796 



SOUTfl AFRICAN REPUBLIC. 



field howitzers, half of them Krupps and half 

 Creusots; and 4 3.7-centimetre Krupp mountain 

 guns. The Free State artillery had 12 7.5-centi- 

 metre field guns. There were besides 18 guns of 

 older designs. In all, with old guns, the Boers 

 possessed about 108 pieces of artillery, and in 

 various battles they captured 19 from the enemy. 

 Col. Albrecht, Col. Schiel, and other German offi- 

 cers were the artillery instructors and commanders 

 of the artillery in the field, and besides the Boer 

 gunners there were many trained German, Hol- 

 lander, and French artillerymen in the army. 

 Col. de Villebois-Mareuil, a French officer, and 

 other Continental military men served on Gen. 

 Joubert's staff. A French engineer named Leon 

 superintended the transportation of the great 

 Creusot gun over the mountains from Laings Nek 

 to Ladysmith, selected the positions for the siege 

 guns, directed the operations of the artillery, and 

 got it away safely in the retreat. M. Grunberg, 

 another French engineer, saw to the repairing of 

 the damaged materiel sent back to Pretoria and 

 Johannesburg, the Long Tom among others, 

 which the British in Ladysmith, by a bold sally, 

 surprised and blew up with gun cotton. He also 

 established a factory for projectiles in Johannes- 

 burg. The engineering, telegraph, postal, ambu- 

 lance, electric, and other technical services, the 

 search lights, the bakeries, etc., were intrusted 

 to Europeans. The intrenchments were made by 

 the Boers themselves, who often made them very 

 deceptive by making mounds of the earth dug 

 from the rifle pits on one side or in the rear, at 

 which the English gunners fired their lyddite 

 shells. Unseen trenches of this description exca- 

 vated in advance of the elevated positions, and 

 protected by other rows of trenches on the high 

 ground behind them, enabled the Boer sharp- 

 shooters to inflict terrible havoc on the British 

 infantry when it advanced to storm the position 

 and unexpectedly received a cross fire at close 

 range. Barbed-wire entanglements were a great 

 impediment to the British bayonet charges. This 

 barbed wire was imported in vast quantities 

 shortly before the war, ostensibly for the fences 

 along the Netherlands Railroad. The commissa- 

 riat of the Boers was abundantly supplied with 

 meat, bread, potatoes, rice, tea, and coffee, and 

 clothing and equipment were liberally distributed. 

 Rice, flour, and coffee began to grow scarce as 

 the campaign advanced. The British cruisers 

 stopped vessels going into Delagoa Bay. One was 

 an English vessel with a cargo of American flour, 

 and the United States Government protested. The 

 German Government raised a protest when a Ger- 

 man mail steamer was searched and merchandise 

 seized. The Boer bases of supply were at home, and 

 the transport was arranged on the relay system in 

 three directions, requiring very few men for its 

 protection. If one base was threatened, the sup- 

 plies could be destroyed. The British, on the 

 other hand, had to bring their supplies from over 

 sea, and all their material as well, and to guard 

 the long railroad lines of communication they 

 needed almost as many soldiers as they could put 

 into the field. The tracks were watched by na- 

 tives, four in every mile, who signaled when the 

 track was threatened or had already -been tam- 

 pered with. When Lord Kitchener and Lord 

 Roberts arrived with re-enforcements their plan 

 of campaign depended dn the organization of a 

 system of military transport equal to that of the 

 Boers or better, one that would give mobility to 

 the army and enable it to operate away from the 

 railroad lines. 



The entire Boer population capable of bearing 

 arms was reckoned by the British War Office 



just before the war at 31,579 in the Transvaal, 

 including 800 artillerymen and 1,500 police, and 

 at 22.314 in the Orange Free State. This com- 

 prised the whole estimated male population be- 

 tween the ages of sixteen and sixty, and was re- 

 duced in the estimate to 51,000 for both States 

 because boys of sixteen years were not counted 

 as fit for military duties, and to this number 

 were added 4,000 probable recruits from the Brit- 

 ish colonies and 4,000 foreigners. Boys of less 

 than sixteen actually fought in the Boer trenches, 

 and showed themselves efficient soldiers and good 

 marksmen. The actual strength of the Boer 

 troops was estimated after the war began at 

 40,000 Transvaal Boers, 4,500 enlisted men, 5,000 

 Uitlanders naturalized before 1897, 3,000 natural- 

 ized since that date, 27,500 Free State burghers, 

 2,500 foreigners, and 8,500 Cape and Natal Dutch ; 

 total, 91,000. 



British Invasion of the Free State. When 

 Field-Marshal Lord Roberts began to carry out 

 his strategic plan he managed to conceal in a 

 great measure the disposition and movements of 

 his troops from the enemy. His plan was to 

 cut off the retreat of Gen. Cronje to Bloemfon- 

 tein when advancing upon the Boer position at 

 Magersfontein in sufficient force to envelop it, 

 though the Boer fortifications covered a front 

 of 25 miles, both flanks touching Modder 

 river. Col. Pilcher, on Jan. 1, with a for- 

 Canadians, Queenslanders, and mounted infantry, 

 surprised and captured a Boer laager at Sunny- 

 side, northwest of Belmont, where Lord Mrt li- 

 nen's line of communications by railroad was 

 threatened. This was the beginning of active 

 operations against Gen. Cronje. The important 

 movements of troops were concealed. Freshly 

 landed forces were sent to the front by rni IK. ad 

 without any accurate information of their num- 

 bers reaching the enemy. On Jan. 6 Gen. \V 1 



occupied Zoutpansdrift, a place where there was 

 no opposing force, on the Free State side of 

 Orange river. Gen. Cronje till now had counted 

 on the fact that no considerable bodies of Eng- 

 lish troops could move or live in the arid coun- 

 try between Jaeobsdal, his advanced base of sup- 

 plies, and Bloemfontein. He was not ignorant >f 

 the improved mobility they had attained under 

 the direction of the new staff. Between the Brit- 

 ish position on Modder river and Pretoria \\ i.- 

 100 miles that had to be traversed without a 

 railroad. To supply an army of 30,000 or 40.000 

 men on that march required* nearly the whole of 

 the transport that the British had collected in 

 South Africa. Accordingly, the wagons and ani- 

 mals were assembled at De Aar and Orange river. 

 and immense reserves of supplies were heaped up 

 at De Aar and other points near the front. Gen. 

 French was at that time spreading out his f<>n-e 

 of about 10,000 men over a front of 40 milt--. 

 and pressing the Boers back toward Orange river 

 by threatening their flanks and rear, creating a 

 diversion that caused them to dislocate a part 

 of their forces to meet his advance just at the 

 time that he quietly drew his off to take part in 

 the intended operation of turning Gen. Cronje's 

 position and cutting off his retreat. Gen. Kelly 

 Kenny, with part of a newly arrived division, 

 was sent to Thebus, apparently threatening the 

 central advance that everybody expected that 

 Lord Roberts to make over the southern bor- 

 der of the Orange Free State; another part 

 was attached to Gen. French's command, point- 

 ing to the same line of advance, yet within easy 

 reach of the real objective: part moved up to 

 Modder river. A ninth division was formed on 

 the Modder under the command of Gen. Colevile, 



