358 FRAGMENTS OF SCIENCE. 
Over this argument, from experience, which at bottom 
is his argument, Mr. Mozley rides roughshod. There is a 
dash of scorn in the energy with which he tramples on it. 
Probably some previous writer had made too much of it, 
and thus invited his powerful assault. Finding the diffi- 
culty of belief in miracles to rise from their being in con- 
tradiction to the order of nature, he sets himself to examine 
the grounds of our belief in that order. With a vigor of 
logic rarely equaled, and with a confidence in its con- 
clusions never surpassed, he disposes of this belief in a 
manner calculated to startle those who, without due exam- 
ination, had come to the conclusion that the order of 
nature was secure. 
What we mean, he says, by our belief in the order of 
nature, is the belief that the future will be like the past. 
There is not, according to Mr. Mozley, the slightest rational 
basis for this belief. 
" That any cause in nature is more permanent than its existing and 
known effects, extending further, and about to produce other and 
more instances besides what it has produced already, we have no 
evidence. Let us imagine," he continues, " the occurrence of a par- 
ticular physical phenomenon for the first time. Upon that single 
occurrence we should have but the very faintest expectation of an- 
other. If it did occur again, once or twice, so far from counting on 
another occurrence, a cessation would occur as the most natural event 
to us. But let it continue one hundred times, and we should find no 
hesitation in inviting persons from a distance to see it; and if it 
occurred every day for years, its occurrence would be a certainty to 
us, its cessation a marveh . . .What ground of reason can we 
assign for an expectation that any part of the course of nature will be 
the next moment what it has been up to this moment, i.e., for our 
belief in the uniformity of nature? None. No demonstrative reason 
can be given, for the contrary to the recurrence of a fact of nature is 
no contradiction. No probable reason can be given; for all probable 
reasoning respecting the course of nature is founded upon this 
presumption of likeness, and therefore cannot be the foundation of 
it. No reason can be given for this belief. It is without a reason. 
It rests upon no rational grounds and can be traced to no rational 
principle." 
" Everything/' Mr. Mozley, however, adds, " depends 
upon this belief, every provision we make for the future, 
every safeguard and caution we employ against it, all cal- 
culation, all adjustment of means to ends, supposes this 
belief; and yet this belief has no more producible reason 
for it than a speculation of fancy. ... It is necessary, 
