmishing went on 

 usual all over the country. The troops assailed 

 rebel positions in Pinar del Rio without inflicting 

 any serious losses. In Puerto Principe the insurgent - 

 were well provided with necessaries and wer* 

 disturbed by the troops. In Santiago de Cuba, the 

 section known as Cuba Libre, the rebels lived in 

 comparative security, raising crops and tending 

 their cattle without interference, and preventing 

 the sugar planters from grinding cane. Gen. Gome/. 

 and his forces were in Santa Clara in a position that 

 the Spaniards did not venture to attack. An officer 

 of the Cuban volunteers who went to the rebel 

 camp to treat for peace in behalf of the Autono- 

 mous Government was tried and executed under the 

 law handed down from the old war of independence, 

 which ordained that any emissary of the Spaniards 

 offering any terms except Cuban independence 

 should be shot. 



