268 MODERN TRAINING. 



seen more than a small portion of mankind, a priori wo. ca.n 

 infer that all men are reasoning animals. 



To proceed understandingly, it is necessary to have at least 

 a general definition of what is meant by the term instinct, it 

 commonly being used loosely with a variable meaning, al- 

 ways with too much comprehensiveness, and therefore with- 

 out a just precision. As to what constitutes the intrinsic 

 properties of instinct, the greatest philosophers are wholly 

 unable to define; it is in the realms of the unknowable; 

 however, while they cannot define it, they can approximately 

 define its limits and enumerate some of its extrinsic proper- 

 ties. 



We will now clear some of the rubbish of popular belief 

 from the purposes of instinct. It has been arbitrarily as- 

 sumed that many acts of the dog are instinctively performed 

 for the service of man, the fact that he could be trained to 

 work being considered as conclusive evidence that he was 

 specially created to so work. In his work aforementioned, 

 Darwin says: "Again, as in the case of corporeal structure, 

 and conformably to my theory, the instinct of each species 

 is good for itself, but has never, as far as we can judge, 

 been produced for the exclusive good of others." 



Hence it is apparent that instinct is distinct and separate 

 from experience, and in a measure independent of intelli- 

 gence. Its purposes are for the good of the individual, or 

 the preservation of the species. Instinctive acts do not im- 

 prove by experience. The bird builds its last nest like all 

 preceding ones; bees constantly build their honeycomb in 

 the same shape, etc. On the other hand, all intelligent 

 animals improve their methods by experience; the dog im- 

 proves by experience, therefore the dog is an intelligent 

 animal. 



We will now consider briefly some of the elementary 

 principles of mind. In its primary relations, mind has 



