790 



SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC. 



and the colonial scouts tried to intercept thorn 

 these suffered severely from a withering rille tire 

 and were forced to retreat. The total British los* 

 was 198 killed and wounded. 



At Belmont the Boers had depended on t 

 natural protection offered by the rocky kopjes. 

 This was their reliance also at Enslin, or Gras 

 pan, except that they threw up on the first and 

 strongest kopje a schanse or stone parapet 

 was a source of weakness rather than strength, 

 because when the British infantry advanced to 

 the assault the gunners burst shrapnel along the 

 crest of the wall, preventing the Boers from rising 

 to take aim at the storming party rushing up 

 the slope. From this time they were under the 

 command of Gen. Cronje, an expert in earth 

 works, who chose and elaborated his positions in 

 accordance with modem theories of intrenchment 

 and protected them with guns, few, but of the 

 best kinds, skillfully placed and well served un- 

 der the direction of Col. Albrecht. 



On Nov. 28 Lord Methuen continued his ad- 

 vance and attacked the strongly intrenched posi- 

 tion held by the Boer forces on Modder river. 

 They were about 8,000 strong, and had 2 heavy 

 guns, 2 Krupp field guns, and machine guns. The 

 battle lasted all day. The guards brigade at- 

 tacked on the right and the infantry of the line 

 on the left, supported by the naval brigade from 

 the railroad. The British had 24 guns. The 

 Boers held a position extending 4 miles, and 

 were intrenched on both sides of the river. Gen. 

 Cronje, the Boer commander, restrained the fire 

 of hi's guns and rifles until the British had de- 

 ployed and advanced well within range. By a 

 feint on the extreme left he drew off their artil- 

 lery strength from his main position. The Brit- 

 ish general found at heavy cost the strength and 

 disposition of the opposing forces and the loca- 

 tion of their works. The steep river banks, cov- 

 ered by a belt of trees on both sides, afforded an 

 excellent natural defensive position, which the 

 Boers had strengthened by the construction of 

 deep trenches and gun pits concealed by the brush 

 growth. Rifle pits in front of the elevated posi- 

 tion were not suspected by the British, who were 

 told by spies that the Boer forces had retired to 

 Spytfontein, leaving only a rear guard at this 

 point. Concealed in low trenches, they fired with 

 telling effect on the British as they advanced in 

 widely extended formation. From their concealed 

 trenches on the south side of the river and from 

 the buildings they opened a murderous fire on the 

 British infantry when it advanced unsuspectingly 

 into range. The assault cost the British 474 

 killed or wounded. The river was in flood, and 

 therefore the British could not execute any 

 flanking operation. Lord Methuen described the 

 battle as one of the hardest and most trying in 

 the annals of the British army. The men were 

 exposed to a burning sun, without food or water. 

 In the end the Boers were forced by shell fire to 

 withdraw from some of their positions, and Gen. 

 Pole-Carew succeeded, with the aid of sappers, in 

 getting a small party over the river. Gen. Cronje 

 had brought up re-enforcements shortly before 

 the battle. Troops had been drawn also from the 

 besieging force before Kimberley, and the gar- 

 rison took advantage of their absence to make 

 another sortie in order to lighten the task before 

 Lord Methuen's column by making a diversion or 

 perhaps breaking through and joining hands with 

 him. But the attempt was a failure. At night- 

 fall the British were in possession of the ford at 

 the extreme right of the Boer position on the 

 Modder, and their artillery would be able to en- 

 filade the whole position. Therefore the Boers 



evacuated it, retiring to prepared positions that 

 were much stronger at Magersfontein. The Free 

 Staters on the right wing had become demoralized 

 by the British gun fire, and their weakness cau-ed 

 Col. Albrecht, the German commander of the ar- 

 tillery, to fear for his guns, which were conse- 

 quently removed under cover of the night. 



In the 3 engagements the relieving force had 

 lost more than 1,000 men. It was re-enforced 

 after the last battle by horse artillery, Highland 

 ers, the Canadian regiment, Australian contin- 

 gents, and 3 British battalions. The railroad 

 had been repaired up to Modder river, but tin- 

 bridge would have to be reconstructed bct'on- 

 trains could go farther. It was necessary, too, to 

 accumulate stores and ammunition. When Lord 

 Methuen was ready to move forward again he 

 had 10,500 infantry, 2,000 cavalry, 3 field bat- 

 teries, and a flying battery, with an equal force 

 behind to guard communications. On Dec. S 

 Commandant Prinslop, with 1,000 men, stole be- 

 hind the British position and began to tear up 

 the railroad, but was driven off before much dam- 

 age was done. 



The new Boer position was only miles bark, 

 and before the British again advanced thev had 

 time to render it almost unassailable by digging 

 tiers of trenches with connecting galleries. Re- 

 enforcements of Transvaal troops, which re- 

 placed the Free Staters, brought up the strengt h 

 of the defending force to nearly 8,000, little more 

 than half the British strength, with still greater 

 inferiority in artillery, but tin-.- di-ad\air 

 were counterbalanced* by their position of gi.Mi 

 natural strength skillfully fortified by <;n. 

 Cronje. The position was too extended to permit 

 of an enveloping movement, running in a semi- 

 circle from Magersfontein to Spytfontein. <in. 

 Methuen therefore decided on a frontal attack 



Qaivd more thoroughly by artillery fire, which 

 proved o effective *in the last engagement. 

 After half a day of shelling, which this time had 

 small effect in the sheltered trenches, and di<l n>1 

 even draw the fire of the Boer artillery, so that 

 their gun positions could l>e located, the High- 

 land brigade led the attack in the gray dawn of 

 Dec. 11. There were concealed rifle pit> in front 

 of the hill, and before the Scots deployed they 

 were struck down by a cross fire at short range. 

 They sought cover, having lost .">< ollicer^ and >.")<) 

 men killed or wounded. Other losses brought tin- 

 total up to 903. The assault of the Highlanders. 

 intended as a surprise, \\as undertaken against 

 the advice of Gen. Wauchope, their commander, 

 who was one of the first to fall. They ran into 

 barbed wire, and the fire was opened from rifle 

 pits dug in the open ground in front of the kopje. 

 Supports coming up, they tried to storm these 

 trenches, but failea. The cannonade that fol- 

 lowed silenced the Boer artillery at time-, but no 

 further attacks or bombardments could dislodge 

 the Boers, who made one attempt to get at the 

 rear of the British over the open ground, hut \\ ere 

 driven back by the artillery. On Dc. 13 Lord 

 Methuen retreated to his former position on Mod- 

 der river. After this defeat at Magersfontein he 

 made no further attempt to storm (Jen. (ionic's 

 works, which were daily strengthened and ex- 

 tended until they covered a front of 30 miles ;nid 

 reached the flanks of the British camp with the 

 object of forcing a retirement to Orange river. 



Operations on the Tugela. The British field 

 force began to arive in the middle of November. 

 Sir Redvers Buller. who landed at Capetown on 

 Oct. 31, sent one division with a strong artillery 

 and cavalry force to Natal to advance at once 

 for the defense of Estcourt and the subsequent 



