180 



CONGRESS. (PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE.) 



planting of mines at* certain other harbors, but 

 owing to the early destruction of the Spanish 

 fleet these mines were not placed. 



The Signal Corps was promptly organized, and 

 performed service of the most difficult and im- 

 portant character. Its operations during the war 

 covered the electrical connection of all coast forti- 

 fications, the establishment of telephonic and 

 telegraphic facilities for the camps at Manila, 

 Santiago, and in Puerto Kico. There were con- 

 structed 300 miles of line at 10 great camps, thus 

 facilitating military movements from those points 

 in a manner heretofore unknown in military ad- 

 ministration. Field telegraph lines were estab- 

 lished and maintained under the enemy's tire at 

 Manila, and later the Manila-Hong-Kong cable 

 was reopened. 



In Puerto Rico cable communications were 

 opened over a discontinued route, and on land 

 the headquarters of the commanding officer was 

 kept in telegraphic or telephonic communication 

 with the division commanders on four different 

 lines of operations. 



There was placed in Cuban waters a completely 

 outfitted cable ship, with war cables and cable 

 gear, suitable both for the destruction of com- 

 munications belonging to the enemy and the es- 

 tablishment of our own. Two ocean cables were 

 destroyed under the enemy's batteries at San- 

 tiago. The day previous to the landing of Gen. 

 Shaffer's corps" at Caimanera, \vithin 20 miles of 

 the landing place, cable communications were es- 

 tablished and a cable station opened giving direct 

 communication with the Government at Wash- 

 ington. This service was invaluable to the Ex- 

 ecutive in directing the operations of the army 

 and navy. With a total force of over 1,300, the 

 loss was* by disease in camp and field, officers and 

 men included, only 5. 



The national defense fund of $50,000,000 was 

 expended in large part by the army and navy, 

 and the objects for which it was used are fully 

 shown in the reports of the several secretaries. 

 It was a most timely appropriation, enabling the 

 Government to strengthen its defenses and make 

 preparations greatly needed in case of war. 



This fund being inadequate to the requirements 

 of equipment and for the conduct of the war, the 

 patriotism of the Congress provided the means in 

 the war-revenue act of June 13 by authorizing a 

 3-per-cent. popular loan not to exceed $400,000,000 

 and by levying additional imposts and taxes. Of 

 the authorized loan, $200,000,000 were offered 

 and promptly taken, the subscriptions so far ex- 

 ceeding the call as to cover it many times over, 

 while, preference being given to the smaller bids, 

 no single allotment exceeded $5,000. This was a 

 most encouraging and significant result, showing 

 the vast resources of the nation and the deter- 

 mination of the people to uphold their country's 

 honor. 



It is not within the province of this message to 

 narrate the history of the extraprdinary war that 

 followed the Spanish declaration of April 21, but 

 a brief recital of its more salient features is ap- 

 propriate. 



The first encounter of the war in point of date 

 took place April 27, when a detachment of the 

 blockading squadron made a reconnoissance in 

 force at Matanzas, shelled the harbor forts, and 

 demolished several new works in construction. 



The next engagement was destined to mark a 

 memorable epoch in maritime warfare. The Pa- 

 cific fleet, under Commodore George Dewey, had 

 lain for some weeks at Hong-Kong. Upon the 

 colonial proclamation of neutrality being issued, 

 and the customary twenty-four hours' notice 



being given, it repaired to Mirs Bay, near Hong- 

 Kong, whence it proceeded to the Philippine 

 Islands under telegraphed orders to capture or 

 destroy the formidable Spanish fleet then assem- 

 bled at Manila. At daybreak on the 1st of May 

 the American force entered Manila Bay, and, after 

 a few hours' engagement, effected the total de- 

 struction of the Spanish fleet, consisting of 10 

 war ships and a transport, besides capturing the 

 naval station and forts at Cavite, thus annihilat- 

 ing the Spanish naval power in the Pacific Ocean 

 and completely controlling the bay of Manila, 

 with the ability to take the city at will. Not a 

 life was lost on our ships, the wounded only num- 

 bering 7, while not a vessel was materially in- 

 jured. For this gallant achievement the Con- 

 gress, upon my recommendation, fitly bestowed 

 u.pon the actors preferment and substantial re- 

 ward. 



The effect of this remarkable victory upon the 

 spirit of our people and upon the fortunes of the 

 war was instant. A prestige of invincibility there- 

 by attached to our arms, which continued through- 

 out the struggle. Re-enforcements were hurried 

 to Manila, under the command of Major-Gen. 

 Merritt, and firmly established within sight of 

 the capital, which lay helpless before our guns. 



On the 7th day of May the Government was 

 advised officially of the victory at Manila, and 

 at once inquired of the commander of our fleet 

 what troops would be required. The informa- 

 tion was received on the 15th day of May, and 

 the first army expedition sailed May 25 and ar- 

 rived off Manila June 30. Other expeditions soon 

 followed, the total force consisting of 641 officers 

 and 15,058 enlisted men. 



Only reluctance to cause needless loss of life 

 and property prevented the early storming and 

 capture of the city, and therewith the absolute 

 military occupancy of the whole group. The in- 

 surgents meanwhile had resumed the active hos- 

 tilities suspended by the uncompleted truce of 

 December, 1897. Their forces invested Manila 

 from the northern and eastern side, but were 

 constrained by Admiral Dewey and. Gen. Merritt 

 from attempting an assault. It was fitting that 

 whatever was to be done in the way of decisive 

 operations in that quarter should be accomplished 

 by the strong arm of the United States alone. 

 Obeying the stern precept of war, which enjoins 

 the overcoming of the adversary and the extinc- 

 tion of his power wherever assailable as the 

 speedy and sure means to win a peace, divided 

 victory was not permissible, for no partition of 

 the rights and responsibilities attending the en- 

 forcement of a just and advantageous peace could 

 be thought of. 



Following the comprehensive scheme of general 

 attack, powerful forces were assembled at various 

 points on our coast to invade Cuba and Puerto 

 Rico. Meanwhile naval demonstrations were 

 made at several exposed points. On May 11 the 

 cruiser Wilmington and torpedo boat Winslow 

 were unsuccessful in an attempt to silence tlte 

 batteries at Cardenas, a gallant ensign, Worth 

 Bagley, and 4 seamen falling. These grievous 

 fatalities were strangely enough among the very 

 few which occurred during our naval operations 

 in this extraordinary conflict. 



Meanwhile the Spanish naval preparations had 

 been pushed with great vigor. A powerful squad- 

 ron under Admiral Cervera, which had assem- 

 bled at the Cape. Verde Islands before the out- 

 break of hostilities, had crossed the ocean, and 

 by its erratic movements in the Caribbean Sea 

 delayed our military plans while baffling the pur- 

 suit of our fleets. For a time fears .were felt 



