754 



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 



A line still nearer to the shore was guarded by what 

 was called the mosquito fleet, commanded by Rear- 

 Admiral Henry Erben, and consisting of more than 

 40 ships of all sizes, which watched along the whole 

 coast line from Maine to Texas. The Signal Corps 

 attended to the transmission of intelligence from 

 the patrol fleets to the Naval Department at Wash- 

 ington. About 60 signal stations along the coast 

 were fitted out with telegraph and telephone instru- 

 ments and elaborate signaling apparatus. 



Bombardment of San Juan. Admiral Samp- 

 son withdrew the battle ships " Iowa " and " Indi- 

 ana " and the cruisers " New York " and " Detroit " 

 from the Cuban blockade on May 1, and went to 

 Key West to prepare for a cruise in search of the 

 Cape Verd souadron. The United States fleet left 

 Key West on May 3 with orders to intercept and 

 destroy the Spanish squadron. They proceeded 

 slowly eastward, having taken in tow the monitors 

 " Terror " and " Amphitrite," which joined the fleet 

 with the torpedo boat " Porter " off Cardenas. The 

 speed was not more than 5 knots. The ocean 

 steamships " Harvard," " Yale," " St. Louis." and 

 " St. Paul " were scouting in the Caribbean Sea, 

 but found no traces there of the Spanish squadron. 

 Some anxiety was felt for the safety of the battle 

 ship " Oregon," which had reached Bahia, accom- 

 panied by the gun vessel " Marietta " and the un- 

 armored " Nictheroy," purchased from Brazil. At 

 Cape Haytien Admiral Sampson heard a report 

 that Spanish war ships had been seen heading for 

 Porto Rico. Early in the morning of May 12 the 

 American ships approached San Juan and made 

 ready for an attack on the forts. The battle was so 

 planned that the vessels would be in position to 

 meet the Spanish war ships, should these emerge 

 from the harbor. The attacking column was 

 formed of the " Iowa," flagship, the " Indiana," 

 " New York," " Amphitrite," and " Terror." The 

 " Detroit " went ahead to sound until 10 fathoms 

 of water was reached, and, after marking the posi- 

 tion, to remain on the lookout for torpedo-boat 

 destroyers. The " Wampatuck " sounded for 10 

 fathoms at the other end of the course. The 

 " Montgomery " took station opposite the Canuelo 

 fort, with orders to silence the guns if they opened 

 fire. The " Porter " watched near the harbor's 

 mouth, ready to torpedo the enemy's ships if they 

 came out. If Cervera's squadron were not in the 

 harbor (as was the case) it was Admiral Sampson's 

 purpose to attack the shore batteries in order to 

 test the effectiveness of his guns against land for- 

 tifications, and to cripple these as much as possible, 

 so as to render them less capable of supporting the 

 Spanish fleet, but chiefly to accustom his men to 

 battle and test their markmanship in action. 



The attack was begun at daylight and lasted 

 about three hours, resulting in considerable damage 

 to the batteries, and incidentally to the adjacent 

 portion of the city. The attack was made on the 

 shore battery of 6-inch guns and the less effective 

 Morro battery on the eastern arm of the harbor. 

 The fleet steamed past the forts in elliptical forma- 

 tion, the " Iowa," which led the column, beginning 

 the attack with a 12-inch shell, followed by a broad- 

 side. The "Detroit" approached within 1,000 

 yards, and then withdrew with the " Montgomery " 

 after passing the fortifications once, their guns being 

 too small to do any execution. The " Wampatuck " 

