UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 



771 



prisoners without success, and at its request the 

 United States military authorities made an unavail- 

 ing demand for their liberation. 

 Occupation of Iloilp. When Gen. Rios, in 



Iloilo, who with 800 Spanish troops could ntot have 

 held out much longer against the assaults of the 

 natives, received word that the islands were to be 

 ceded to the United States, he handed the town 

 over to Vincente Guies, the Alcalde, and on Dec. 

 25 departed with his troops, instead of awaiting the 

 American force, which was sent somewhat tardily 

 to take possession. The Alcalde surrendered the 

 place on Dec. 26 to 3,000 insurgents, expressing the 

 hope that the Philippine republic would maintain 

 its power against any other Government. The 

 Eighteenth Infantry, Sixth Artillery, and Iowa 

 volunteers, under command of Gen. M. P. Miller, 

 arrived in the bay, Dec. 29, on the " Newport," 

 convoyed by the " Baltimore." Gen. Lopez at once 

 assembled 15,000 native warriors at Jaro, outside of 

 Iloilo. The orders from Washington were to occupy 

 Iloilo, but to do nothing to bring on a conflict with 

 the insurgents. The Filipinos refused to surrender 

 the town without instructions from Aguinaldo, and 

 Gen. Miller prepared to land forces to take forcible 

 possession, but was deterred by a petition from the 

 European residents. It was not till Feb. 11, 1899, 

 that the city was occupied by the Americans. 



The Cuban Military Assembly. The Pro- 

 visional Government of the Republic of Cuba, con- 

 sisting of President Bartolome Maso, Vice-President 

 Mendez Capote, and Secretaries Font, Aleman, and 

 Moreno de la Torre, met at Santa Cruz on Sept. 1, 

 and considering that they had been elected by the 

 people under arms, but that they represented the 

 majority of the Cubans ; that the United States 

 Government, which had liberated Cuba from Span- 

 ish domination, pursued the same object as them- 

 selves, Cuban independence, and, while not recog- 

 nizing, had not opposed or dissolved their authority 

 decided to call another assembly to determine 

 what course should be pursued pending the execu- 

 tion of the purpose of the United States Govern- 

 ment, which was that the whole Cuban people 

 should choose a Government that would shape the 

 destinies of the island. The first Council of Gov- 

 ernment was constituted in September, 1895, when 

 representatives of the Cuban army assembled at 

 Jimaguay and voted a constitution for two years 

 unless the war ended before. In 1897 the Assem- 

 bly, meeting again, adopted a new constitution, and 

 appointed a new Government Council for the war 

 period. President Maso, in a letter to President 

 McKinley, represented that this constitution was 

 the only legal system in force in Cuba; and that 

 the Provisional Government, although its mandate 

 expired on the cessation of the war, ought to be the 

 legal starting point for future developments of Cu- 

 ban politics, since it alone exercised any authority 

 that was respected. The Provisional Government 

 was not recognized any more than it had been. A 

 military government was appointed for Santiago, 

 with Gen. Leonard Wood as Governor, and when 

 the other provinces were evacuated by the Spanish 

 troops an army officer was appointed to administer 

 each one. 



There was some friction and distrust between the 

 Cubans and the Americans from the time of the 

 landing of Gen. Shafter's army at Santiago. The 

 American soldiers complained that their allies did 

 not do their share of work on intrenchments and 

 transport, and conceived a poor opinion, both of 

 their fighting qualities and of their moral character, 

 finding some of them predacious and cruel to the 

 Spaniards who fell into their hands. When a body 

 of Cuban guerrillas closed in on the survivors of 

 Cervera's fleet who went ashore near Cabrera, pre- 



venting them from escaping inland, they were seen 

 to fire at sailors clinging to the wrecks, upon which 

 the American officers who were endeavoring to 

 save the drowning men threatened to throw sh<-lls 

 among the Cubans if they did not desist from such 

 inhuman actions. Gen. Garcia's troops were posted 

 in the siege of Santiago at the extreme right of the 

 American line, and in the end took the Spanish 

 outposts on the north and the villages of Dos Cami- 

 nos and Cobre, completing the circle of invest- 

 ment, but not until Col.Escario had slipped through 

 with 2,000 Spanish troops from Manzanillo. Gen. 

 Francisco Estrada, who afterward joined Gen. Gar- 

 cia, harried the Spanish column on the march, with 

 the assistance of some of Garcia's cavalry, but Gen. 

 Garcia himself did not move out to meet the Span- 

 iards, giving as his reason that he was unwilling 

 to abandon his position on the right flank of the 

 American army, where, after extending his line to 

 the bay, he could prevent a sortie of the besieged 

 toward Holguin or assist the Cuban forces of Cama- 

 guey and Holguin to prevent the entrance of a 

 large relieving force of Spaniards that Gen. Mario 

 was expected to bring from Holguin. When San- 

 tiago surrendered, Gen. Shafter was unwilling to 

 admit Gen. Garcia to any share of the triumph, the 

 Cubans having taken a minor part in the victory. 

 He feared that the rude and undisciplined negroes 

 would commit acts of pillage, or that they and the 

 Spaniards would come into collision. Their leaders, 

 moreover, would be tempted to aspire to political 

 control and to pursue their old enemies with acts 

 of confiscation and revenge, for which the United 

 States would be held responsible. Gen. Garcia, not 

 being invited to take part in receiving the sur- 

 render, and the Cubans being forbidden to enter 

 the city, he marched away with his forces, taking 

 them back to their own districts on the plea that 

 Gen. Miles had given him no orders to co-operate 

 in further operations. The Cubans generally,- while 

 grateful to the Americans for liberating their island 

 from Spanish rule, felt deeply wronged through the 

 dilatory and unsympathetic way in which the war 

 was carried on. The pacific blockade, especially, is 

 said to have caused more frightful suffering and 

 mortality among their people than Gen. Weyler's 

 order of reconcentration. The evils of famine fell 

 upon the native country population, not upon the 

 Spanish troops or the Spanish residents of the cities, 

 for whom the food that was on the island was col- 

 lected and more was brought in by blockade run- 

 ners. After the conclusion of the armistice the 

 Cuban army was left in a desperate case. Its com- 

 manders accepted the armistice and abstained from 

 further hostilities against the Spanish. The Pro- 

 visional Government, which had failed to obtain 

 recognition, was powerless, nor was there any other 

 authority that could raise loans to buy food for the 

 soldiers or the starving civil population. The troops 

 had subsisted by levying contributions from the 

 owners of plantations, but this resource was now 



tion to" the garrison towns pending evacuation. 

 They refused to permit Red Cross agents or other 

 almoners of American charity to import food for 

 the Cuban army. Toward the end of Noveinlvr 

 the situation was relieved through the distribution 

 among the Cuban forces and the starving inhabit- 

 ants of 2,000,000 rations sent by the United States 

 Government. A previous cargo had been brought 

 back to the United States because the Spanish 

 authorities would not let il pass tin- customs bar- 

 riers without paying duties. In the neighborhood 

 of Havana the Cubans fared not so badly as in 

 other parts of the island, as their sympathizers in 



