2 



But I had no choice in my beginning, nor in my construction, 

 nor in my birth, nor in my endowments. All were without 

 even my concurrence. I did not make or place the object which 

 first evoked my consciousness, nor am I the author of those 

 which by continual operation increase my knowledge and 

 augment my power. 



For my being I am immediately indebted to my parents, but 

 not to their direct and immediate volition. For, when we com- 

 pare human and brute procreation, we find a lack of uniformity 

 in the former, which shows that a superior authority to our 

 immediate parentage must be the source of life. All others 

 have come into being in the same manner as ourselves ; hence 

 our relations to others and theirs to us are independent of our 

 own will, we have all been without the possibility of choice, 

 and, therefore, are plainly under the direction and at the dis- 

 posal of some superhuman authority, possessed of power to 

 fulfil his own purposes. 



Here is a chain of accountability. First, to the author of our 

 nature and the giver of our life. When a man constructs a 

 machine, he has a right to its use and to dispose of it as he 

 pleases. He also is presumed to have had some definite purpose 

 in its construction, and the right, therefore, to employ it for this 

 purpose, and to forbid its use in any way which will spoil or 

 deteriorate it. And this right is considered sacred and in- 

 defeasible, in proportion to the excellence and value of the in- 

 strument constructed. How, then, can bounds be set to the right 

 of the author of a nature like ours, with all its wealth of intellect, 

 emotion, and will, which he has placed in conditions calculated 

 to call forth every power to its full strength, to use, or to require 

 its use, according to his own purpose ? 



But here we see the special distinction of humanity. We 

 have a body, a wonderful and exquisite machine, by which we 

 receive instruction and various other benefits from the material 

 universe, and by which we can act upon it, for good or evil, 

 but we ourselves are more than, and different from, a machine, 

 however perfect. We are not instruments, as our body is, but 

 agents. That is, we can see the nature of any and every act, 

 the consequences which follow from it to ourselves and others, 

 and the reasons why we should do it or leave it undone. And 

 we are further able to determine, of and from ourselves, whether 

 we will act in harmony with our nature and relations or not. 

 We are, therefore, as much bound to answer to our great Author 

 for the proper use of the personal and relative endowments 

 committed to our trust as the driver of a locomotive is for the 

 use of the engine put into his hands. 



But our responsibility to the Author of our nature is not 



