"92 



SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC. 



they could move men and guns to the point .at 

 which the attack was directed, which was indi- 

 cated to them in time by their pickets on the 

 heights. Their intrenchments they constantly ex- 

 tended, until on the Tugela they covered a line of 

 20 miles. A trench could be dug under cover of 

 night to a depth sufficient to hide the men. who 

 completed the excavation by day. The Boers 

 were much more skillful with their rifles in volley 

 firing, as well as in marksmanship, than the 

 English, among whom only the officers carried 

 glasses, while of the Boers every fourth man had 

 a binocular. The ranges for their cannon were 

 also measured and marked in front of their posi- 

 tion on the Tugela. 



On Jan. 6 the Boers made an attack in force on 

 the redoubts south of Ladysmith at Caesar's camp 

 and Wagon hill. The intrenchments on Wagon 

 hill were three times captured and retaken, and 

 Besters hill was held by the Boers till evening, 

 when they were driven out at the point of the 

 bayonet. Their losses were heavier than the Brit- 

 ish losses, and the failure of the assault dis- 

 couraged them from another attempt. The at- 

 tack on the main objective was prepared by di- 

 versions at two other points, and when it was 

 renewed in the afternoon it was supported by 

 troops drawn from the intrenched position on the 

 Tugela. Gen. W T hite signaled that he was very 

 hard pressed, and Gen. Buller made a demonstra- 

 tion against the Colenso trenches, but he found 

 them manned in sufficient numbers to oppose his 

 advance. The British loss in repelling the attack 

 on Ladysmith was 417. 



Gen. Buller's force was increased until it 

 amounted to 24,000 infantry, 5,000 cavalry, and 

 2,000 artillery, with 70 guns, including 20 naval 

 and siege guns. Gen. Joubert's was estimated at 

 18,000 mounted infantry and 1,500 artillery, with 

 60 guns, on the Tugela and before Ladysmith. 

 The British, while shelling the Boer works daily, 

 carried out cavalry reconnoissances east and west 

 from Chieveley. On Jan. 11 Gen. Buller began a 

 flanking operation west of Colenso. He occupied 

 the bank of the river at Potgeiter's drift, 4$ 

 miles south of an intrenched position of the 

 Boers. If he could force back their left wing and 

 reach Acton Homes, he would find a level road 

 to Ladysmith. On Jan. 10, the Boers having re- 

 tired from the south side of the Tugela on ac- 

 count of the flood in the river, Lord Dundonald 

 seized Zwart Kop, an eminence commanding Pot- 

 geiter's drift, enabling the infantry to follow on 

 the next morning. On Jan. 16 Gen. Lyttle- 

 ton's brigade crossed to the north bank by the 

 ferry, and the next day howitzers bombarded 

 the Boer position. The naval guns were mounted 

 on Mount Alice at the northern end of Zwart Kop. 

 The Boers, who had offered no opposition to the 

 crossing, added constantly to their defenses. They 

 intrenched Spion Kop and the kopjes opposite 

 Potgeiter's drift. At Trichard's drift, 5 miles 

 farther west and 20 miles from Colenso, Sir 

 Charles Warren with another column effected a 

 passage by means of a pontoon bridge. While 

 these movements were carried out a demonstra- 

 tion in force was made by Sir Francis Clery against 

 Colenso and another position to the east of it. 

 While Sir Charles Warren's advance was directed 

 against the northern side of Spion Kop, Lord 

 Dundonald's cavalry passed round to the west of 

 Acton Homes, and in a skirmish at Dewdrop 

 took 23 prisoners. The main force was that under 

 Sir Charles Warren. The Boers were known to 

 be strongly intrenched in front of Potgeiter's 

 drift, but it was supposed that they had made 

 no preparations to oppose an advance over Tri- 



chard's drift. The forward movement took longer 

 than was expected, on account of the great diffi- 

 culty of transport over the wet ground. The first 

 plan was to turn the enemy's position by the 

 route opened by the cavalry ; but this was aban- 

 doned when the Boers were found swarming on 

 the heights commanding the route, and a frontal 

 attack on their position, with the object of break- 

 ing through, was decided on. The cavalry were 

 therefore ordered to retire from Acton Homes. 

 On Jan. 20, while Gen. Hildyard on the right 

 drew the attention of the Boers and an advance 

 was made in the direction of their main position 

 by dint of constant shelling, Sir Charles War- 

 ren's column worked its way along Taba Myama 

 ridge toward Spion Kop. Gen. Hart's brigade 

 attacked them and, though they had few guns 

 and were subjected to a very heavy shrapnel fire, 

 they stuck to their position on a commanding 

 ridge, where they were sheltered behind bowlder* 

 and stone breastworks, and when they abandoned 

 the trenches in the night they fell back half a 

 mile on a still stronger position. The British 

 casualties were 92. The opposing forces held their 

 respective positions for three days, keeping up a 

 fire of musketry, which did little harm. The 

 British found that they could make no farther 

 advance in this direction, because there wa> no 

 position for their guns, and to attack the ridge 

 they would have to cross a bare, open slope; so 

 an 'advance on Spion Kop was ordered, as this 

 eminence was supposed to command the Taba 

 Myama ridge that the British were confronting 

 and also the Boer positions on Brakfontein rid^e. 

 opposite Potgeiter's drift, where the Boers under 

 Gen. Schalk Burger had constructed elaborate 

 fortifications. As all the fighting had been on 

 Gen. Warren's extreme left, while the mountain 

 was outside of his right, he thought it would 

 have few defenders and could be taken by sur- 

 prise in the night. Two and a half battalions 

 of Major-Gen. Woodgate's brigade were led by 

 Col. Thorneycroft up the steep and narrow path 

 in the darkness and rain, and when they readied 

 the top of the southwest peak without 'being ob- 

 served the 30 defenders, after one hasty volley, 

 fled out of their trenches to escape the bayonets 

 of the British infantry. The captors hastily dug 

 trenches, only to find when the morning of Jan. 

 24 came that they were exposed to the fire of 

 two Maxim-Xordenfeldts on the opposite peak of 

 the mountain and four other guns behind the 

 ridge of Taba Myama. Boer riflemen scattered 

 over the hill slowly advanced in skirmishing 

 order, while the machine guns shelled the 

 trenches incessantly. The Boers drove the men 

 out of the trenches, and were themselves driven 

 out in turn at the point of the bayonet. Two 

 battalions were sent up to re-enforce the rapidly 

 dwindling detachment, while the guns that the 

 British had placed in position on a kopje in front 

 of Taba Myama ridge tried in vain to silence the 

 Maxim-Xofdenfeldts, drawing the fire of 1 1n- 

 unseen battery behind the ridge, with \\hidi a 

 duel ensued. Two more battalions were'sent from 

 Gen. Lyttleton's brigade, which made an attack 

 on the Brakfontein position to divert the atten- 

 tion of the Boers on that wing. These regiment* 

 climbed the eastern slope of Spion Kop, exposed 

 at every step to the fire of sharpshooters on both 

 sides of them. Two more battalions arrived, and 

 the top of the hill was crowded with men who 

 only made a better target for the ^uns and rifles 

 which they could not answer effectively. To add 

 to their difficulties, they could find no water. 

 The men who found no shelter at the top sought 

 cover on the side of the hill, where the Maxim- 



