OBITUARIES, AMERICAN. (SAMPSON.) 



473 



the harbor of Santiago were similarly treated. 

 At this time Sampson informed Shafter that it 

 would not be possible to force an entrance into 

 the harbor until the channel should be cleared of 

 mines, a task impossible until the forts guarding 

 the entrance to the harbor could be captured. A 

 meeting had been arranged between the two com- 

 manders at Siboney for the morning of July 3, 

 and Sampson, having hoisted the signals " Disre- 

 gard the action of the commander-in-chief," was 

 on his way to the conference. This order simply 

 meant that the other vessels of the fleet were not 

 to follow him, and did not signify a yielding of 

 the command. Had that been his intention a sig- 

 nal " Second in command take charge," would 

 have been displayed. His own account of the 

 subsequent movements of the New York is: 

 " Shortly before half-past nine we reached a point 

 between 7 and 8 miles east of the Morro. The 

 men were at quarters, and the customary Sunday- 

 morning inspection was proceeding, when I sud- 

 denly saw from the quarter-deck a puff of white 

 smoke not black smoke, as a good many have 

 said rising above the bluff inside the Morro, as 

 if from the Socapa battery. As I heard no re- 

 port, I was convinced that the shot was not from 

 the eastern battery, which was directly in the line 

 of vision, for that would have made a loud rever- 

 beration. The impression was immediate that 

 Cervera's fleet was coming out. I at once sent 

 to the bridge the order: ' Put the helm aport 

 and turn back immediately,' giving it directly 

 to the officer of the deck, without waiting to send 

 it through the commander, as was the custom. 

 Capt. Chadwick hurried on deck, and, without 

 stopping to consult me, went instantly to the 

 bridge. Before the flag-ship had turned, a Span- 

 ish vessel appeared at the entrance, coming out 

 under full steam. I at once sent for the chief 

 engineer and directed him to light all the furnace 

 fires, which he assured me had already been done 

 by order of the commanding officer. At the- same 

 time I distinctly saw that all the blockading 

 ships, which a moment before had been at Sun- 

 day inspection, were on the move and had opened 

 fire on the enemy." The return was quickly 

 made. Chadwick, who commanded the flag-ship, 

 writes : " We were rapidly coming to the fray. 

 We were close under the batteries, but paid no 

 attention to the shots which came over us. One 

 of the torpedo-boats had now turned, and was 

 evidently heading toward the port. We stood 

 in a little closer to head her off. The farther one 

 at this time got a shot in her boilers from one 

 of our ships, and I shall never forget the wonder- 

 ful, swift jet of silvery steam, like an ostrich- 

 feather, that leaped 500 feet into the air. Know- 

 ing that the Vizcaya and the Colon were still 

 going to the westward, we rushed past the Glou- 

 cester and the destroyers, both of which were 

 now clearly out of action. In a few moments we 

 passed the Maria Teresa and the Oquendo. Both 

 showed lurid masses of flame and smoke from 

 the mainmast aft, and the men were dropping 

 over the bows into the water. But we could 

 not stop with an enemy yet unsurrendered ahead, 

 and quickly coming up with the Indiana, between 

 10 and 11 miles beyond the port, we signaled her 

 to go back and resume the blockade, lest another 

 Spanish ship might come out of the harbor to 

 annoy the transport fleet." With the Brooklyn, 

 Oregon, and Texas, the New York participated 

 in the chase and surrender of the Colon, which 

 brought to an end the long, tedious, and anxious 

 campaign, and the result was announced to the 

 world in Sampson's message to the department as 

 follows : " The fleet under my command offers 



the nation as a Fourth-of-July present the whole 

 of Cervera's fleet." According to Philip: " It was 

 the blockade that made the battle possible. The 

 battle was a direct consequence of the blockade, 

 and upon the method and effectiveness of the 

 blockade was very largely dependent the issue 

 of the battle. It was necessary to have always 

 before the entrance to Santiago harbor a force 

 of ships amply sufficient to cope with the Spanish 

 squadron should it come out to do battle, and it 

 was necessary to have this force so disposed that 

 none of the Spaniards could escape, if that were 

 their object, no matter which direction they 

 should take. Unremitting vigilance by night and 

 by day was an absolute necessity." Says Mahan: 

 " The methods of the Santiago blockade are now 

 commonly understood, but their precise military 

 merit has scarcely been adequately appreciated." 

 It was the genius of Sampson that " compelled 

 the enemy to accept battle on the terms they con- 

 sidered most disadvantageous." Secretary Long 

 is equally emphatic. He writes : " He had been, 

 from the first till after the victory was won, 

 commander-in-chief in command. He was never 

 out of signal distance of his blockading fleet. He 

 was on duty at the eastern end of the fighting 

 line; and had Cervera gone that way, then by 

 that chance he would have been universally ac- 

 claimed the foremost figure. Yet, as it was, the 

 plan of battle was not changed; it was fought 

 under his standing order unbroken. Before its 

 smoke was over he had steamed along the whole 

 battle line, firing as he went. He has been cen- 

 sured for the despatch announcing the victory. 

 He did not write it; but he assumed it, for he 

 never shirked a responsibility which he had per- 

 mitted. If you will read it you will note that 

 the pronoun ' I ' is not in it, and also that it 

 is not unlike Gen. Sherman's announcement of 

 the capture of Savannah. It assumes no credit 

 for Sampson, but gives it to the fleet under his 

 command." It seems to be conceded that Samp- 

 son's campaign has " come to be regarded as es- 

 tablishing a standard of efficiency in the handling 

 of a squadron in war. There is no question 

 among these experts as to who earned the credit 

 for the victory at Santiago, and there never has 

 been. The man who won the victory was the 

 man whose tireless energy during thirty-nine days 

 and nights of the most daring and successful 

 blockade in naval history had kept the fleet in 

 such a state of preparation that victory was as- 

 sured at any hour, day or night, of that long 

 period when the Spaniards cared to take the 

 chances of battle." The omission of the name of 

 Schley, who was second in command, from Samp- 

 son's official report of the battle, led to an effort 

 by the friends of the former officer to claim for 

 him the actual command of the squadron during 

 the fight, and a bitter controversy ensued, which 

 continued for three years, when Schley asked 

 for a court of inquiry, the verdict of which was 

 against that officer. Schley, in a despatch to 

 Secretary Long, sent a week after the battle, 

 wrote: "Feel some mortification that the news- 

 paper accounts of July 6 have attributed vic- 

 tory of July 3 almost wholly to me. Victory 

 was secured by force under commander-in-chief 

 of North Atlantic station, and to him the honor 

 is due." Concerning this controversy, Secretary 

 Long said: "I can think of nothing more cruel 

 than a depreciation of the merits of the faith- 

 ful, devoted, patriotic commander-in-chief, phys- 

 ically frail, worn with sleepless vigilance, weighed 

 with measureless responsibilities and details, let- 

 ting no duty go undone; for weeks, with cease- 

 less precautions blockading the Spanish squad- 





