762 



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 



with them the arrangements for a withdrawal. 

 He ordered them to remain in the positions then 

 held for another day, at the end of which they 

 would hold another conference. That night the 

 troops were dismayed afresh by a lively fire of 

 musketry, which occasioned a belief that the Span- 

 iards were trying to break through the lines. Gen. 

 Shatter cabled to the Secretary of War that he was 

 seriously considering a withdrawal of his forces to 

 high ground about 5 miles in the rear. Santiago 

 he found so well defended that he feared he could 

 only take it with serious loss of life, and he must 

 have re-enforcements. While waiting for them he 

 was afraid he could not supply his army in its 

 present advanced position. The Secretary cabled 

 in reply that he desired him to hold the San Juan 

 heights if possible, though he would leave the mat- 

 ter entirely to the judgment of Gen. Shatter. Gen. 

 Miles, who had another expedition already organ- 

 ized at Tampa for the invasion of Puerto Rico, tele- 

 graphed to Gen. Shatter that he would be with him 

 in a few days with re-enforcements, which were im- 

 mediately sent forward. Gen. Shatter had deter- 

 mined to demand the surrender of Santiago before 

 either retreating or advancing. After the first day's 

 battle he asked Admiral Sampson to force the en- 

 trance of the harbor and attack the city with the 

 fleet in order to avoid further sacrifice of life in the 

 army. The admiral explained that he was de- 

 terred from making such an attempt by the mines 

 in the channel, which would probably cause the 

 destruction of one or more of his ships, render- 

 ing the position of both fleet and army more diffi- 

 cult ; that if the land forces had attacked the shore 

 batteries in the rear and reduced them he would be 

 -able to raise the mines and take his ships inside, 

 but without that the army would have to wait until 

 he could try countermining. He had the apparatus 

 and would make the attempt if Gen. Shafter desired, 

 but it would take a long time. A conference was 

 appointed for the next morning. While Admiral 

 Sampson was steaming up the coast to Siboney for 

 the purpose of going to Gen. Shatter's headquarters 

 at El Pozo in the morning of July 3, Admiral 

 Cervera made his desperate dash out of Santiago 

 harbor. Lest the enemy should evacuate the city, 

 Gen. Shafter had extended his line round to the 

 north and then to the west, so that with the left 

 flank resting on Santiago Bay he had the Spaniards 

 shut in on every side, but with a line perilously at- 

 tenuated until a re-enforcement of 6,000 men ar- 

 rived a week later. Siege guns, however, came up 

 and were placed in position, also the re-enforcements 

 of field artillery, and intrench ments were rapidly 

 thrown up by the infantry. In the morning of July 

 3 there was firing of infantry on both sides, with 

 more heart on the part of the' Americans, with less 

 on the part of the Spaniards, who yielded some 

 ground. The siege line was thus drawn closely 

 round the city when the Spanish admiral made his 

 attempt to run the gantlet of the blockading fleet, 

 taking with him some of the guns that had done 

 good execution on the investing troops. The issue 

 of the naval battle greatly altered the military situ- 

 ation. Already on the same morning Gen. Shafter 

 had sent a flag of truce into Santiago demanding 

 the surrender of the town and its garrison before 

 10 o'clock the next day, on pain of bombardment, 

 and asking the commanding general of the Spanish 

 forces to notify the citizens of foreign countries and 

 women and children to leave the city. Gen. Jose 

 Toral, on whom the Spanish command devolved, 

 Gen. Linares having been wounded at San Juan, 

 refused to surrender. At the request of the foreign 

 consuls Gen. Shafter agreed to postpone shelling 

 the city for a day, in order that foreigners might be 

 brought into places of safety beyond the American 



lines. They asked if the non-combatants would be 

 allowed to take refuge in El Caney, and begged the 

 American general to supply them with food there. 

 Since the imperfect transportation made it impos- 

 sible to feed the troops sufficiently, the task of sup- 

 plying 20,000 more people at a point 15 miles from 

 the base was one that Gen. Shatter was unwilling 

 to undertake on his own responsibility. He tele- 

 graphed to Washington, and received the approval 

 of the President to his plan of opening the battle 

 on July 5. The whole civil population of Santiago 

 trooped out, their fears being quickened by a ter- 

 rific cannonading that was heard at the mouth 

 of the harbor, which they believed to be the 

 American fleet forcing an entrance. It was caused 

 by the attempt of the Spaniards in the night of 

 July 4 to block the channel by sinking the " Reina 

 Mercedes," which drew the fire of the American 

 ships. She was sunk by her own crew at the 

 designated place, but, like the " Merrimac," failed 

 to close the passage, for the reason that a shot 

 severed one of the anchor chains, causing her 

 to swing round to one side. At a conference on 

 July 5 with Capt. Chadwick, representing Admiral 

 Sampson, it was agreed that the army and navy 

 should make a joint attack on Santiago at noon on 

 July 9. A truce was arranged till that date, when 

 Gen. Shatter repeated his demand and the threat 

 of bombardment. Gen. Toral offered to evacuate 

 the city on condition that his troops were allowed 

 to march out with all their arms ; but Gen. Shafter 

 insisted on unconditional surrender, which was re- 

 fused. In the afternoon of July 10 the Spaniards 

 opened a vigorous fire with musketry and field 

 pieces. The American artillery returned the fire 

 with telling effect, while the infantry kept under 

 cover of their trenches, firing but little. The in- 

 fantry fire of the Spaniards also lagged, and their 

 men kept hidden behind their breastworks. The 

 American casualties were only 3 men wounded. 

 Before the firing ceased in the evening all the Span- 

 ish artillery had been silenced except one gun. 

 The navy had promised to throw 8-inch and lO-im-h 

 shells into the city for twenty-four hours, and, if 

 this did not prove effective, to force an entrance 

 with the smaller vessels. Accordingly, the ships 

 continued firing on the morning of July 11. Some 

 of the shells fell within the city, but did little dam- 

 age, as the houses were of stone, and when in one or 

 two instances fires were started they were quickly 

 extinguished. The army fired only a few six its 

 from the field guns on this second day, and the in- 

 fantry kept quiet. In the afternoon another truce 

 was arranged as a preliminary to negotiations for 

 surrender. The archbishop and the citizens, as 

 well as the consuls, urged Gen. Toral to capitulate. 

 After the arrival of Gen. Miles, on July 12, Gen. 

 Toral met him and Gen. Wheeler to discuss terms, 

 and on July 17 the terms were finally settled. The 

 Spanish general agreed to surrender the provim-.- 

 of Santiago and all the Spanish troops within ii-s 

 boundaries, except 10,000 at Holguin. The Span- 

 iards were to come to Santiago and to surrender 

 all arms. The guns and fortifications of Santiago 

 and other fortresses were to be turned over to the 

 Americans in good condition. The Spaniards were 

 to co-operate in destroying sunken torpedoes. The 

 American medical corps was to give its services in 

 taking care of Spanish sick and wounded, and the 

 American Government promised to transport bark 

 to Spain the surrendered troops, about 22,000 in 

 number. When Gen. Shatter entered Santiago he 

 found such an entanglement of defensive works 

 that, had the Spaniards offered the same resistance 

 as on the first day, it would have cost 5,000 Am-r- 

 ican lives to reduce the place. The actual Amer- 

 ican losses in the three days of fighting were 



