SPHERE OF STATE GOVERNMENT ji 



but that it does not constitute a right as against the para- 

 mount authority of the state. They might also have well 

 argued that the statute did not take away a property right. 

 The property consisted of the " exclusive right to take wild 

 game " found on a certain piece of land. That right re- 

 mained; true the appellee could not use that right himself 

 because he was not otherwise qualified, but it still had value 

 and still remained vested in him. He could sell or lease the 

 right to any qualified person. It was never the theory in 

 England where the principle first arose, that the right to 

 take game because of ownership of the land vested in the 

 individual. 60 The same situation arose there and was met 

 by allowing the landowner to lease the right to take game to 

 any qualified person. 



If the majority opinion were sound, then with equal force 

 it might be contended that a foreign corporation owning 

 land in the state could not be subjected to any requirement 

 to which a domestic corporation was not subject. Obviously 

 the court confused the property right with the individual 

 right whereas they should be considered separately. 



The statutes which are the most often challenged are those 

 which either entirely forbid aliens to hunt or require them 

 to pay a higher license fee than do other residents. The 

 courts have uniformly upheld such a classification as consti- 

 tutional. 61 Consequently should the state forbid aliens to 

 hunt it may, under the police power, go a step further and 

 forbid them to own guns used in hunting. 62 



The constitutional limitations imposed upon the state by 

 its own constitution vary greatly from one state to another 

 and will not be discussed in detail here. It is sufficient to 

 say that the courts have tended to interpret them in such a 



60 Christian, Edward, Treatise, op. cit., p. 116. 



61 Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138 (1914). 

 2 Ibid. 



