34 



ing His modes of operation in cases which supply no other data from which 

 to start our cogitations." This is a point that has always struck me as being 

 one of very great force. In the physical world we see a marvellous 

 adaptability of means to ends. In whatever department of physical science 

 we pursue our studies we find this remarkable evidence of purpose and 

 design. And yet there are those who tell us that all the higher strivings 

 of our nature which lead us to devotion to God, which bring forth 

 prayer and a sense of dependence, and which lie at the bottom of all 

 religion, are produced in us without an object that the mere physical 

 faculties have a distinct and definite purpose, but that those which are 

 highest of all have been brought into existence for no reason whatever. It 

 seems to me that nothing can be more self-condemnatory than a notion such 

 as this, that all that is worthiest and best in human nature was given to us 

 without a purpose, but that all the lowest, the meanest, and the most com- 

 monplace of our faculties have been bestowed upon us for special and definite 

 objects. I agree, however, with a remark I heard made the other day at a 

 meeting at Cambridge by the Eight Hon. W. E. Forster, who said he 

 always felt when he got up to speak as if he were in the House of Commons, 

 and that, whether he had an antagonist or not, he was obliged to think he 

 had one. Like Mr. Forster, I also fancy that I can get on best when I 

 have an antagonist ; but in the present instance I cannot term Mr. 

 Blencowe an antagonist, because he is in perfect sympathy with myself, 

 and, this being so, the best thing I can do is to finish what I have to say, 

 and resume my seat. (Applause.) 



Mr. W. P. JAMES, F.L.S. I have much the same feeling with regard to 

 this paper as has been expressed by Mr. Lias, namely, that I agree so entirely 

 with it that it is scarcely possible to say anything in regard to it that is not 

 in the shape of praise. I quite concur in the statement that it would be 

 peculiarly ungracious to enter upon a minute criticism of this paper, 

 especially as the author is not present. I think it a most interesting one, 

 and that some parts of it are extremely well put. If anything is open to 

 criticism it is the title, which hardly does it justice. It is rather a branch 

 of the theistic argument in general than a mere discourse on human 

 responsibility. It seems to me to take a much wider field than that indicated 

 by the title, and to deal with the proof of theism from the point of view of 

 man's responsibility to the Creator, at the same time introducing the subject 

 of creation in general. Some of the earlier parts of the paper I consider 

 exceedingly well presented, especially in reference to the various arrange- 

 ments in nature, from which we must infer a Creator. I may, 

 perhaps, say that among those things from which we generally deduce 

 the argument from design, I myself stumbled on one, which I have not 

 yet seen in print, but which I have several times adduced in arguments I 

 have had with Secularists and Atheists. On one occasion I offered to stake 

 the argument from design upon it, but the challenge was not replied to 

 The point is this that when we consider what we see in the world aroun 

 us, there is scarcely any single thing which furnishes so strong an argum en 



