principle, and it is manifestly a dictate of common sense. A 

 recent writer contends that Mr. Spencer's " metaphysical 

 principles are empirical."* By this he can only mean that 

 because Mr. Spencer shows that the Logical Laws are the slow 

 growth in us, through unnumbered organisms, of much humbler 

 elements of Mind, therefore they have been acquired by and 

 are the result of the experience of those organisms. In my 

 judgment such an argument is neither sound nor just, and it 

 admits of a most effective rejoinder. Mr. Spencer may reply 

 that, so far from deriving those Logical Laws from experience, 

 he is, on the contrary, showing that they are the simple out- 

 growth of the one a priori principle which runs throughout 

 the universe; he is showing that their 'roots stretch far away 

 down, deeper than all things ; he is assigning them an anti- 

 quity compared with which the date the Professor affixes 

 makes them but of mushroom growth, and is giving them an 

 authority which makes his a priori canon nothing more than 

 their humble vassal. 



So much Mr. Spencer might say on the ground of his 

 synthetic system alone. But when in addition, in his analytic 

 system, he expressly sets aside all possible rivals of the simple 

 deliverances of consciousness, and proclaims his adhesion to 

 consciousness alone, then it seems to me only fair and just to 

 accept his disclaimer, and to regard his system as an honest 

 attempt to found only on consciousness. The a priori is his 

 structural element ; his metaphysics are not empirical. 



We have now to examine his Theory of the Will. He denies 

 to the Will all moral freedom, taking up the position of the 

 Philosophical necessarian. Now, if Consciousness could be 

 clearly shown to assert that we have a sense of moral Liberty, 

 Mr. Spencer could be proved to contradict Consciousness on 

 this point. No doubt some of the greatest Philosophers, 

 including Kant, Jacobi, Hamilton, contend that Consciousness 

 does give us this sense of Freedom, and they attach to it the 

 greatest possible importance. But others as strenuously deny 

 it, and there is no more vexed question in all Philosophy. Leav- 

 ing this, then, for the present at least, let us look at Mr. 

 Spencer's reasoning on the matter. 



Now, if Consciousness really asserts that we are morally 

 free, there must be some break in Mr. Spencer's logical 

 chain, since he asserts the exact contradictory. If, then, on 

 examination we find such a break, it will so far be an evidence 

 that Consciousness does make the assertion, and we shall then 



Professor Fairbairn, Contemporary Bevieiv for July. 



