UNITED STATES OP AMERICA. 



71'.' 



next mustered in a camp was prepared at Wash- 

 ington. 



The Blockade of Cuba. The dismissal of Min- 

 ister Woodford was considered equivalent to a dec- 

 laration of war, and a state of war was assumed to 

 exist from April 21. To regularize the situation, 

 Congress passed on April 25, and the President 

 signed, a declaration to that effect, empowering the 

 President to use the land and naval forces of the 

 United States and to call into service the militia of 

 the several States. A notification of the act was 

 telegraphed to all of the United States legations, 

 to be communicated to foreign governments, so 

 that their neutrality might be assured. The squad- 

 ron at Key West received orders to blockade the 

 Cuban coast at once. War preparations had been 

 pushed with redoubled energy in both countries 

 during the diplomatic crisis, when in all quarters 

 except the Vatican hopes of a peaceful issue had 

 vanished. The Spanish Minister of War issued 

 orders for 80,000 reserves, and in Cuba Gen. Blanco 

 called all men to arms. Three vessels loaded with 

 troops sailed from Cadiz on April 21. Capt. Wil- 

 liam T. Sampson, who had been placed in command 

 of the North Atlantic squadron, was made acting 

 rear admiral. Armed yachts and merchant steam- 

 ers were being made ready to re-enforce the block- 

 ading squadron. Meanwhile Admiral Sampson 

 confined his efforts to sealing up the larger ports. 

 The President proclaimed the blockade on April 

 22, announcing that a sufficient force would be 

 posted to prevent the entrance or exit of vessels 

 from all ports on the north coast between Cardenas 

 and Bahia Honda and the port of Cienfuegos, on 

 the south coast. Any neutral vessel approaching 

 or attempting to leave a blockaded port without 

 notice or knowledge of the blockade would be 

 warned by the commander of the blockading force, 

 and if she again attempted to enter any of the 

 ports she would be captured. Neutral vessels in the 

 ports were allowed thirty days to issue therefrom. 

 Admiral Sampson kept a particularly strong force 

 in front of Havana and Matanzas. He disposed 

 his forces in such a manner as to have near the 

 entrance of the blockaded ports a line of torpedo 

 boats and other small craft, with a line of cruisers 

 outside of these, and the battle ships in a third line 

 beyond the probable radius of action of the enemy's 

 torpedo craft. 



The United States Government announced in 

 the beginning that its policy would be not to resort 

 to privateering, but to adhere to the rules of the 

 declaration of Paris and conduct the war upon 

 principles in harmony with the present views of 

 nations and sanctioned by recent practice. A de- 

 cree was issued by the Spanish Government on 

 April 25 proclaiming a state of war and defining 

 the rules of war that Spain meant to observe. In 

 regard to privateering, it was considered indis- 

 pensable to make absolute reserve in order to 

 maintain Spain's liberty of action and uncontested 

 right to issue letters of marque when deemed ex- 

 pedient, but the Spanish Government would at first 

 confine itself to organizing immediately a force of 

 auxiliary cruisers taken from the mercantile marine 

 to co-operate with the navy under naval control and 

 to exercise the right of search. The regulation that 

 neutral flags "cover the enemy's merchandise except 

 contraband of war, and the one exempting from 

 seizure neutral merchandise under the enemy's flag, 

 were accepted. American vessels in Spanish ports 

 were warned to leave within thirty days. Foreign 

 vessels not American, if committing acts of war 

 under letters of marque issued by the United 

 States, would be treated as pirates. A blockade 

 to be obligatory must be effective, and this was do- 

 fined as meaning that it must be maintained with 



sufficient force to prevent access to the enemy's 

 littoral. 



In the President's proclamation of April 26 de- 

 claring that war had existed since April 21, includ- 

 ing that day, he declared respecting the right of 

 search and the rights of Spanish vessels that the 

 neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the excep- 

 tion of contraband of war ; that neutral goods not 

 contraband of war are not liable to confiscation 

 under the enemy's flag ; that blockades in order to 

 be binding must be effective : that Spanish vessels 

 in American ports would have till ^lay 21 to load 

 and depart, and would not be molested on their 

 voyage unless they carried officers in the enemy's 

 service or coal or other prohibited article ; that any 

 Spanish merchant vessel bound to American ports 

 would be permitted to enter, discharge her cargo, 

 depart forthwith, and continue her voyage to any 

 port not blockaded ; and that the right of search 

 must be exercised with strict regard for the rights 

 of neutrals, and the voyages of mail steamers not be 

 interfered with except on the clearest ground of 

 suspicion of a violation of law in respect of contra- 

 band or blockade. 



A general order issued by the Navy Department 

 subsequently defined the rule laid down at Paris in 

 1856, that blockades to be binding must be effective, 

 as meaning that the blockading force must be suf- 

 ficient to render ingress and egress from a port 

 dangerous; if the blockading vessels leave volun- 

 tarily or are driven away by the enemy's force the 

 blockade is broken, but not if they are driven away 

 by stress of weather or are absent in a chase. Arti- 

 cles adapted or designed only for hostile use by the 

 enemy, including arms and equipments of all kinds, 

 machinery for manufacture of arms, all ammuni- 

 tion and explosives, including saltpeter, armor 

 plate, gun carriages, pontoons, range finders, and 

 other warlike appliances and materials, and horses 

 were declared to be absolutely contraband, while 

 coal when destined for a naval station, a port of 

 call, or a ship or ships of the enemy, materials for 

 the construction of railroads or telegraphs, money 

 destined for the enemy's forces, and provisions de 

 tined for an enemy's ship or ships, or for a place 

 that is besieged, were conditionally contraband. 



Neither Spain nor the United States was a signa- 

 tory to the declaration of Paris, by which the rest 

 of the chief maritime powers agreed not to issue 

 letters of marque or countenance privateering in 

 war. The British Government notified Spain that 

 it intended to treat coal as contraband of war and 

 would forbid its sale to both parties, and it also 

 asked Spain what her intentions were as to the right 

 of searching neutral vessels. The " Somers," which 

 had put into the English port of Falmouth to take 

 on a crew, received notice to leave when a state of 

 war was declared before the complement of men 

 were enlisted, and was consequently there till the 

 end of the war. The cruiser "Albany," formerly 

 the Brazilian ship " Admiral Abreu," was tied up 

 in the same manner at Newcastle. The State De- 

 partment received notifications from nearly all for- 

 eign governments that they would observe striet 

 neutrality in the war between the I'uited State- 

 and Spain. Germany sent no such notice, deeming 

 it unnecessary. 



The Blockade. The blockading vessels formed 

 in line before Havana in the evening of April .'O. 

 Admiral Sampson confined the blockade to the 

 ports connected with Havana by railroad. Gen. 

 Blanco took measures to prepare Havana for either 

 a siege or an attack. He issued a decree declaring 

 the island again in a state of war, annulling all pre- 

 vious decrees, but granting pardon to rebels who 

 surrendered within a month. The colonial Cabinet 

 published a manifesto protesting against the in- 



