CANADA, DOMINION OP. 



107 



no hope that we can settle the dispute by com- 

 promise, there are only two other ways in which 

 we can settle it. One would be by arbitration, 

 and the other would be by war. I am sure that 

 no one would think of war; and everybody would 

 agree that, though sometimes our patience would 

 be sorely tried, though sometimes we might be- 

 lieve that our opponents were taking undue lib- 

 erties with us and undue advantage over us, still 

 everybody would agree that we must exhaust all 

 peaceful means of reaching a settlement by arbi- 

 tration." 



T.he idea set forth by Sir Charles Tupper was, 

 in substance, that it was time to do more than 

 indulge in amiable and endless palaver with our 

 American cousins. They, being in practical pos- 

 session of the disputed territory, were only too 

 willing to keep up the discussion indefinitely, 

 while in the meantime American miners were 

 taking out most of the gold and American trad- 

 ers were enjoying all the commercial advantages 

 of the Yukon. Sir Charles paid his respects to 

 English statesmen in a manner which probably 

 did not afford them any great pleasure. He told 

 them, in good round terms, that his long years 

 of experience and observation had taught him 

 that the abiding weakness of the powers that be 

 in England is a tendency to consult the feelings 

 and wishes of the United States altogether too 

 much. He congratulated the Canadian Govern- 

 ment upon its determination to have no. more 

 meetings of the Anglo-American Commission un- 

 less and until this question was in a fair way 

 of settlement. By way of meeting the situation 

 as it now stood, he suggested that the Govern- 

 ment take power to construct a railway from 

 Kitimat Arm in British Columbia to Dawson via 

 Teslin lake, and also to provide that no mining 

 licenses should be issued to any but British 

 subjects. He assured the Government of hearty 

 support from the Conservatives in whatever might 

 be done to uphold the interest and the dignity 

 of Canada. 



Sir Wilfrid Laurier evidently thought that the 

 remarks made by Sir Charles with reference to 

 a railway were a weak point in the argument, 

 and he enlarged upon it at some length in an 

 attempt to show that the leader of the Opposi- 

 tion had repudiated the Senate's action of the 

 preceding session in rejecting the Mackenzie- 

 Mann scheme. As to the Alaskan boundary, the 

 Premier pointed out, as above, that there were 

 only three possible modes of settling such a con- 

 troversy compromise, arbitration, or war. The 

 attempt at compromise had failed, and nobody 

 contemplated the possibility of war. Only arbi- 

 tration remained, and Sir Wilfrid's remarks on 

 the point were of the nature of the physician's 

 statement that " while there's life there's hope." 

 From his general tone it was evident that he 

 did not expect to see in the near future any agree- 

 ment reached between Great Britain and the 

 United States. There was a distinct note of dis- 

 couragement in his appeal to the people of Can- 

 ada to be patient for a few months longer. While 

 discouraging the proposal to exclude American 

 miners from the Yukon country, he did not say 

 that it would be impossible for circumstances to 

 arise under which such a policy might be con- 

 templated. He confined himself to a contention 

 that such action would almost certainly lead to 

 retaliation, to be followed very probably by non- 

 intercourse. On July 30 was published an elab- 

 orate defense of the Canadian position by the 

 Hon. David Mills, Minister of Justice, and from 

 it the following is quoted: 



" The United States obtained a cession of this 



territory from Russia at a time when the Ala- 

 bama claims were unsettled, and the long strip 

 of territory extending from Mount St. Elias along 

 the coast of the southeast of Prince of Wales 

 island ought undoubtedly to be a Canadian pos- 

 session, if a similar strip of territory lay be- 

 tween the mainland of the United States and the 

 sea, I am quite sure its acquisition by us would 

 be regarded as a menace to that country. But 

 it is too late to consider how far this is injurious 

 to tlys country. Under the treaty of 1825 the 

 line drawn between the recogni/ed territory of 

 Russia and Great Britain was begun at the 

 southeast of Prince of Wales island, and from 

 that point was to ascend north along the chan- 

 nel called Portland channel. This could hardly 

 be the channel called Portland channel in mod- 

 ern maps, because Portland channel of this day 

 lies due east from the southern extremity of 

 Prince of Wales island, a distance of 130 miles. 

 The line was to ascend the channel to a point on 

 the coast on the fifty-sixth degree of north lati- 

 tude. Now what is known as Portland channel 

 falls short of that point. The line was also to 

 extend north in such a way as to leave Prince 

 of Wales island to Russia. If the boundary 

 started from the south extremity of Prince of 

 Wales island and ran due east, it would have left 

 the whole of the island to Russia; but if drawn 

 north from the south extremity, it would have 

 cut off a small portion of the southeast end of 

 the island. So the treaty would indicate a line 

 drawn up that channel which is east of Prince of 

 Wales island to the fifty-sixth degree of north 

 latitude, a point which could not be reached by 

 what is known as Portland channel. So you see 

 the initial point of the boundary is in contro- 

 versy. The boundary when it reached the fifty- 

 sixth degree was to follow the summit of the 

 mountains, which extend in a line parallel to the 

 coast from the fifty-sixth degree to the intersec- 

 tion with the one hundred and forty-first paral- 

 lel; but when the mountains prove to be more 

 than 10 marine leagues from the coast, the limit 

 between the British possessions and the coast 

 was to be a line parallel to the coast, but which 

 should never exceed a distance of 10 marine 

 leagues. It is clear that the makers of the treaty 

 assumed that there was a mountain range which 

 for the most part was within 10 leagues of the 

 coast. The treaty also provides that neither con- 

 tracting party shall form settlements within the 

 territory of the other. The United States re- 

 ceived all the right of Russia, and no more. But 

 the United States authorities seem to think that 

 not only have they the right to form settlements 

 on our side, but also that when they do so the 

 territory ought to be considered as theirs, and 

 under no reference to arbitration should the sov- 

 ereignty over our territory thus encroached on 

 be open to question. I return again to Lynn 

 Canal. Bear in mind what the treaty says about 

 the line, which should follow the 'coast, being 

 within 10 leagues of it. If a line were drawn 

 around the head of Lynn inlet, as the United 

 States contends it should be, the point where 

 it passed that inlet would be at least 20 leagues 

 from the coast. There is a well-defined coast 

 line from the one hundred and forty-first me- 

 ridian to Cape Spencer, on the fifty-seventh de- 

 gree of north latitude, and by the 'terms of the 

 treaty the boundaiy could not be more than 10 

 leagues from the coast. It must, .in fact, be 

 much nearer, because the range in this latitude 

 sets in near the coast. The United States refuse 

 to arbitrate unless we abandon our claim to the 

 Lynn Canal. Why should we abandon it? The 



