540 



PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. 



provinces, where Malvar operated alternately, 

 were not scenes of privation or suffering, for the 

 people were better provided for than they ever 

 had been before, and the mortality was less than 

 in the neighboring provinces. When Malvar's 

 sources of supply were cut on" the native volunteers 

 hunted down his rebel bands, one after the other. 

 Their work resulted in the capture or surrender 

 of 3,500 riflemen and hundreds of storehouses filled 

 with ammunition and provisions. On April 15 

 Malvar himself surrendered to Gen. Bell at Lipa. 

 A few days later the last of the ladrones in the 

 island of Negros surrendered and took the oath 

 of allegiance. On April 27 Major, now Brig.-Gen., 

 Frederick D. Grant ascended the Gandara with 

 two gunboats, and received the surrender of Gue- 

 v;uTa, the last of the guerrilla leaders in Samar. 

 This ended the insurrection. 



On May 1 the ports of Batangas and Laguna 

 were reopened for trade, and a few days later the 

 ports of Samar. Ladrones were still at large in 

 parts of the Philippines where there were moun- 

 tains and forests to give them refuge. Sporadic 

 murders of soldiers still reflected the fierce hatred 

 of Americans with which many of the natives had 

 been inspired by the teachings of the revolution- 

 ary leaders or the occasional lawlessness or arro- 

 gance of men of the army. A party of non-com- 

 missioned officers and privates while decorating 

 graves of comrades near Manila were seized by 

 natives, some of whom were policemen, and their 

 limbs were hacked off. 



From the battle of Manila, which occurred on 

 Feb. 4, 1899, down to April 30, 1902, there were 

 2,651 engagements with the enemy, most of them 

 skirmishes, in which small detachments took part 

 or attacks from ambush on the American troops. 

 In many cases the percentage of loss was high, yet 

 in almost no engagement did American troops sur- 

 render or have to retreat or to leave their dead 

 and wounded in the possession of the enemy. The 

 number of troops transported to the Philippines 

 up to the middle of July, 1902, was 4,135 officers 

 and 123,903 men. The average strength of the 

 army in the Philippines was about 40,000. The 

 casualties from the beginning to the end of the in- 

 surrection were 69 officers and 936 enlisted men, 

 killed or died of wounds ; deaths from accident, 6 

 officers and 125 men; drowned, mostly in action 

 or active operations, 6 officers and 257 men; mur- 

 dered, 1 officer and 91 men; died of disease, 47 

 officers and 2,535 men; total deaths, 1-39 officers 

 and 4,016 enlisted men; wounded, 190 officers and 

 2,707 enlisted men; total killed and wounded 

 and deaths other than by disease, 282 officers and 

 4,188 enlisted men. The proportion of killed and 

 wounded to the strength of the army was 9.7 per 

 cent. The total cost of the war was $170,326,586 

 in gold. 



Campaign against the Moros. On March 15 

 two soldiers of an exploring party in Mindanao 

 were approached by Moros under the semblance of 

 friendship, and after the rifle they had between 

 them was snatched away both were stabbed, one 

 of them fatally. The murderers were known, but 

 the Dattos refused to deliver them. The Moros 

 had always been friendly. Mindanao is more 

 healthful than Luzon, probably as rich in natural 

 wealth, and this is entirely undeveloped. Some of 

 the Moros objected to the topographical surveys 

 and exploration of the resources of the island that 

 Gen. Chaffee had ordered. He told them that the 

 Government had a right to explore the country. 

 After the murder he wont to Malanbag and sum- 

 moned to a conference the Dattos, or chiefs, of the 

 tribe to which the murderers belonged. They did 

 not come. He left after sending a letter to the 



Dattos saying that the authority of the United 

 States must be respected and its sovereignty fully 

 acknowledged. An expedition of 1,200 cavalry 

 . and artillery under Col. Frank D. Baldwin was 

 ordered to leave for Lake Lanao on April 27 for 

 the purpose of arresting the murderers and punish- 

 ing the Moros who sheltered them. The American 

 policy in dealing with the Moros lias been to avoid 

 any exercise of authority over the Moros so long 

 as they outwardly acknowledged American sover- 

 eignty. The Spaniards, who had always left the 

 Moros alone and practically independent, attempt- 

 ed two years before the cession of the islands to 

 the United States, when the cessation of the Tag- 

 alog rebellion released their military and naval 

 forces, to subjugate the lake Moros. They built 

 a railroad, placed two gunboats on the lake, and 

 kept fortified posts in the country for some time. 

 Still they were unsuccessful. The loss of the Phil- 

 ippines put an end to their project, which re- 

 quired prolonged exertion and a greater develop- 

 ment of power. The movement was favorable 

 because the tie that formerly united the most for- 

 midable tribes, however loosely, no longer existed. 

 The Mindanao Moros owe no political allegiance 

 to the Sultan of Jolo, although recognizing that 

 island as the source and center of Mohammedan 

 civilization in the Philippines. Formerly there 

 was a Sultan of Mindanao, who had sufficient 

 prestige and authority to unite the tribes against 

 an external foe. Datto Mandi, of Zamboango, 

 who claims to be heir and successor of the former 

 sultans, is chief of the tribe that has fallen most 

 under the peaceful influences of European civiliza- 

 tion. His hereditary right to exercise any au- 

 thority over the powerful Datto Piang and the 

 warlike and fanatical tribes of the Dattos Ali and 

 Utto is rejected with scorn. The Moros therefore 

 relapsed into jealous and mutually hostile tribes. 

 They speak four different languages, and there is 

 little intercourse except among neighboring tribes, 

 and these are often at War with each other. Those 

 about Lake Lanao cultivate the land well with 

 their slaves and are numerous and rich. Since 

 the Spaniards attempted to establish their power 

 over them they have accumulated arms and 

 strengthened their fortifications. Every house is 

 fortified, and they make pitfalls and entangle- 

 ments in the roads and have strong central forts of 

 masonry, with their native bronze cannon, called 

 lantakas, swung in embrasures on pivots or hang- 

 ing from beams. All Moros are armed with the 

 curved kris of highly tempered steel, which come* 

 from Borneo. They are noted as cunning, swift, 

 agile, and muscular fighters, and their Mohamme- 

 dan fatalism and fanaticism makes them more 

 daring, desperate, and ferocious than Christian 

 Malays. The picked men swear to their Dattos 

 to conquer or die in battle. Recently they had 

 obtained rifles from unknown sources. The au- 

 thorities at Washington were inclined to counter- 

 mand Gen. Chaffee's order for a punitive expedi- 

 tion, fearing that it would lead to a war with the 

 400,000 Moros of Mindanao, united and iiilhimed 

 by religious zeal against Christians. When as- 

 sured by Gov. Taft that there was no danger of 

 their uniting and by Gen. Chaffee that the |;ULM 

 majority of the tribes would remain as friendly ;i~ 

 ever, some in the neighborhood of the scene of 

 action, but that if American military power were 

 not demonstrated to those who now challenged 

 it no garrison could be kept on the island without 

 fighting, the Secretary of War authori/ed the 

 projected movement to be carried out provided a 

 peaceful solution could not be reached by parleys, 

 but operations were ordered to be restricted as far 

 as possible to the objects the expedition was sent 



