6 



To reduce the general question to its simplest form : Psychical changes 

 either conform to law or they do not. If they do not conform to law, this 

 work, in common with all works on the subject, is sheer nonsense ; no 

 science of Psychology is possible. If they do conform to law, there cannot 

 be any such thing as free-will.* 



If now we carefully take to pieces this tissue of elaborate 

 argument, we shall find, I think, that there is hardly one 

 sentence in it which does not contain either a glaring mis- 

 statement, a palpable fallacy, or a clear petitio principii. Let 

 us take the sentences in order. 



1. In sentences two and three he says that "the real pro- 

 position involved in the dogma of free-will " is " that every 

 one is at liberty to desire or not to desire." Now as to 

 whether this is a just statement of the problem, we will call 

 two witnesses of unimpeachable character Kant and Hamil- 

 ton. Kant says "we only mean by liberty that negative 

 property of our thinking frame not to be determined to act 

 by physical excitements. "f Still more clearly he says, "The 

 instincts of man's physical nature give birth to obstacles 

 which hinder and impede him in the execution of his duty. 

 They are, in fact, mighty opposing forces which he has to go 

 forth and encounter." J Again he speaks of "the force reason 

 has to vanquish and beat down all the appetites which oppose 

 the execution of the law." Clearly then Kant allows that 

 we must desire, but says we have power to rein in our desires. 

 Hamilton is just as clear. He speaks of man's liberty as 

 ' ' capable of carrying that Law " of Duty " into effect, in op- 

 position to the solicitations, the impulsions of his material 

 nature." || A few lines lower he speaks of Liberty as a power 

 " capable of resisting and conquering the counter action of our 

 animal nature." || Thus Kant and Hamilton admit that we 

 are compelled to desire, but they assert that our free will can 

 restrain desire. Mr. Spencer must therefore stand convicted, 

 either of being ignorant of what they held, or else of a de- 

 liberate misrepresentation of the question at issue. On either 

 supposition he stands convicted of glaring misrepresentation. 



2. In the next sentence sentence four there is a fallacy. 

 Let it be remembered that Mr. Spencer has to prove that the 

 will is not free, and he is now advancing arguments which are 

 supposed to prove it. This is his argument. "From the 

 universal law that, other things equal, the cohesion of 

 psychical states is proportionate to the frequency with which 



* Principles of Psychology, vol. i. pp. 500, 503. 



tKant, Metaphysic of Ethics, Calderwood's Ed., p. 174. J Ibid. p. 194. 



Ibid. p. 198. || Hamilton, Lectures on Metaphysics, vol. i. 4th Ed. ; p. 29. 



