54 PROBLEMS IN WILD LIFE CONSERVATION 



power," i. e. the power to legislate for the health, safety, 

 and morality of its inhabitants, and the second, the principle 

 that the state owns animals ferae naturae found within its 

 borders in its sovereign capacity. 3 



These two principles are distinct and separate, for in Geer 

 v. Connecticut 4 the United States Supreme Court said : 5 



Aside from the authority of the state, derived from the com- 

 mon ownership of game and the trust for the benefit of its 

 people which the state exercises in relation thereto, there is an- 

 other view of the power of the state in regard to property in 

 game, which is equally conclusive. The right to preserve game 

 flows from the undoubted existence in the state of a police power 

 to that end. 



The existence in the state of a police power to conserve 

 animals ferae naturae by regulating their taking is so widely 

 accepted that it hardly needs further discussion. The United 

 States and individual state constitutions, however, do hedge 

 that authority around with certain restrictions, which will be 

 discussed later. 6 



The Principle of State Ownership of Animals ferae 

 naturae: The first clear-cut definition of the ownership 

 theory as distinct from the police power is found in the 

 Geer Case. The various state courts that refer to it prior to 

 that time do so in such a manner as to confuse the authority 

 arising out of the police power with that arising from owner- 



3 Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U. S. 519, (1896) ; State v. Rodman, 58 Minn. 

 393, 59 N. W. 1098 (1894) ; State v. McCullough, 96 Kan. 786 (1915) ; 

 Chambers v. Church, 14 R. I. 398 (1884). 



* 161 U. S. 519, 16 S. Ct. 600 (1896). 



5 Ibid., at p. 534. The court later in Lacoste v. Dept. of Conservation,, 

 263 U. S. 545 (1920) cited the above case for the twofold basis of the 

 state's authority. 



6 Infra, p. 64. 



