SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC. 



793 



Nordenfeldt shells played havoc among them. In 

 the evening a mountain battery arrived, and 

 two naval 12-pouhders reached the foot of the 

 hill, to be brought up the next day, when Gen. 

 Hildyard's brigade was to advance against the 

 main ridge of Taba Myama. Engineers were 

 also on the way to intrench the position; but Col. 

 Thorneycroft, who had succeeded to the com- 

 mand, Gen. Woodgate having been killed early 

 in the action, had already given the order to re- 

 tire in the night, and when the leading troops 

 went down they met the sappers coming up. The 

 failure to retain Spion Kop made all further at- 

 tempts to cross the range hopeless, so on Jan. 25 

 Gen. Warren's division recrossed the Tugela. The 

 British losses in the second attempt to relieve 

 Lady smith were 1,744, including 95 officers. 



After another period of inactivity Gen. Buller 

 made a third attempt to break through the line 

 of fortifications and rescue the suffering garrison 

 and population of Ladysmith. The movement 

 this time had the additional object of engaging 

 the attention and the activity of Gen. Joubert's 

 forces so as to leave the way clear for Lord 

 Roberts's operations. Already the Free Staters 

 were leaving Colenso and the Ladysmith laagers, 

 in order to be ready to resist an invasion of their 

 country from the south or the west. Part of the 

 Transvaal troops and guns were also withdrawn 

 when the newly arrived British forces were seen 

 to be concentrating in Cape Colony for action in 

 some other quarter. The situation of Ladysmith 

 was not as desperate as it was supposed to be 

 after the assault of Jan. 6, and the pressure on 

 the garrison was somewhat eased and the bom- 

 bardment less trying than it had been before a 

 part of the guns had been removed for the de- 

 fense of the right flank on the Tugeja and the 

 strengthening and extension of its defenses to 

 resist the British forces gathered there and pre- 

 vent a turning movement. The British still re- 

 tained Spearman's camp and their fortified position 

 on Zwart Kop. On Feb. 5 another advance over 

 the Tugela was made. Additional troops were 

 brought up from Chieveley for the attack, which 

 was made at a point east of Brakfontein, where 

 the Boer line was weakest. While a feint was 

 made on the left against Brakfontein by Gen. 

 Wynne's brigade, Gen. Lyttleton's brigade crossed 

 the river on a pontoon bridge that the engineers 

 had built under fire and attacked and took the 

 nearest kopje of the Vaal Krantz ridge. Creeping 

 along under the high bank of the river for a 

 quarter of a mile, the battalions formed in ex- 

 tended order, crossed an open plain under rifle 

 fire from kopjes in front and dongas and broken 

 ground on the right and right rear, and rushed 

 the kopje with the bayonet. For the rest of the 

 day they remained under a heavy fire of shrapnel, 

 Maxim-Nordenfeldts, and rifles from the Doom 

 Kloof, a high mountain on the right, which was 

 not supposed to be strongly occupied. But the 

 Boers had posted a Long Tom and another Creu- 

 sot there and concentrated a force of mounted 

 infantry, in expectation that the British would 

 make their advance in this quarter not by a 

 bridge, but over the Schiet drift. Hence the hill 

 that the British took was only weakly occupied. 

 The advance over the river was covered by bat- 

 teries on Zwart Kop previously masked. On the 

 hill the British infantry were exposed to rifle fire 

 from a large donga on the left, running down 

 from Brakfontein, as well as from Doom Kloof. 

 They advanced along the ridge until they came 

 to a higher kopje, where they intrenched them- 

 selves. In the night the Boers placed additional 

 guns in position, one of them of the disappearing 



pattern, and during the following day their bat- 

 teries exchanged shots with the British guns on 

 Zwart Kop and shelled the trenches on Vaal 

 Krantz hill and the field batteries that the Brit- 

 ish were moving up. In the afternoon the Boers 

 made a determined attack on the British in their 

 intrenched position, and the latter wavered, but 

 the officers rallied them till re-enforcements came 

 presently. Other re-enforcements followed, and the 

 British advanced along the ridge, which is a spur 

 a mile long jutting out at right angles from the 

 higher Brakfontein ridge. One day more they 

 held their position, but could not advance on 

 account of the raking artillery fire from Doom 

 Kloof, Brakfontein, and Spion Kop. During the 

 night and on the morning of Feb. 8 they re- 

 treated across the Tugela. 



The movement of the other force over the Pont 

 drift, though intended only as a demonstration, 

 was a difficult and dangerous operation both in 

 the advance and in the retreat, executed in front 

 of the highest part of Brakfontein. The trenches 

 were constantly shelled by five British batteries, 

 and there was no rifle fire until the retirement 

 began; but shrapnel swept the column and al- 

 most put out of action a field battery, which was 

 hastily retired. 



A few days after the last action on the Tugela 

 the Boers before Ladysmith began to withdraw 

 in considerable numbers toward the north and 

 across the Drakensberg. 



On Feb. 14 Gen. Buller began a turning move- 

 ment on the right flank. The first point seized 

 was Hussar hill, a long ridge south of Hlang- 

 wane mountain. Infantry advanced over wooded 

 ridges to a higher ridge east of Hlangwane and 

 connected with it, w r here the enemy was in- 

 trenched, but the defenders were few and were 

 driven back by Colt machine guns. The troops 

 were kept still for two days on account of the 

 heat. On Feb. 17 they captured Cingolo; and 

 Green hill and Monte Cristo, defended by Boer 

 artillery which did little damage because of the 

 thick woods, were taken the next day. The Brit- 

 ish losses in the four days were. 274. A British 

 force reoccupied Vaal Krantz on Feb. 18 to re- 

 connoiter the Boer positions on that flank, and 

 found them practically undefended. The object 

 of the movement was to turn the flank of Hlang- 

 wane, and that of the resistance of the Boers 

 was to enable it to be evacuated with safety. 

 They got their guns away from all their positions, 

 and on Feb. 19,. when the British occupied 

 Hlangwane, their rear guard passed over Tugela 

 river unmolested. On the same day Gen. Hart 

 occupied Colenso, meeting with feeble resistance. 

 The advance north of the Tugela was vigorously 

 contested. The Free State Boers had yielded up 

 the advanced position beyond the river in order 

 to return to their homes and prepare for the in- 

 vasioh of their own country, and this necessitated 

 the abandonment of the line of the Tugela and 

 the raising of the siege of Ladysmith. Several 

 days were necessary, however, to retreat beyond 

 the Drakensberg and the Biggarsberg mountains 

 with the heavy guns and all the stores and muni- 

 tions. The artillery did not remain long to con- 

 test the passage of the Tugela. The British began 

 the attack on Feb. 23, after what was considered 

 a sufficient artillery preparation. They advanced, 

 but were effectually checked by musketry fire 

 and 1 -pound shells. In a hopeless attack on Rail- 

 way hill 250 Irish soldiers fell. Grobler's Kloof, 

 immediately north of Colenso, had to be taken 

 by storm. The Dublin fusileers volunteered for 

 the effort, and the heights were finally carried 

 after a desperate contest. Two days more of 



