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primary and inseparable quality of the nature itself. And 

 this receives confirmation from the fact that no other impulse 

 is capable of developing the moral, which is the highest side 

 of our nature, into heroic virtue, or of adorning the life with 

 all that is true, honourable, just, pure, lovely, and of good 

 report. One in whom this excellence is found more nearly 

 approaches the ideal of perfect manhood than any other. 

 Consequently, the power by whose operation this state is pro- 

 duced, is most peculiarly and intensely human. But that 

 power is a profound sense of responsibility in intense and 

 continued operation. 



If we look at the contrast, that is, at a man who has no 

 sense of responsibility, having suppressed every call to duty 

 and all remembrance of benefits from others, and who now 

 lives as though he were perfectly independent, we see one 

 without a motive to virtue, and who can only act in mere 

 concert with others from some individual and temporary 

 interest of selfishness. A family, a city, a nation of such 

 isolated units is impossible ; and yet the family, the city, the 

 nation, are integral and necessary parts of complete humanity. 

 Union in purpose and work is impossible among individuals 

 who have no sense of responsibility ; but without such united 

 purpose and action no cultivation of the mind, no improve- 

 ment in outward conditions, no perpetuation of the race, and 

 no life, but in the lowest barbarism and privation, is 

 possible. Such a state of things is not the intended, as it is 

 not the actual, condition of humanity, but it is the necessary 

 consequence of the existence of beings with our endowments 

 without responsibility. Had such been created, it would have 

 been impossible to awaken a sense of responsibility after- 

 wards ; and, had it been possible, who possessed the right to 

 interfere with the Creator's work, and who could possibly have 

 the inclination to impart such a gift to man ? Thus, by the 

 necessity of nature, we are driven to the conclusion that man 

 is liable to answer to his Maker for every endowment which 

 has been committed to his trust. 



In discussing the question of Human Responsibility, we 

 are bound to give all possible attention to the declarations of 

 the divine will, and to all divine acts which have relation to 

 this side of our nature. And this obligation arises from the 

 fact that none can know the nature so well as its Author, and 

 that He can have no purpose towards it but its improvement 

 to the highest limits. Taking this as our rule of procedure 

 and judgment, we cannot fail to see that, from the beginning, 

 there has been a continual effort to awaken and perpetuate 



