SOUTH AFRICA. 



631 



destroyed. The raiders in the midland districts 

 of Cape Colony were driven out once again by 

 Gen. French's columns. Mobile columns were sent 

 out next after De Wet. On Feb. 3 Col. Garratt 

 captured a convoy with 2 of the guns that De 

 Wet had taken from a British column on Dec. 24. 

 The extension of the blockhouse lines brought the 

 British nearer to the Boers and greatly improved 

 the mobility of their columns. Almost every day 

 a Boer laager or convoy was taken, with cattle 

 and wagons, and a dozen or more prisoners re- 

 duced the fighting strength. The captures al- 

 ready amounted to more than the estimated 

 strength of the whole Boer army. The result of 

 the drive against De Wet was a Boer loss of 283 

 men killed, wounded, and prisoners, 1,700 horses, 

 and 5,000 cattle. De Wet himself narrowly es- 

 caped capture. There were about 1,200 Boers 

 with the leader north of Heilbron, and Lord Kitch- 

 ener stretched out 10,000 troops to encompass 

 them. De Wet divided his command into 3 main 

 and many small parties, offering every man the 

 opportunity to surrender to the British who was 

 unwilling to fight to the end. Two of the larger 

 bodies and several small ones broke through the 

 girdle of British troops in the night of Feb. 6, and 

 on the following night De Wet's own party broke 

 the wire fencing by driving cattle against it, but 

 only half got through. The Boers captured Brit- 

 ish detachments from Gen. Bruce Hamilton's 

 force, which had been weakened to increase the 

 forces that attempted to corner De Wet, and from 

 the bodies operating in the northwestern Trans- 

 vaal. 



On Feb. 16 was begun another great drive with 

 the object of capturing De Wet and Steyn, who 

 were not aware of the movement until the col- 

 umns were extended and advanced to push them 

 upon the blockhouse line from Vrede to Botha's 

 pass. In the night of Feb. 19 a commando of 

 Transvaalers that had inflicted severe losses on a 

 detachment of mounted infantry a week before 

 rushed their cattle upon the wire fence and passed 

 through the blockhouse line without loss. In the 

 night of Feb. 24 De Wet and Steyn broke through 

 the cordon of troops at Botha's pass, though not 

 without a heavy loss inflicted by the New Zea- 

 landers, who likewise had 60 killed and wounded. 

 The Boers drove a herd of 6,000 oxen ahead of 

 them against the position of the New Zealanders, 

 but these kept up so sharp a fire that the onset 

 was checked, and beasts and men were piled up 

 as a rampart. The new tactics of stampeding 

 their own cattle to break the British lines or ob- 

 structions lost for the Boers the services of many 

 of their native ox-drivers. A third body fought 

 its way through the cordon, and on Feb. 27 the 

 Commando of Jan Meyer surrendered. The total 

 Boer losses were 800 men, with 2,000 horses, great 

 numbers of sheep, wagons, and 23,000 cattle. 

 There were 750 Boers Avho gave themselves up 

 when cornered. A third great drive in March re- 

 sulted in the capture of much baggage, the dis- 

 covery of a Boer arsenal in a cave, and some 50 

 surrenders, but the Boers in parties of 200 or more 

 passed through the gaps in the cordon and De Wet 

 broke through the blockhouse line, passed between 

 blockhouses on the railroad unobserved, and 

 joined Commandant Pariis, who had long defied 

 the British in the vicinity of Potchefstroom, and 

 afterward President Steyn joined Delarey's forces 

 in the Transvaal. 



The Boers were able to move about freely in 

 small parties and to concentrate by appointment 

 or on command even in the districts cleared by 

 the British troops. They could not, however, feed 

 themselves long without returning to their base 



of supplies, and they were obliged to be vigilant 

 Gen. de Wet issued orders that any burgher 

 found sleeping in a house should be fined or 

 flogged with the sjambok. The commandos never 

 slept on the same spot two nights in succession, 

 thus making it difficult for the British to carry 

 out successful night raids. De Wet and Delarey 

 had their scouts so well posted that if a British 

 column or convoy moved from any post every 

 commando within 70 miles knew it before night 

 and could prepare for a combined attack or van- 

 ish out of the district. The British could obtain 

 intelligence from the natives by paying for it, but 

 native spies and guides were not trustworthy at 

 times. When the surrendered burghers became 

 sick enough of the war that kept them from their 

 farms and families and the Boers weak enough 

 and they themselves numerous and bold enough 

 not to fear the sjambok, they acted as guides and 

 latterly fought in the British ranks, besides form- 

 ing the bodies of burgher scouts, whose principal 

 service was to go among the wavering commandos 

 and persuade them to surrender also. The sjam- 

 bok was frequently used by commandants to bring 

 wavering Boers back into the line, and it was the 

 disgrace more than the pain of the punishment 

 that was effective. 



Members of the Boer commandos entered Jo- 

 hannesburg, Krugersdorp, and Pretoria frequently 

 and learned all that the civil population could tell 

 of the military conditions and plans of the Brit- 

 ish. The British general who let a body of 300 

 Boers pass because they wore khaki raised a com- 

 plaint against this breach of the customs of war. 

 Many of the Boer commandos were supplied with 

 khaki uniforms, which they had taken from pris- 

 oners or captured convoys. They wore them as 

 lounging clothes, but in action they wore at least 

 their distinctive Boer hats. Most of the Boers 

 were clad in home-made leather garments. 



The English, if they failed to encompass the 

 Boers, nevertheless reduced the area of Boer occu- 

 pation by clearing the country swept by their col- 

 umns. On the night of Feb. 24 a large force of 

 Boers in the western Transvaal suddenly attacked 

 Col. von Donop's convoy near Klerksdorp, stam- 

 peded the mules, and received the surrender of 

 Lieut.-Col. Anderson and 475 of his yeomanry 

 and volunteers. The absolute losses of the British 

 were still as heavy as those of the Boers. The 

 captured British did not affect their fighting 

 strength appreciably and were invariably set free 

 by their captors. The men and rifles captured 

 from the Boers reduced their numbers materially. 

 On March 7 Lord Methuen, who, with 1,200 men 

 and 5 guns, was marching from Vryburg to join 

 Gen. Grenfell south of Lichtenburg, was attacked 

 at Tweebosch by the commandos of Delarey and 

 Kemp, which surrounded the rear-guard and de- 

 livered so sudden and accurate a fire that the 

 yeomanry fled in a panic, mingled with the stam- 

 peded mules. The infantry attempted to make 

 a defense until the Boers completely surrounded 

 them and Lord Methuen was incapacitated by a 

 wound. 



This was the last important success of the Boers. 

 Delarey released Lord Methuen and the surren- 

 dered troops. The Orange River Colony was al- 

 ready made untenable for any large body of Boers. 

 Lord Kitchener began vigorous operations against 

 Delarey. On March 23 Col. Kekevich recaptured 

 the guns taken from Lord Methuen's column. It 

 was a big drive, like those that had been carried 

 oift against De Wet, and was not more successful 

 in the capture of Boers in the enclosed area, al- 

 though 8 columns took part and some of the light- 

 ly equipped mounted troops marched 80 miles in 



