3 



be in a position, when Mr. Spencer's arguments are swept out 

 of the way, to look carefully and dispassionately at the whole 

 matter. We shall find, I think, that here Mr. Spencer is 

 singularly weak so weak, indeed, that what he says scarcely 

 deserves the name of reasoning. 



Let us, then, examine his theory. 



Mr. Spencer's Theory of the Will is one of the most original 

 and remarkable parts of his Philosophy. It will be remem- 

 bered that he makes what is subjectively Mind to be, in its 

 objective aspect, currents or motions of nervous molecules. 

 He makes what we call Will, or an act of volition, to be the 

 commingling, in one definite stream of force, of a number of 

 those nerve currents, which, in a previous state of indecision, 

 were colliding one against another. It is like many rivers 

 debouching into a lake; they come rushing pell-mell; and 

 this confusion in the currents represents, in its subjective 

 aspect, the time of uncertainty ; until, at length, one adverse 

 stream has neutralised another, the lake becomes calm, and 

 the one unobstructed current flows on ; which current is the 

 resultant of all the streams that there met. Thus it will be 

 seen that Mr. Spencer's theory utterly denies the existence of 

 any determining element in the Will itself; it makes the whole 

 process to be merely mechanical, nothing more than the mix- 

 ture of nerve molecules. Or to take another illustration of 

 his theory from a contested county election. There are various 

 polling places, where votes of various numbers are recorded- 

 and these votes represent the different motives with their 

 exact quota of weight but the result is arithmetically deducible 

 from the completed polling-books, and the delay in learning 

 which candidate is returned arises, not from any contingency 

 or uncertainty, but simply because time is required to arrive 

 at the totals. 



That such is Mr. Spencer's theory will be apparent from 

 the following passages. He is describing what he calls Will, 

 and he says : 



" On passing from compound reflex actions to those actions so highly com- 

 pounded as to be imperfectly reflex on passing from the organically-deter- 

 mined psychical changes, which take place with extreme rapidity, to the 

 psychical changes which, not being organically-determined, take place with 

 some deliberation, and therefore consciously ; we pass to a kind of mental 

 action, which is one of Memory, Reason, Feeling, or Will, according to the 

 side of it we look at." * 



* Principles of Psychology, vol. i. p. 495 (2nd Edition, from which all 

 quotations are made). 



B 2 