 and " Porter " also stayed out of range. The rest 

 of the fleet sailed by three times, the end of the 

 course being marked by an anchored boat of the 

 tug " Wampatuck." The thick smoke from the 

 common brown powder used on the American ships 

 interfered, as in all other engagements of the war, 

 with the aim of the gunners. Nevertheless, the 

 fortifications were hit frequently, and structures 



within were set on fire several times. The " Ter- 

 ror " not seeing the signal, continued firing for half 

 an hour after the rest of the ships withdrew. The 

 Spanish gunners were frequently driven away by 

 the shower of large and small shot that fell inside 

 of the fortifications, but always returned and 

 worked their guns industriously though unskill- 

 fully. Nearly all their shots went wide of the 

 mark, and the incessant fire had no material effect 

 on the American ships. An 8-inch shell went 

 through the superstructure of the " Iowa," scatter- 

 ing splinters that wounded 3 men. This vessel was 

 hit eight times, but her armor was not pierced. 

 On the " New York " 1 seaman was killed and 5 

 were wounded, and on the " Amphitrite " a gunner's 

 mate was killed. The Spanish commander reported 

 1 officer, 3 soldiers, and 1 civilian killed, and 13 

 soldiers and 30 civilians wounded. The " Porter " 

 crept up during the engagement close under a bluff 

 from which a masked battery suddenly poured a 

 plunging fire, from which she escaped unharmed. 

 The ships forming the battle line, rolling in a 

 heavy sea, manoeuvred at too long range to do 

 much execution. Most of their shells fell in the 

 harbor, Morro Castle and the fortress of San Cris- 

 tobal were damaged in places, and shells struck the 

 barracks as well as the cathedral, the palace, the 

 town hall, the seminary, and private houses in the 

 city. The American fleet discharged only 400 shots, 

 ceasing then because the men were becoming ex- 

 hausted by their exertions in the torrid heat. The 

 Spaniards fired a great many more shots. 



After the action Admiral Sampson returned with 

 his squadron to Key West, reuniting the whole fight- 

 ing force of the American navy, for Commodore 

 Schley's ships were at that rendezvous on the alert for 

 any hostile movement of the enemy. The " Terror " 

 made a dash out of the harbor a month later, with 

 the object of sinking the auxiliary cruiser " St. 

 Paul," which was steaming along the coast on ob- 

 servation duty. Capt. Sigsbee saw the destroyer in 

 time, and turned his rapid-fire guns upon her, kill- 

 ing an officer and 2 men and damaging the vessel 

 so badly that only with difficulty did she manage to 

 make her way back into port. 



Blockade of the Spanish Fleet in Santiago. 

 Commodore Schley's flying squadron left Hamp- 

 ton Roads for Key West on receipt of the news 

 that the Spaniards were off Martinique, and re- 

 mained at Key West guarding the coast and cover- 

 ing the blockading fleet of small vessels against a 

 possible attack, while Admiral Sampson was endeav- 

 oring to intercept the Spaniards at the entrance of 

 the Caribbean. Schley's squadron was still at Key 

 West when Sampson returned from the fruitless; 

 bombardment of San Juan de Puerto Rico, but 

 after Cervera's fleet left the vicinity of Curacao it 

 hurriedly took on coal and departed on Mav 20 to- 

 blockade Cienfuegos with the " Brooklyn," " Texas" 

 " Massachusetts, " Iowa," and "Scorpion," while 

 Admiral Sampson was instructed to guard the en- 

 trance of Havana harbor. In consequence of infor- 

 mation arriving at the Naval Department from the 

 Cubans that the Spanish ships were at Santiago^ 

 Commodore Schley was ordered on May 21 to pro- 

 ceed cautiously thither, if satisfied that they were 

 not at Cienfuegos. When the " Marblehead " ar- 

 rived on May 24 Commander McCalla established 

 communications with the Cubans on shore, and 

 thus obtained definite knowledge that the Spanish 

 fleet was not at Cienfuegos. Commodore Scliley 

 therefore sailed for Santiago. The fleet steamed 

 very slowly, and after arriving off that port on May 

 26 and receiving the reports of the commanders of 

 the scouts, Commodore Schley, rendered anxious 

 for his fleet by the state of the weather and the 

 shortness of coal on his ships, having less than two 



