052 FRAGMENTS OF SCIENCE. 
sequence, which gives rise to bodily actions? Speaking 
for myself, it is certain that I have no power of imagining 
such states interposed between the molecules of the brain, 
and influencing the transference of motion among the 
molecules. The thing 'eludes all mental presentation/ 
Hence an iron strength seems to belong to the logic which 
claims for the brain an automatic action uninfluenced by 
consciousness. But it is, I believe, admitted by those who 
hoM the automaton theory, that states of consciousness are 
produced by the motion of the molecules of the brain; and 
this production of consciousness by molecular motion is to 
me quite as unpresentable to the mental vision as the pro- 
duction of molecular motion by consciousness. If I reject 
one result I must reject both. /, hoivever, reject neither, 
and thus stand in the presence of two Incomprehensibles, 
instead of one Incomprehensible." Here I secede from 
the automaton theory, though maintained by friends who 
have all my esteem, and fall back upon the avowal which 
occurs with such wearisome iteration throughout the fore- 
going pages; namely, my own utter incapacity to grasp the 
problem. 
This avowal is repeated with emphasis in the passage to 
which Professor Virchow's translator draws attention. 
What, I there ask, is the causal connection between the 
objective and the subjective between molecular motions 
and states of consciousness? My answer is: I do not see 
the connection, nor am I acquainted with anybody who 
does. It is no explanation to say that the objective and 
subjective are two sides of one and the same phenomenon. 
Why should the phenomenon have two sides? This is the 
very core of the difficulty. There are plenty of molecular 
motions which do not exhibit this two-sidedness. Does 
water think or feel when it runs into frost-ferns upon a 
window pane? If not, why should the molecular motion 
of the brain be yoked to this mysterious companion 
consciousness? We can form a coherent picture of all the 
purely physical processes the stirring of the brain, the 
thrilling of the nerves, the discharging of the muscles, and 
all the subsequent motions of the organism. We are here 
dealing with mechanical problems which are mentally 
presentable. But we can form no picture of the process 
whereby consciousness emerges, either as a necessary link, 
or as an accidental by-product, of this series of actions. 
